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Vietnam’s policy was to shift the fishing pressure from onshore to offshore water since the 
coastal resource has been overexploited, and a program of investing offshore vessels has 
thus implemented since 1997. The question raised is whether the offshore fishing fleet is 
profitable and efficient or not? This study aims to evaluating economic performance and 
efficiency of the offshore fleet in Vietnam – the case of the Nha Trang gillnet fishery in 
open access condition, based on a costs and earning survey carried out on the 58 offshore 
vessels. The empirical results indicate that an average gillnet vessel earns a gross margin 
profit of 17.3% and a profit margin of 3.8%, but makes an economic loss, including the 
government fuel cost support. The average annual crew income is 74.5% more than the 
local average income per capita. Efficiency analysis of the vessels basing on an application 
of the Salter-diagram shows that the large number of vessels with high relative 
standardized effort (above one) is the most cost efficient vessels in both short- and long-
run perspectives. The majority of them get intra-marginal rents. The government fuel 
subsidies help to increase 17.5% for gross cash flow and 36% for profit in an average 
vessel. The small-scale vessels receive the most benefits from these subsidies. The study 
also demonstrates that engine capacity, fishing gear and fishing day are the factors best 
reflecting fishing effort of the vessels.  
 
 
Key words: gillnet fishery, economic performance, economic efficiency, cost efficiency, 












1.1. GENERAL INFORMATION 
 “Vietnam has a coastline of about 3,260 km and its exclusive economic zone (EEZ)1 extends 
over more than one million square kilometers” (FAO, 2005a, p.34). Its coast has many bays 
and estuaries as well as diversity of coastal and marine resources (FAO, 2005a, p.34) and the 
EEZ of Vietnam contain abundant multi-species of fishery (Pho Hoang Han, 2007). In 
Vietnam’s marine waters there were about 3.1 million tones of the entire standing stock of 
marine fish with more than 2000 fish species and around 1.4 million tones of the sustainable 
potential yield (FAO,2004, p.33-34). These have created a good potential for development of 
marine capture fisheries as well as marine aquaculture in Vietnam. Therefore, in recent years, 
Vietnam’s fisheries sector, including marine capture fisheries, has become an important 
sector in the national economy (FAO, 2004, 2005a), with its contribution for GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) of 4% in 2006 (Pomeroy et al., 2009; FAO, 2009b; Lewis, 2005) and 
5.44% in 2008 (ARGOINFO, 2009). According to FAO statistics, Vietnam’s fisheries have 
achieved a high position in the world fisheries community, ranking 13th in capture production, 
3th in animal aquaculture and 8th in export value in 2006 (FAO, 2008). 
However, Vietnam’s marine fishing fisheries are referred to as small scale, multi-species, 
multi-gear and open access (FAO, 2009a). Marine fisheries production has continuously 
increased over time (GSO, 2008) and the number of fishing vessels has increased 
significantly and gone far beyond the control (FAO, 2005a). Coastal fishing capacity has 
exceeded the sustainable limit (FAO, 2004 and 2005a). Coastal resources have thus been 
overexploited, and are in decreasing level. Therefore, Vietnamese government has run its 
offshore fishing program to reduce the fishing pressure on onshore waters (FAO, 2004 and 
2005a). 
Khanh Hoa is a coastal province in Southern Central Vietnam, and its sea area belongs to the 
Southern China Sea region. It is located along the coastal zone with total land area of more 
1 United Nations defined EEZ showed in Articles 55-75, Part V: exclusive economic zone in the Law of the Sea 
Convention, p43-53 (See LOS Convention). Vietnamese Government stated that EEZ of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam is adjacent to the Vietnamese territorial seas and forms with it a 200 nautical-mile zone from the 
baseline used to measure the breadth of Vietnam’s territorial sea (See [1]). 
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than 5200 square kilometers and the coastal line of 520 kilometers. This coastline is made up 
of territorial waters and more than 200 islands (Kim Anh et al., 2006; Kim Anh et al., 2007; 
Long et al, 2008). Khanh Hoa’s marine resources are considered to be abundant and 
diversified. According to report of IEFP and RIMF (2005), Khanh Hoa sea area has about 
600 fish species, of which there are 50 species with high economic value. The amount of 
pelagic fish species occupies a high rate, estimated amount of 115,800 tonnes. The habitat of 
these species was concentrative in coastal sea areas and the maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY) is estimated about 38,000 tonnes per year. In addition to all these advantages, there 
are also many other various marine resources in Khanh Hoa sea areas (IEFP and RIMF, 
2005). For these preferential natural conditions, Khanh Hoa has had a long tradition of 
development for marine capture fisheries (Kim Anh et al., 2006; Kim Anh et al., 2007). 
Nha Trang is the center city of Khanh Hoa province. It occupies an area of 251 km2. This city 
is not only an attractive destination for tourism, but also a potential area for further 
development of fisheries (Kim Anh et al., 2006, Thanh Thuy et al., 2008). The fisheries 
sector is the driver of growth, responsible for 42% of the city’s GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product) (Kim Anh et al., 2006). Khanh Hoa’s capture fishery in general and Nha Trang’s 
capture fishery in particular are, in general, largely small-scale fisheries. From statistics of 
DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2009), the capture sector in Nha Trang city strongly represents 
for Khanh Hoa’s capture sector, and most offshore fishing fleet is considered to concentrate 
in this city. 
Marine capture production of Khanh Hoa has fluctuated over time (Khanh Hoa’s DARD, 
2009a). The number of vessels and engine capacity has increased in recent years, especially a 
dramatic increase in 2008 and 2009 with a program of the 2008 fuel cost support2 of 
Vietnamese government. Catch per vessel and catch per unit of engine power have almost 
decreased over time (Khanh Hoa’s DARD, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; DECAFIREP of Khanh 
Hoa, 2009). Khanh Hoa’s marine fisheries resources were considered to be declining 
remarkably over time (Long and Anrooy, 2004). Therefore, the necessity of sustainable 
fisheries development and the urgent need for the establishment of reasonable policies are of 
great important issues. 
2 See Decision 289/QD-TTg and Decision 965/QD-TTg, 2008 
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1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
As mentioned above, as coastal resources of Vietnam in general and Khanh Hoa in specific 
have been overexploited and are in decline, and a program of investing offshore vessels has 
thus implemented. However, the question raised here is whether this program has been 
efficient and the offshore fleet is profitable or not? The Vietnamese government, therefore, 
has emphasized the need to develop the offshore fleet, and to be done with great caution to 
avoid the development of an economically unsustainable fleet (FAO, 2005a). In 2005, 
Ministry of fisheries of Vietnam proposed two new major development goals of offshore 
fisheries management and development in Vietnam which are, (1) “to ensure sustainable and 
efficient offshore fisheries, while maintaining both marine ecosystem functions and 
harmonious relationships with coastal fisheries and contributing to the protection of the 
sovereignty of the territorial waters and the national security of Viet Nam”; (2) “to enhance 
income, create new occupations and improve the living standards of fishing communities that 
depend on offshore fisheries” (FAO, 2005a). In order to assess whether these two 
development goals are being achieved, monitoring and reporting the annual performance 
indicators were mentioned in Conference on the National strategy for marine fisheries 
management and development in Vietnam (FAO, 2005a). These indicators are referred as 
measures for making policies of marine resource management in Vietnam. In addition, Kim 
Anh et al. (2006) stated that “Vietnam’s marine fisheries are in need of knowledge-based 
management”. This implies that the Vietnamese policy-makers necessitate not only reliable 
assessments of offshore resources, but also an understanding of the economic realities of 
offshore fishing (FAO, 2005a; Long et al., 2008).  
Based on above considerations, a study on economic performance and efficiency of the 
offshore fishing vessels is necessarily carried out, and following questions should be come up 
with, such as, “What are economic performance indicators of offshore fishing vessels?”, 
“What is the income of crew members?”, “Which vessels are more or less economic 
efficiency than others?”, And “How does a government support like the fuel cost support 
affect annual earnings and costs of the fishing vessels?”. At the industry level, fisheries 
managers may use the information to correct, design and implement policy instruments in 
order to obtain partly the above two important goals of offshore fisheries management in 
report of FAO (2005a). At the vessel level, fishermen may use this information to determine 
their real fishing effort for improving their economic efficiency in fishing.       
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In scope of Nha Trang city and Khanh Hoa, several researches on costs and earnings surveys 
for tuna-mackerel offshore gillnet fishery have been done in Kim Anh et al. (2006), 
researches on offshore longline fishery in Kim Anh et al. (2007) and Long et al. (2008). 
However, the studies on costs and earnings surveys are needed to be performed continuously 
since log-books of boat owners have not been implemented yet. Hence, this study will 
address economic performance indicators and economic efficiency of Nha Trang’s gillnetting 
vessels in the season of 2008 through a costs and earnings survey. The offshore gillnet fleet is 
targeted to be chosen for this research. The reasons are that 1) gill net is one of the main 
Vietnamese gear types for offshore fisheries; 2) gill net is the type of gear that have high 
selectivity and less potential to do damage to the sea floor (King, 1995). The catching ability 
of this passive gear relies on the migration or movement of fish through the area where the 
nets are set; and it usually has a mesh size designed to catch fish of a specific size range, and 
does not gill very small and very large fish (King, 1995). As a possible result, the 
overexploited marine resources can be recovered quickly; 3) project suggestion for research 
cooperation between Nha Trang University and the Norwegian College of Fishery Science 
[2]. Finally, this study is done only for the offshore gillnet fleet in Nha Trang city of Khanh 
Hoa province in a limited time budget. Additionally, the majority of previous researches had 
answered the first two questions above in the case of Khanh Hoa. Therefore, the hope of this 
study is to venture into the last two questions above, on vessel efficiency and the fuel cost 
support effects.      
 
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This thesis will address four main objectives. The first is to determine a set of economic 
performance indicators of the offshore gillnet vessels in Nha Trang, based on a costs and 
earnings survey for this fleet. The second is to find out which vessel group gets intra-
marginal rents. The third is to find out which gillnet vessels are of economic efficiency. And 
the final objective is to determine how the government 2008 fuel cost support impacts on 
profitability of the offshore gillnet vessels in Nha Trang. In addition to the main objectives, 
this study’s aim is also to contribute to the development of methods of measuring 
standardized fishing effort for the fishing vessels. 
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Chapter 2 
OVERVIEW OF MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES OF 
KHANH HOA AND VIETNAM 
 
2.1. VIETNAM’S MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES 
Marine capture production 
From 1995 to 2008, the total production from capture fisheries of Vietnam has increased 
approximately twice up to nearly 2.14 million tonnes in 2008 (Figure 2.1 and appendix B in 
details), accounted for about three-quarter of total fisheries production in 1995, and around a 
half of that in 2008 (GSO, 2008).  Vietnam’s marine capture fisheries production has tended 
to increase gradually during this period of time. The marine catch amounted from 0.99 
million tones in 1995 to 1.95 million tones in 2008 (GSO, 2008). It is a fact that the 
proportion of the marine catch was always high and increasing in total capture production, 
and reached more than 91% of total quantity of capture in 2008, and of which marine fish 















































Total fisheries production Capture Marine capture Marine fish capture
 
Figure 2.1: Fisheries production during 1995- 2008 in Vietnam. Source: General Statistic 
Office (GSO), 2008. Note: Fisheries quantity in 2008 is estimated preliminarily by GSO 
(See appendix B in detail).  
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Marine fishing fleet 
The number of marine capture vessels and engine capacity increased rapidly over time in 
Vietnam (FAO, 2005a). In 1985, the total motorized fishing vessels were 29,000 with a total 
of 456,796 horsepower (HP) (FAO, 2004, p.5), while in 2006 these indicators were reported 
around 95,000 units with total horsepower of 5,735,000 (Pomeroy et al., 2009). According to 
a report of FAO (2005a, p.4), the total engine power of marine fishing fleet has increased 
about 12% per annum in the earliest years of this century. About 84% of marine fishing 
vessels have an engine size of less than 90 HP. The fishing grounds of these vessels focused 
mainly on coastal sea areas3 (FAO 2005a, p.4; Pomeroy et al., 2009).  
By the end of 2008, in 53,287 of the total marine fishing boats with engine of over 20 HP 
classified by group of capacity, there were more than 70% of vessels with engine of less than 
90 HP (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: The distribution of vessels with engine of over 20 HP in Vietnam, 2008 
Engine capacity Number of vessels Rate (%) 
20 – < 50 hp 
50 - < 90 hp 







Total 53,287 100.00 
Source: NADAREP 4 (2008) in Country Report: S.R. Vietnam (2009), West Pacific East 
Asia Oceanic Fisheries Management Project (See WPEAOFMP, 2009). 
3 Before November 2006, Coastal sea area was defined as inside areas of the waters of less than 30-m deep 
line from the shore onward for the Tonkin Gulf waters, East and Southwest waters and Thailand Bay, and by 
under 50-m deep line from the shore for Central coastal (See Circular no. 05/1998/TT-BTS on December 29, 
1998 by the Ministry of Fisheries). On October 27, 2006, Decree no. 123/2006/ND-CP of Prime Minister of 
Vietnam defined that “Coastal sea areas, which are measured from the coast (the lowest tide line) to the line 
connecting points of 24 nautical miles from the coast”. 
4 Before 2008, NADAREP (National Directorate of Aquatic Resources Exploitation and Protection) under 
former MOFI (Ministry of Fisheries). Currently, DECAFIREP (Department of Capture Fisheries and 
Resources Protection) under MARD (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development). (See WPEAOFMP, 
2009). 
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The Structure of offshore fishing fleet 5: 
 In 2000, there were 5,896 vessels operating offshore (FAO, 2005a, p.35). This fleet has 
reached 6,675 units (a growth of 6% per year) with total engine power of about 1 million 
horsepower (HP) in 2002 (FAO, 2005a, p.37). According to statistic report of DECAFIREP 
(2009), until September, 2009, there were about 16,080 offshore fishing vessels. This figure 
was 2.7 times and 2.4 times higher than that in 2000 and 2002, respectively. The structure of 
the offshore fleet by fishing gear is presented in Table 2.2. The four most important fisheries 
consisted of trawl, purse seine, gillnet and long line fishery. At present, these fisheries are 
still fundamental components constituting the offshore fishing fleet in Vietnam 
(DECAFIREP, 2009)   
Most offshore fishing vessels are constructed by wood and about 88.7% of this fleet is 
equipped with second-hand engine. The majority of them is equipped with oil and fresh water 
tanks that are too small for long trips; most of the fleet has only ice and salt storage 
compartments with no modern reefer systems (FAO, 2005a, p.37).  
Table 2.2: The structure of offshore fleet by fishing gear in Vietnam 





















Total 100% 100% 100% 
Sources: a Lewis A.D. (2005); b FAO (2004, p.5); c FAO (2005a, p.37). 
Marine resource status 
Vietnam’s marine fishing is small scale (Son, 2004; Pomeroy et al, 2009; FAO, 2009a; Pho 
Hoang Han, 2007; Paul et al., 2002) as about 82% of total marine catch come from the 
coastal sea areas where there are almost 72% of fishing boats equipped with engines of less 
5 Offshore fishing fleet is generally taken to mean engines of a total capacity of 90 horsepower or more; 
offshore is defined as inverse of the definitions in quote 3 (See Circular no. 05/1998/TT-BTS on December 29, 
1998 by the Ministry of Fisheries; and see Decree no. 123/2006/ND-CP of Prime Minister on October 27, 
2006) 
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than 45 HP (Long, 2004) and more than 84% less than 90 HP vessels (FAO, 2005a; Pomeroy 
et al., 2009). During the last years, the fast increase in the number of vessels and engines has 
lead to a decrease in catch per unit of effort, from 1.11 tones /HP in 1985 to 0.61 tones /HP in 
1993 and 0.36 tones/HP in 2004 (Long, 2002; FAO 2005a; Pomeroy et al, 2009) . This is a 
consequence of overexploitation of coastal resources in Vietnam, resulting in the unbalance 
between potential coastal stock abundance and fishing capacity in terms of amount of fishing 
vessels (FAO, 2005a). According to Long (2002), FAO (2005a) and Pomeroy et al. (2009), 
the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of coastal fisheries resource was about 0.6 million 
tonnes. As mentioned above, 82% of total national marine catch was corresponding to the 
level of coastal marine catch from 0.812 to 1.596 million tonnes during the period 1995 to 
2008. These figures were much higher than MSY, and the fishing effort levels have always 
been larger than the effort level of MSY. As a result, coastal resources in Vietnam have been 
overexploited (FAO, 2005a).    
In order to reduce the pressure on coastal fisheries resource, Vietnam’s policy switch from 
onshore to offshore waters and a program of investing offshore vessels have thus 
implemented since 1997 (MOFI, 1997a; MOFI 1997b; FAO, 2004 and 2005a; FAO 2009b). 
Hence, the number of offshore fishing vessels has increased during the period 1997 to now. 
However, the offshore fishing program has not perfectly obtained its goals (FAO, 2005a). 
The reasons were that “the lack of suitable fishing technologies and skilled skippers and 
crew, high input costs, insufficient information on offshore resources, fishing grounds and 
seasons, and inadequacy of onshore services” (FAO, 2005a, p.37). A large number of 
offshore vessels had lower catch than expected rates and performed poorly in economic 
terms. Many of them were apparently facing economic difficulties and there have been trends 
removing from offshore fishing grounds into inshore waters (FAO, 2005a, p.37). According 
to some recent documents, it is indicated that there is a possibility for further development in 
the offshore fishery because the MSY estimation in Vietnamese EEZ area was 1.1 million 
tones while the offshore fishing production of Vietnam is forecasted to be 0.6 million tones in 
2005 (excluding the catch of foreign illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing vessels) 
(FAO, 2005a). However, with a large increase of offshore fishing fleets like above, there will 
not be any guarantee to decrease the pressure on near shore exploitation and develop 
reasonably and suitably offshore fisheries in accordance with offshore resource capacity in 
the future.  
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Marine fishermen communities 
For Vietnam’s fishermen communities, there were about 640,000 laborers in 2004, of whom 
60,000 take part in offshore fishing (Son, 2004), and there were an increasing number of 
22,500 fishers involving in marine fisheries each year (Long, 2004). In 2007, the labor force 
working directly in marine capture increased at level of 700,000 people (WPEAOFMP, 
2009). Most of them are considered poor (FAO, 2005a, 2009a; Long et al., 2008; Pomeroy et 
al, 2009). Their household income mainly depends on marine fishing (FAO, 2009a). The 
people here lack capital or access to formal credit. Hence, it was difficult for them to invest in 
big fishing vessel for offshore (Long, 2004). In addition, the majority of fishers has the low 
educational level6. Consequently, fishers cannot afford offshore fishing advanced 
technologies. As a result, a large percentage of fishers has focused on coastal fishing (FAO, 
2005a; Pomeroy et al, 2009). 
In summary, Vietnam’s marine capture fisheries are small scales, multi-species and multi-
gear (Son, 2004; Pomeroy et al, 2009; FAO, 2009a; Pho Hoang Han, 2007; Paul et al., 2002) 
and open access (Pomeroy et al, 2009; FAO, 2009a). Marine fisheries production has 
continuously increased over time and the number of fishing vessels has increased greatly and 
gone far beyond the control. Coastal fishing capacity has exceeded the sustainable limit. 
Coastal resources have thus been overexploited, and are exhausting. The majority of coastal 
fishermen communities is poor, lacks capital as well as lacks the knowledge for offshore 
fishing activities. Therefore, Vietnam’s marine fishing fisheries are in need of good 
management.  
 
2.2. KHANH HOA’S MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES 
Marine capture production and fleet 
Figure 2.2 shows total marine capture production and the number of vessels as well as total 
engine capacity in Khanh Hoa during 2001 – 2009. The annual marine catch has fluctuated 
over time; it has slightly increased 1.3% in annual average. It often occupied from 73% to 
88% in total fisheries production during the same period of time (Khanh Hoa’s DARD, 
2009a). In 2009, total marine capture production of Khanh Hoa was 72,301 tonnes (Khanh 
Hoa’s DARD, 2009c).  
6 “68% of fishers have not finished primary school; 20% have finished primary school and nearly 10% have 
finished secondary school; less than 1% of fishers have a certificate or diploma from a vocational school or 
university” (see FAO, 2005a; Pomeroy et al., 2009). 
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Figure 2.2: Marine catch, number of vessels, and total engine capacity during 2001-
2009 in Khanh Hoa. Note: see Appendix C in detail. Sources: Khanh Hoa’s DARD 
(2009a, 2009b, 2009c); DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2009).   
The number of fishing vessels has increased significantly over time, from 4,812 vessels in 
2001 to 12,802 vessels in 2009 – corresponding to an average annual increase of 15% (see 
Figure 2.2 and appendix C). The majority of fishing vessels is powered in last two years, with 
only 82 and 65 vessels without engine power in 2008 and 2009 respectively. With the 
increase in the number of vessels, the total engine capacity of the fleet has increased 
remarkably – an average annual increase of 18%. In 2007, the number of vessels increased 
about 33% in comparison with 2006, while total engine capacity rose almost at 50%. This 
implies that there was more investment in big vessels with large horsepower. Inversely, in 
2008, the number of powered vessels increased more than twice in comparison with 2007 
while an increase of 60% is for engine capacity. The reasons are that (1) Vietnamese 
government subsidized for fishing vessels in 2008; and (2) The Khanh Hoa’s DECAFIREP 
discovered the large number of vessels without registration (2834 vessels in 2008), and these 
vessels are required to register in 2008 and 2009. (Khanh Hoa’s DARD, 2009a;  
DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa, 2009).  
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Figure 2.3: Marine catch per unit of vessel (in tones/vessel) and per unit of engine power 
(in tones/HP) during 2001-2009 in Khanh Hoa. Note: see Appendix C in detail. Sources: 
Khanh Hoa’s DARD (2009a, 2009b, 2009c); DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2009) and the 
author’s calculations.   
From the above figures, catch per unit of effort is calculated for Figure 2.3. Catch per vessel 
(in tones/vessel) and catch per unit of engine power (in tones/HP) have almost declined 
during period of time 2001 – 2009. The average annual decrease rate was 9.4% of catch per 
vessel and 12% of catch per HP during this period of time. In 2009, catch per vessel and 
catch per HP decreased to 5.65 tones and 0.195 tones, respectively. There was only a little 
increase in 2005.   
Structure of fishing vessels 
By the end of 2009, the number of purse seine using light was 3,322 vessels – accounted for 
the highest rate of 25.9% in total vessels in Khanh Hoa (see Table 2.3). The second position 
was the number of trawlers, accounted for 13.2% in total. Besides, Table 2.3 shows the 
majority of vessels had an engine size of less than 50 HP. Approximately 89% of the total 
mechanized vessels was less than 50 HP, and 95% was less than 90 HP. This is the same 
situation of Vietnamese capture fisheries. Khanh Hoa’s capture fishery, as a master of fact, 
can be described as largely small scale.  
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Table 2.3: The distribution of vessels by fishing gear and engine power in Khanh 
Hoa, 2009. 
Gear type 
Range of engine power  
Total Rate  
0-<20 20-<50 50-<90 90-<250 250-<400 400-<4000 
Gill net 394 144 82 105 88 15 828 6.5% 
Longline 860 277 55 86 19 2 1299 10.1% 
Trawl 400 791 291 187 16 3 1688 13.2% 
Purse seine 642 260 74 17 1 1 995 7.8% 
Purse seine 
using light 1871 1194 169 83 5 0 3322 25.9% 
Lift net 239 52 59 56 6 3 415 3.2% 
Others 3619 581 37 16 1 1 4255 33.2% 
Total 8025 3299 767 550 136 25 12802 100% 
Rate  62.7% 25.8% 6.0% 4.3% 1.1% 0.2% 100%  





































From 90 HP and above 50 - < 90 HP
 
Figure 2.4: The distribution of vessels by fishing gear with engine of 50 HP and 
larger in Khanh Hoa, 2009. Source: DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2009) 
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Among total number of fishing vessels, there were 711 vessels with engine of 90 HP and 
larger. This fleet is considered as offshore fishing vessels. The four most important fishing 
gears still consisted of gillnet, trawl fishery, purse seine (both with and without using light), 
and long line; of which gillnetters and trawlers accounted for the greatest number of vessels, 
208 and 206 respectively (Figure 2.4). In fact, many of vessels with engine of 50-90 HP also 
joined into the offshore fishing fleet in Khanh Hoa (Long et al., 2008; Kim Anh et al., 2006). 






























From 90 HP and above 50 - < 90 HP
 
Figure 2.5: The distribution of vessels by location with engine of 50 HP and 
larger in Khanh Hoa, 2009. Source: DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2009) 
Nha Trang’s fishing fleet 
Nha Trang’s fishing fleet has a high representation in Khanh Hoa province. This fleet helped 
account for the highest proportion in the total number of Khanh Hoa’s fishing vessels in 
2009, reaching nearly 34% (DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa, 2009; see Table C3 in appendix C 
in detail). Most offshore capture vessels of the province is allocated in this city, with 80.6% 
of 90 HP and greater engine vessels (573 units) and 70.6% of 50 HP and larger engine vessels 
(1044 units) (see Figure 2.5).    
Marine fishermen communities 
According to report of Khanh Hoa’s DARD (2009a), the number of labours in fishing sector 
was 31,500 people in 2007. The majority of fishers in Khanh Hoa has the low educational 
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level with about 90% of fishers without finishing secondary school; most fishermen inherit 
fishing experience from previous generations. Based on the costs and earnings surveys for 
2004 and 2005, the offshore and inshore fishing fleets of Khanh Hoa province were 
considered as highly profitable for both vessel owners and crews, whereas the small scale 
fisheries were negative profitable (Flaaten, 2008). The net profit in percent of gross revenue 
depended on the types of fishing gear in 2004 and 2005, generally fluctuating from 8.78% to 
24.01% for anchovy purse seine, offshore gillnet and long line fisheries. However, fishermen 
might be considered as poor people if their family size was more than that in average level of 
the nation (Flaaten, 2008).  
Khanh Hoa’s offshore gillnet7 fishery 
At present, the total number of gillnet fleet is 828 units – corresponding to total engine power 
of 65,050.5 HP (DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa, 2009), in which there are about 65% boats with 
engine of less than 50 HP and almost 75% boats with engine of less than 90 HP (Table 2.4). 
Most these groups are allocated in Cam Ranh district and Nha Trang city.  




Districts in Khanh Hoa  
Total Rate  
Nha Trang Cam Ranh Ninh Hoa Van Ninh Cam Lam 
0-<20 62 303 22 0 7 394 47.6% 
20-<50 59 51 23 10 1 144 17.4% 
50-<90 55 14 7 6 0 82 9.9% 
90-<250 79 16 1 9 0 105 12.7% 
250-<400 86 1 1 0 0 88 10.6% 
400-<4000 13 1 1 0 0 15 1.8% 
Total 354 386 55 25 8 828 100%  
Rate  42.8% 46.6% 6.6% 3.0% 1.0% 100%  
  Source: DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2009).  
7 Gill net and its characteristics are defined in books of King, 1995, p.65-78 and Jennings et al., 2001, p.90-111. 
In the case of the Khanh Hoa fishery, Kim Anh et al., 2006 defined that “Gill net is composed of separate 
pieces of small nets that are combined together to form a big one. Each piece may contain up to 1,000 meshes 
in length and 180-200 meshes in depth. When casted, meshes will take the square shape with 5 cm for each 
side, corresponding to the measurements of 60m (in length) and 9-10m (in depth) for the whole piece” (see 
Kim Anh et al., 2006, p.2).  
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Nha Trang city has 233 units in total of 290 gillnet vessels with engine of more than 50 HP 
(account for more than 80%), and 178 vessels in total number of 208 vessels with engine of 
more than 90 HP (account for nearly 86%). Most gillnet vessels with engine of more than 250 
HP concentrate in this city (see Figure 2.6). Hence, it can be said that the offshore gillnet 
vessels of Khanh Hoa province are mostly located in Nha Trang’s fishing community, of 
which they are mostly found in Vinh Phuoc (145 units) and Xuong Huan wards (75 units) 






























Figure 2.6: The distribution of gillnet vessels with engine of 50 HP and larger by location 
and engine capacity in Khanh Hoa, 2009. Source: DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2009) 
The Khanh Hoa’s offshore gillnet operators often operate in the sea waters of 50 - 70 nautical 
miles onward from the coastline, along the territorial waters of Khanh Hoa province and 
move toward the East and Southwest waters (6o00’-8o00’N; 104o30’-108o00’E) and 
Southwest of Truong Sa Island (6o00’-9o00’N; 110o30’-114o00’E), and fishing grounds of 
high sea waters (6o00’-7o00’N; 109o00’-110o00’E). Fishing grounds depend on the movement 
direction of fish aggregation of migratory species (Kim Anh et al., 2006). The target species 
are mainly tuna8 and mackerel9 species. These offshore gillnetters operate from September 
8 Tuna species consist of “Bullet tuna (Auxis rochei), Frigate mackerel (Auxis thazard), Eastern little tuna 
(Euthynnus affinis), Longtail tuna (Thunnus tonggol), Striped tuna (Sarda orientalis), Skipjack tuna 
(Katsuwonus pelamis), Yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) Bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus)” (see Kim Anh et 
al., 2006) 
9 Mackerel species include “Indo-Pacific Spanish mackerel (Scomberomorus guttatus), Wahoo (Acanthocybium 
solandri), Narrow barred Spainish mackerel (Scomberomorus commerson)” (see Kim Anh et al., 2006) 
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(or October) to July (or August) of the following year. The major fishing season of tuna falls 
from February to July (called the south-west monsoon), which fish are found out in the 
offshore waters from Khanh Hoa to Ba Ria-Vung Tau province, while the fishing season that 
ranges from February to June is for mackerel species. The second season is normally called 
the north-west monsoon, ranging from October (or November) to January of the following 
year. Tuna is concentrated in the extreme South of Vietnam in this second season and only 
gillnet vessels with large engine power can go to further into this fishing ground. Almost all 
offshore gillnet vessels stay on shore for repairs and maintenance from August to September. 
The majority of them is the tuna gillnet vessels as it is difficult to find the mackerel gillnetters 
in Khanh Hoa province. The reasons are the mackerel stock depletion as the first reason and 
the requirements of fishing experience and capacity of prediction of fishing ground as the 
second cause (Kim Anh et al., 2006). Consequently, the mackerel gillnet owners have to 
transfer to fishing tuna or combine both operations.   
According to Kim Anh et al. (2006), the offshore gillnet fleet is often invested with a large 
amount of capital. The crew size ranges from 8 to 12 people. Skippers and vessel-owners are 
above 40 years old and have more than 20 years of experience. Each trip takes 10 – 25 days 
with 1 or 2 trips per month depending on the fishing season and capacity of vessel. There is a 
break of 5 -7 days between trips, normally from 10th or 12th to 17th of every lunar month. In 
2004 and 2005, average gillnetter earned more than 3,700 USD and 6,500 USD of net profit 
per year respectively – corresponding to 8.81% in 2004 and 12.15% in 2005 in term of profit 
margin. Average income per fishermen ranged from nearly 800 USD to 930 USD per year 
(Kim Anh et al., 2006; Flaaten, 2008).  
In short, the Khanh Hoa fisheries are a largely small scale. 89% of the total mechanized 
vessels were less than 50 HP, and 95% was less than 90 HP. The pressure on already 
overexploited near-shore resources increasingly spreads out in the provincial sea areas. 
Hence, the strategy for offshore fisheries development is a need as declared in report of FAO 
(2005a) at the “Conference on the National strategy for marine fisheries management and 
development in Vietnam”. Gillnet vessels are one of main offshore fishing fleets in Vietnam 
as well as Khanh Hoa. In Khanh Hoa, most this fleet is allocated in Xuong Huan and Vinh 
Xuong wards of Nha Trang city. This offshore fishery is now an open access with the 
addition of tax systems abolishing in 2006 (Flaaten, 2008); the policy of fuel subsidy used in 
2008. Other regulations have not been strong for Vietnamese offshore capture fisheries in 
general and Khanh Hoa’s offshore fishing fisheries in particular (Flaaten, 2008). 
- 18 - 
 
Chapter 3  
FISHERIES ECONOMIC THEORY 
 
3.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic surveys of fisheries have been undertaken in many nations for many years as a 
means of assessing the economic performance of their fisheries. In 1987, a study of the 
profitability of the fishing fleets was performed in the Gulf of Thailand by Panayotou and 
Jentanavanich. The research was carried out through four surveys in 1969, 1974, 1977 and 
1982. From these, some economic indicators were presented, such as revenues, costs, gross 
profits, net profits, pure profits, and rate of return on capital as well as catch per unit effort. 
The gross profits defined as the difference between revenue and operating cost, and net profit 
was gross profit after subtracting the fixed costs, and pure profits obtained as the distinctions 
of the net profits and the opportunity cost of capital assumed equals to 20% of capital. The 
study concluded that all indicators were positive for an average vessel by type of scale in 
different regions, whereas they were negative in terms of gross profits, net profits and 
economic rents in some types of fishing gear. Hence, the authors admitted that there might be 
misleading in average figures since variance was large because of the unreasonable 
definitions of vessel scales and small sample sizes. However, the study showed that the trawl 
fishery revealed the persistence of excess profits for most boat classes despite massive entry 
and marine resources overexploited in the Gulf of Thailand (Panayotou and Jentanavanich, 
1987).  
In Brazil, Almeida et al. (2001) presented the results of an economic analysis of the Santarem 
commercial fishing fleet in 1997 in lower Amazonian fisheries based on 50 interviews with 
boat operators that gill nets were their main gears. The boat fleet was homogeneous in 
technology in terms of gear and hull design, but different in boat size (weight). The study 
results showed that smaller boats had higher economic efficiency in terms of income in 
relation to expense, but had less in terms of catch per unit effort than larger boats. The 
authors explained that the greater economic efficiency of small boats was due to the 
combination of labor, fishing and marketing strategies, whereas the large boats faced small 
domestic market size. The crew payment was the biggest expenses of the fishing activity, 
which range from 30% for smallest boats to 63% for the largest (Almeida et al., 2001). 
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In the United States (U.S.), two researchers from the University of Hawaii’s Joint Institute for 
Marine and Atmospheric Research (JIMAR), Marcia Hamilton and Steve Huffman carried 
out costs and earnings study of Hawaii’s small boat pelagic fishery in 1995 and 1996. Data, 
which was surveyed through both direct and mail-back surveys from vessel owners and 
operators, consisted of information on vessel operations and characteristics, investment and 
fixed costs, trip costs, annual catch, gross revenue, and operator demographics. The surveys 
were stratified into four groups based on fishermen’s motivations on fishing income, 
including the fulltime, part time, expense, and recreational fishermen10. The findings showed 
that, for those who sold fish, fishing intensity, catch rates, and gross revenues were highest 
for fulltime fishermen and lowest for expense fishermen. The average annual fixed costs 
accounted for large rate in total cost. Fixed costs were higher for pelagic vessels as compared 
to non-pelagic vessels across all motivations. Average trip costs showed no big differences 
between fisherman groups, with only slight variations by operator motivations, vessel targets, 
sizes, and islands, of which fuel consumption was the most significant cost which can vary 
according to size and gear type of the vessels. Fulltime fishermen reported receiving of 96% 
of their personal income from fishing profit; part-time fishermen got only 16% and expense 
fishermen dropped to 4%. It can be sees that the study was mostly done through the analysis 
of the structure of cost items by groups of fishermen, vessel target and vessel characteristics; 
yet it lacks labor share information. Therefore, the study was presented the result of net 
revenues of the vessels (Hamilton and Huffman, 1997).   
Agar et al. (2005) also carried out a costs and earnings study of fish trap fishery in U.S. 
Caribbean in 2003. The main socio-economic characteristics of the trap fishery were 
described in the contexts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Territory of the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. The approach of economic and financial performance measures was adapted 
from Whitmarsh et al. (2000). However, the authors defined the costs of crew payments as 
the opportunity cost since they calculated economic profits in order to determine the 
economic performance. The study concluded that, on average, vessels could cover their cash 
cost from positive vessel income (financial profit). It also illustrated that the various 
economic surpluses generated were to give evidence to the heterogeneity of the trap fishery in 
U.S. Caribbean. Another thing is that higher gross revenue was always not likely to transform 
into higher net return. In addition, it is asserted that the results of negative economic profits 
10 “The fulltime fishermen were defined as those who reported receiving over 50% of their income from fishing 
profits; part time fishermen received 50% or less of their income from fishing, expense fishermen sold fish only 
to cover trip costs, and recreational fishermen did not sell any part of their catch over the previous 12 months” 
(see Hamilton and Huffman, 1997). 
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were imputed as evidence of the overcapitalized trap fisheries, and that a higher economic 
return could be attained from a social perspective by retaining some of the scarce capital and 
human resource elsewhere in the industry (Agar et al., 2005).   
In Australia, under the Fisheries Management Act 1991, the Australian Fisheries 
Management Authority (AFMA) pursued a number of objectives in managing 
Commonwealth fisheries and required annual assessment of the biological and economic 
status of Commonwealth managed fisheries (Hohnen et al., 2008).  
Rose et al. (2000) presented a paper based on second data supplied by AFMA and the 
information collected was summarized in annual Australian Fisheries Surveys Report of 
Australia Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics (ABARE) from 1990 to 1998. The 
study adapted the calculating approach of economic performance indicators in Whitmarsh et 
al. (2000). However, the difference is that item of management cost was added in order to 
determine the net return (called as economic rent by the authors) to the fisheries resource. 
The purpose of the study was to analyze and provide performance indicators in public sector 
resource management of three Australian Commonwealth fisheries during period 1990 to 
1998. The results showed that the net revenue was the largest and constantly increasing over 
time in the northern prawn fishery while it was decreasing in offshore trawl sector of the 
south east fishery. For net return, it was negative for the east coast tuna and billfish fishery 
during the same period of time. The study finally emphasized on the importance of 
integrating economic and biological indicators in assessing the performance of fisheries 
management, and recommended that consideration of the net returns could not be undertaken 
without an understanding of the ecological, market and institutional factors.  
In 2008, ABARE also presented an annual report that assesses the economic state of the 
commercial fisheries managed by the Australian government in 2006-2007. The objective of 
the report was to present an assessment of the performance of the relevant fishery 
management authority against the objective of maximizing the net economic returns from the 
exploitation of Commonwealth fisheries for the Australian community. The report described 
characteristics and indicators of catch volume, value and composition, fisheries financial and 
economic performance, biological status of stock biomass, and management arrangements for 
each fishery. A range of economic indicators and tools are used for assessing economic 
performance. These indicators included net economic return (is calculated similar in the 
paper of Rose et al., 2000), productivity indexes, level of latent effort for small fisheries, and 
value of quota. For one quota-managed fishery, the authors compared actual catch to total 
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allowable catch for each of the fishery’s quota managed species. They indicated that latent 
effort in the fishery has been high and can be linked to the fishery’s historically poor 
economic performance. The tools were profit decompositions, stochastic frontier analysis and 
bio-economic models. The results represented in details in Hohnen et al. (2008). 
In Europe, there have been many studies and reports about costs and earnings survey for 
recent two decades on scale of country as well as the continent. For instance, Flaaten et al. 
(1995) carried out the analysis of the profitability for the Norwegian purse seine fishery, with 
costs and earning data of 1983 and 1984. The authors proposed the profitability model for 
determining economic performance indicators. A small different point in the model is that 
gross revenue to vessel was defined as the retained value after sharing to crew from fishing 
income. The study was to test empirically and to compare the profitability of vessels which 
had their free licenses, with the profitability of vessels which had to purchase the license, in 
order to determine the differences of rents between the two vessel groups. This results in the 
higher profit in the former vessels group than the later vessels group. However, the authors 
had applied the econometric models for analyzing of the factors affecting different sides of 
fishing vessels performance (Flaaten et al., 1995).   
In United Kingdom (UK), costs and earnings surveys were carried out in the English Channel 
fisheries in 1994-1995 (Pascoe, Robinson and Coglan, 1996) and 1996-1997 (Coglan and 
Pascoe, 200111). In report 44 of Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic 
Resources (CEMARE) carried out by Pascoe, Robinson and Coglan (1996), it was 
emphasized the purpose of explaining the methodology in undertaking the survey and 
presented key findings of the financial and economic performance of boats in the English 
Channel. The survey methodology began from determining the target population. In each 
target population, a stratified random sample of vessels was selected for interview on the 
basis of both boat numbers in each size class in each region category and the estimated value 
of landings. The sample statistical techniques were applied in accordance with a probability 
distribution which provided information on the probability that the estimates were true. The 
results of the study were presented into separated parts: boat characteristics and fishing 
behaviour, financial performance (revenue, running costs, crew costs, fixed costs and boat 
income) and economic performance (economic labor costs which included crew costs and 
skipper costs that were imputed as the opportunity cost, fixed economic costs which excluded 
interest payments due to no true resource cost in their study and which the depreciation cost 
11 Unfortunately, the document of Coglan and Pascoe (2001) is unavailable   
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was estimated rather than using an accountancy based measure, full equity profits and rate of 
return) by boat sizes and fishing activities, and overall value of the fishery. The opportunity 
cost of capital was referred to as the normal or expected rate of return (take a value of 10% in 
the study) which the rates of return to capital was compared with in the research. It is 
concluded that most vessels covered their cash cost during period 1994-1995 on average, 
resulting in positive vessel income. However, about 11% of vessel interviewed failed to cover 
their cash cost. When all costs was considered as economic costs (including non-cash costs 
and cash costs), about 29% of UK fleet had negative economic profits. The authors also 
mentioned in terms of resource rent and intra-marginal rent that derived from costs and 
earnings survey, and affirmed that “the assessment of economic performance is a key element 
in further the understanding of the economic incentives that exist in the fishery” (Pascoe, 
Robinson and Coglan, 1996).    
On whole scale of European Union (EU) since 1998, economic performance of selected 
European fishing fleets was assessed within EU fisheries and it was suggested to have some 
annual reports on the topic. For example of 2004, an annual economic report on “Economic 
performance of selected European fishing fleets” had been prepared by the Concerted Action 
“Economic Assessment of European Fisheries” (Q5CA-2001-01502). The study carried out 
in marine fisheries of 20 countries, of which 86 specific segments of fishing fleets were 
included. Main characteristics, economic and technical indicators, economic performance of 
the fishing fleets in 2003 were discussed (not from the financial point of view). Most 
important economic indicators such as value of landing, gross value added, gross cash flow, 
net profit were presented for each selected segment of fishing gear for each country. The 
methodology of imputing capital cost followed the method in Davidse et al. (1993). For 
calculating and evaluating capital costs, the replacement value of the vessel was used to 
calculate depreciation. The replacement value was defined as the current building costs of 
similar new vessel. Each type of physical assets had different rate of annual depreciation, and 
majority of them was depreciated by the straight line method. An imputed interest was 
computed, reflecting the opportunity cost of the capital invested in the vessel as there was a 
widely difference in actual interest cost per vessel in different countries (Action 2004). 
Additionally, at the conference on energy efficiency in fisheries (Brussels, 11th-12th May 
2006), a report of summery and conclusion related to the economic performance and the 
effects of fuel price changes on the costs and profits of selected EU fishing fleets during 
1996-2004 was also presented [3].    
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On a global scale, FAO Fisheries Department began collecting empirical information on the 
economic of fishing operations in 1995 in close cooperation with fisheries research 
institutions and national fisheries administrations in selected nations in Europe, Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America (FAO, 1999a). According to reports in FAO Fisheries Technical Papers 
377, 421 and 482, studies of costs and earnings carried out by FAO in 1995-1997, 1999-
2000, and 2002-2003 (FAO 1999a; FAO 2001, FAO 2005b).  
In 2005, FAO presented the findings of country level studies on the economic and financial 
performance of marine capture fisheries. During 2002 and 2003, 13 countries were studied 
with the 94 most important fishing fleets operating covered: South America (accounted for 
62%), Caribbean (8%), Europe (42%), Africa (24%) and Asia (24%). The result of the studies 
showed that all 94 kinds of fishing vessels had a positive gross cash flow and fully recovered 
their operating costs, with no losses in 2002 and 2003. 88 of the 94 types of boats 
(corresponding to 94%) had a net profit after deducting the costs of depreciation and interest. 
The studies also found that there were significant improvements in financial and economic 
performance of fishing fleets in the Republic of Korea, Germany and Argentina comparing in 
both 2002 to 2003 with 1999 to 2000, partially due to reduction and limitation in fleet 
capacity. In other countries, the results, however, remained similar. The findings of the 
national studies also proved the variations in cost structure in different continents resulting 
from the differences in labor, maintenance and repair costs of fishing vessels (FAO, 2005b).  
For the report of FAO (2005b), information on costs and earnings of the fishing fleets had 
been generated through empirical studies combining secondary data, and the methodology 
followed that used in the study “Costs and earnings of fishing fleets in four EC countries”, 
published by the Department of Fisheries of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute 
and funded by the European Union (FAO, 1999a). A same methodology was conducted in 
1995-1997, 1999-2000 and 2002-2003. Two groups of indicators were used for assessing the 
economic and financial performance of fishing vessels. The economic performance was 
measured by the net cash flow (which is defined as net profit). The net cash flow was 
computed as the value of landing less all costs including the costs of depreciation and 
interest. Another indicator of economic performance used is the ratio of the net profit to total 
earnings. The financial performance was measured by rate of return on investment (net 
profit/capital invested ratio). The fishing fleets were divided by ranges of length. For each 
category of boats, the operating costs were divided into running, vessel and labor costs; and 
total costs included depreciation and interest, which were referred to as capital cost. “Labour 
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costs consist of wages and other labour charges such as insurance and employers’ 
contributions to pension funds. Running costs include the costs of fuel, lubricants, selling fish 
via auction, preservation and storage of fish, packing materials, harbor dues, bait, salt, ice 
and food and supplies for the crew. Vessel costs are those of vessel insurance, vessel and 
gear repair, and maintenance expenses” (FAO, 2005b, p19). For calculating and evaluating 
capital costs, the methodology was similar Action (2004) which mentioned above (FAO, 
2005b). 
With the available data from costs and earnings surveys and the annual reports which 
mentioned above, many papers were published to discussing such an issue related to the topic 
of the economic performance from different perspectives. 
Coglan and Pascoe (1999) demonstrated that the use of average economic performance 
indicators would be misleading in the English Channel fishery with the multi-purpose fleets, 
and that failing to separate out the resource rents from intra-marginal rents might result in 
misrepresentation of the economic performance.  
Whitmarsh et al. (2000) presented the profitability model in which the authors argued the 
need of separating the economic and financial performance indicators. According to the 
authors, the financial performance indicators were based on the concept of income that 
presented the rewards to the boats owner’s labour and the return on his/her capital invested as 
well. Meanwhile, economic performance indicators were based on the concept of efficiency, 
of which the value of output was calculated based on the real cost of the needed to produce it. 
The study also focused on the role of costs and earnings surveys in assessing not only the 
current actual profitability of the fisheries, but the indicators of the profit-earning potential 
under alternative fisheries management regimes. Hence, the up-to-date picture of costs and 
earnings surveys and bio-economic modeling required different policy scenarios.  
Boncoeur et al. (2000) proved that the irrelevance of rate of return on capital in measuring 
economic performance to small boats of the English Channel fishery, and proposed a better 
indicator on the rate of return on owner-operator labor for the small boats.  
Surís-Regueiro et al. (2002) found out that the fishermen continued to invest in fishing 
despite the over-capitalization which existed at the same time since the authors studied on 
“profitability of the fishing fleet and structural aid in the European Union” during 1994-1999. 
The study also showed that the levels of profitability of some fleet segments were related to 
the levels of the public protection.  
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Additionally, Le Floc’h et al. (2008) concluded that the measure of economic and financial 
performance was depending on the different sources of information of the data, such as 
bookkeeping or field surveys. From two data sources, the authors focused on the comparative 
analysis of vessels’ economic performance (both in short and long run). They also 
demonstrated that the measures of economic performance, in the short term, required the 
indicators of the landing value, operating costs for assessing the gross surplus, and in the long 
term, required the capital cost.  
Another research of Ceriola et al. (2008) proposed a system of 47 bio-economic indicators, 
including 22 biological indicators and 25 socio-economic indicators which were applied for 
the demersal trawl fishery in the southern Adriatic Sea in the central Mediterranean. Those 
economic indicators included the measures of economic performance, productivity, costs and 
prices. In fact, in previous time, FAO (1999b) “Indicators for sustainable development of 
marine capture fisheries” was also mentioned in FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible 
Fisheries No. 8. 
The majority of the above studies used the method of the proxy economic indicators or the 
market based economic valuation12, excepting the study of Flaaten et al. (1995) whose 
methodology was the combination between indicators and the regression technique.  There 
were a lot of researchers applying other methods, resulting in indicators of economic 
performance, such as the method of productivity and efficiency analysis (i.e. productivity 
indices, regression techniques, and frontier estimation). A typical example was presented in 
CEMARE Report 60 (2003) applying methods of stochastic production frontiers (SPF) and 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) for analyzing the efficiency of EU fisheries. However, 
these methods often required the significant amounts of data to estimate and more costly 
evaluation techniques (Vieira et al., 2009).  
In Vietnam, there were only some studies on costs and earnings surveys such as Kim Anh et 
al. (2006), Kim Anh et al. (2007), Long et al. (2008), and Thanh Thuy et al. (2008). Most the 
studies used the definitions of costs and earnings in correspond to principle used in the 
profitability of fishing fleets in the studies of Action (2004) and FAO (2005b). The authors, 
however, had adjusted in accordance with the actual accounting and book-keeping systems in 
Vietnam, for example, the methodology of calculating depreciation and opportunity costs.  
Kim Anh et al. (2006) carried out the study of costs and earnings of gillnett vessels in Nha 
12 Definitions of the methods of the proxy economic indicators and the market based economic valuation were 
showed in the study of Vieira et al. (2009, p.10-19). 
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Trang, Vietnam in 2004 and 2005, which assumed that the gillnet operators had achieved 
noteworthy economic efficiency. Average net profits of vessels with small size (measured by 
hull length of less than 15.5 m) were much higher than those of the large scale vessels (more 
than 17 m) while gross revenues were in inverse in both 2004 and 2005. Regarding the rate of 
return on equity, the small scale vessels still performed best while the group of the medium 
vessels (15.5-17m) produced the poorest return on equity. However, in general, all vessels 
had higher rate of return on equity than the average interest of Vietnamese commercial banks 
in 2005. In the study, the authors collected data from 50 gillnet vessels (accounting for 17.5% 
of the population) by the face to face interview on a questionnaire form designed. The study 
defined the items of depreciation and loan interest as the fixed costs since gross cash flow 
was an indicator that they did not take interest in their study. This similar method was also 
used in the study of Kim Anh et al. (2007) when the authors researched on costs and earnings 
from offshore tuna long-line fishery in Nha Trang of Khanh Hoa province of Vietnam (Kim 
Anh et al., 2007). 
Two studies of Long et al. (2008) and Thanh Thuy et al. (2008) had the same characteristics 
of methodology since economic performance indicators were measured separately by gross 
revenue, gross value added, gross cash flow, net profit and profit margin. When calculating 
net profit, both these studies did not include opportunity cost of capital. 
The results of Thanh Thuy et al. (2008) showed that in 2005, an average small-scale purse 
seiner in Khanh Hoa province was able to cover its all costs including depreciation and 
interest payment, and earned a profit margin of 24% and a return on investment of 30%. 
Crew income was higher than that in the local seafood processing companies. However, the 
authors concluded that this fishery was not an occupation of last resort since the purse seine 
fishing was an open access.  For Long et al. (2008), the authors demonstrated longline vessels 
on average made a profit margin of 12.1%, and crew members earned high opportunity 
income. The authors assumed that the Vietnamese longline fishery might expand more in the 
future. With the regression analysis of annual performance, the results showed the long line 
operators would maximize their gross revenue and income since the vessels designed with 
hull length of 15.9m and 15.1m, respectively.  
Another report of Flaaten (2008) compared the economic performance indicators of some 
major fishing vessel groups in Khanh Hoa of Vietnam in 2004 and 2005. It is proved that the 
two inshore vessel groups had a contrast in economic performance: a negative profit margin 
for small scale trawlers and a positive profit margin for anchovy purse seiners, whereas the 
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offshore gillnetters and offshore longliners had positive net profits in percentage of gross 
revenue.   
 
3.2. COSTS AND EARNINGS DEFINITIONS 
A study on costs and earnings necessities defining explicitly what indicators is measured. 
Based on the discussion of the literature review above, economic performance indicators are 
derived in accordance with the objectives of this study and the actual accounting and book-
keeping system in the study region. The definitions used in this study are adapted from Long 
et al. (2008) and Thanh Thuy et al. (2008) and partially the combination of the studies from 
Flaaten et al. (1995), Whitmarsh et al. (2000), Action (2004) and Le Floc’h et al. (2008). The 
generally calculation approach is presented as follows: 
Gross Revenue 
- Variable costs (except labour cost) 
= Income 
- Fixed cost 
= Gross value added 
- Labour cost 
= Gross cash flow 
- Depreciation 
- Interest payment on loans 
= Profit 
- Calculated interest on owner’s capital  
= Net profit   
 
Gross revenue is defined as landing value of the vessel in year of fishing operations. It is the 
result of the average vessel trip revenue times the number of trips in the year 2008.  
In order to compare the effect of the 2008 fuel cost support of Vietnamese government to 
profitability of fishing vessels, gross revenue is calculated for two cases of including the fuel 
subsidies and excluding the fuel subsidies. The 2008 fuel cost support appears as quasi-lump-
sum subsidies payable, and is given directly to fishers; and in fact fishermen have to accept 
the market fuel price in their fishing operation. Since a subsidy is referred to as quasi-lump-
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sum subsidy payable to fishers, the profitability of fishing vessels with this type of subsidy 
may be sum of the profitability without the subsidy and the quasi-lump-sum subsidy, 
regardless of adding this subsidy to revenue or subtracting it from cost. Additionally, 
although the 2008 fuel cost support seems like a fishing effort subsidy. In reality it was the 
income support of the government for fishermen, hence, this subsidy item should be added to 
gross revenue instead of subtracting from cost.   
Variable costs are total expenses for all fishing trips in year, except labor costs. They include 
costs for fuel, lubricant, ice, provision, minor repair in one fishing year, exclusive of labor 
costs. They are the result of the average vessel variable cost per fishing trip times the number 
of fishing trips in the year 2008.   
Income is the difference between gross revenue and variable costs, except labor cost. 
Fixed cost is the total of annual repair and maintenance costs of hull, engine, gear, and other 
equipments on the vessel, and insurance for vessels and all crew members. Fixed cost does 
not change with the number of fishing trips taken in the fishing year 2008.  
Gross value added is referred to as the difference between the values of landings (gross 
revenue) and cost paid to other supplying industries (except of labor costs). It is the result 
obtained from the annual gross revenue minus the total of annual variable costs and fixed 
cost, excluding labor costs.  
Labor cost is expenditure for crew members in the income share system, as remuneration of 
crew members. Crew members are all fishermen who participate in fishing operations on the 
vessel, including vessel owner-operator’s labor, owner’s family-crew members. 
Gross cash flow referred to as a reward for capital employed in fisheries. It is calculated as 
gross value added less labor cost or as gross revenue minus all expense, except depreciation 
and interests. It is the sum of costs of depreciation, interest payment on loans, opportunity 
cost of owner’s capital and the net profit.  
Profit is the remaining value after deducting depreciation and interest payment on loans 
(except the calculated interest on owner’s capital) from gross cash flow. It is considered as a 
reward for the operating year exclusive of opportunity cost of owner’s capital.  
Net profit is referred to as net economic profit to society of employing the owner’s capital in 
the current fishing activity after subtracting the opportunity cost of this capital from profit. It 
is calculated as the gross revenue less all expense, including the calculated interest on 
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owner’s capital. Thus, it is considered as an actual net reward after all factors of production 
have received their compensation. 
The user cost of capital is considered as the cost for the use of the fixed capital assets for one 
period (OECD, 2001). This employed by the fishing operator has two components. The first 
is the economic consumption of the capital asset, which is called in terms of “economic 
depreciation” or “depreciation” in this study. The second is called in terms of interests. Since 
the fixed capital structure of fishing operation consists of the level of equity and debt, these 
interests include the paid interest on loans and interest on owner’s capital.  
Depreciation is calculated as the actual loss in the value of a capital asset through the use of 
the asset, which is not offset by maintenance and repairs over the period due to wear and tear 
(Pascoe, Robinson and Coglan, 1996; Boncoeur et al., 2000). In this study, the depreciation is 
computed basing on the fixed capital value which is to be valued at current prices. In this 
case, this means that assets acquired in earlier period (or called historic prices) have to be 
revalued in order to convert the prices of the current year (OECD, 2001). The price indices 
for the relevant types of asset should be used. However, constructing “constant quality” price 
indices for capital goods is a difficult task (OECD, 2001), and moreover, the information of 
the price indices for the relevant types of asset is unavailable in developing countries as 
Vietnam. Therefore, the annual average consumer price indices13 are used. In this study, 
consumption of fixed capital is obtained by using straight-line depreciation basing on the 
owner’s estimated lifespan of the fixed capital items. 
Interest payment on loans is costs for payment of loan interest in year. The rate of interest on 
loans has differences among the vessel owners because of a non-perfect capital market as 
Vietnam. There are various loan sources for fishermen with the unfair price. These sources 
can come from their relatives, the national offshore fishery program, or Vietnam’s 
commercial banks. Although interest payments are considered as a transfer within society 
rather than a real resource cost of the fishing activity, the interest paid on loans is a cash 
expense which the vessel owners often record to know how much money would spend for. 
Thus, the loan interest should be deducted before the profit. 
The calculated interest on owner’s capital is referred to as the opportunity cost of employing 
the owner’s capital in the current fishing activity. Whitmarsh et al. (2000) assumed that “the 
opportunity cost of capital is based on what the capital invested in the vessel would have 
earned in the next best alternative investment”. However, Pascoe, Robinson and Coglan 
13 Information of annual average consumer price indices of Vietnam is available IMF, 2009 
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(1996, p.25) demonstrated that “the opportunity cost of capital is the normal or expected 
return forgone by holding the capital asset rather than some other comparable asset”. The 
researchers also assumed that it is necessary to have an objective benchmark for determining 
the opportunity cost of capital, and that the rate of return of firms in other industries with 
similar levels of risk can be chosen for reflecting the opportunity cost of capital.  
Nha Trang’s fishery includes a diversity of vessel kinds undertaking different fishing 
activities, and additionally, information about economic performance of the fishing fleets are 
limited, so it is difficult to identify an appropriate rate of return. For this study, the nominal 
rate of interest is chosen to reflect the opportunity cost of owner’s capital. 
The calculated interest (I) on owners’ capital in the year of the profitability analysis (2008) is 
calculated in this study as follows: 
I = [(TK – D) – L]* r 
where TK is total fixed capital stocks revalued at the price of year 2008 (as mentioned 
above); D is the accumulated depreciation at year 2008; so TK – D is the net capital value of 
vessel at year 2008. L is the remaining debt at the current year 2008 or the remaining balance 
on the loan at year 2008; [(TK – D) – L] is the vessel owner’s capital or the level of equity 
held by the owner at year 2008. r is the nominal rate of interest which is defined as the prime 
interest rate announced by the state bank of Vietnam. For 2008 the base interest rate in 
Vietnamese dong to be about 9% per annum14, which was chosen to reflect the opportunity 
cost of owner’s capital.  
Gross profit margin is referred to as ratio of gross cash flow to gross revenue. This ratio 
expresses what is left as compensation to capital in relation to gross revenue as percentage of 
gross revenue.   
Profit margin is defined as ratio of profit (before the opportunity cost of owner’s capital but 
after depreciation and interest payment on loans) to gross revenue. This ratio expresses what 
is left as compensation to the vessel owner’s capital in relation to gross revenue as percentage 
of gross revenue.   
Return on capital value is defined as the profit in percent of net capital stock of the vessel 
(presented above) at year 2008 or rate of profit to net capital stock of the vessel. This ratio 
expresses the return on the net capital invested as percentage of net capital stock of the 
vessel.  
14 This information is available from website of the state bank of Vietnam 
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Return on owner’s capital is defined as the profit in percent of owner’s capital of the vessel at 
year 2008 or rate of profit to owner’s capital of the vessel. This ratio reflects what is left to 
the vessel owner as compensation to the opportunity cost of owner’s capital in relation to 
owner’s capital of the vessel as percentage of owner’s capital of the vessel. 
In a fishery, gross revenue can be considered as an indicator of harvest since the price of fish 
catch is hardly affected by quantity fished in the competitive market where there are many 
sellers and buyers (Flaaten, 2009). Hence, the fixed price of fish for all vessels in short run is 
a reasonable assumption in this study. The study of Long et al. (2008) also was referred the 
annual gross revenue as a proxy of annual production with the assumption of fixed price of 
fish (Long et al., 2008).  
In this study, indicators taken from interest are economic performance, not financial 
performance. This means particularly that almost capital costs are imputed which can depress 
the apparent net profit in some certain cases. Therefore, the main indicator added for this 
analysis is gross cash flow. Gross cash flow is referred to as a good short term indicator in 
fisheries (Action 2004). Positive gross cash flow means that the vessel owners are able to pay 
for all their operational costs and meeting at least part of their obligations to creditors. A 
reasonable hypothesis here is that the vessel owner has positive gross cash flow in the fishing 
operation year (Hypothesis 1).   
Hypothesis 1  
The vessel owner has a positive gross cash flow from his fishing in 2008, including the 
fuel cost quasi-lump-sum subsidy. 
 
3.3. OPEN ACCESS BIOECONOMIC MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS EFFORT 
OF THE FISHERY 
The traditional bioeconomic model of a fishery was derived from the population dynamic 
model, of which technical and economic variables were added in (Gordon, 1954). This 
traditional bioeconomic model was based on important assumptions15. Firstly, the vessel 
fleets in a perfectly competitive market are homogeneous with an identical cost structure and 
a given technology (Gordon, 1954). Hence, cost per unit of effort is constant, or, in order 
words, all vessels have the same of the average cost per unit of effort. All costs, including 
15 Other assumptions: A mobility of capital is guaranteed, a single stock of marine renewable resource is 
exploited, and information on prices and costs is perfect (see Gordon, 1954). 
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capital, labor, operating costs, opportunity cost of labor, are imputed to be directly 
proportional to effort16. Secondly, the motivation of fishers is assumed to be the profit 
maximization (Gordon, 1954). Thereby, individual vessel will operate at point where 














Figure 3.1: The traditional bioeconomic model. Note: the shape of total revenue 
curve is assumed the basis of biological equilibrium, and price of fish is 
constant over time. Source: Flaaten (2009, p. 21). 
In a free and open access fishery where the common property of fisheries resource is not 
determined, individual vessels will enter the fishery since total revenue, TR(E), exceeds total 
cost, TC(E), and a economic equilibrium is at point where TR(E) =TC(E) (see Figure 3.1.a) 
(Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955). In other words, when average revenue of effort, AR(E), equals  
marginal cost of effort, MC(E), there will be an open access equilibrium of effort (EOA) (see 





EOA                           Effort (E) O 
(b) 
(a) 
16 Griffin et al. (1976) proposed an empirical model that allowed costs to be proportional to both effort and 
catch and this was applied to the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery. 
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(Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Anderson and Lee, 1986; Perman et al., 2003; Flaaten, 2009). 
Indeed, at lower levels of effort, individuals will be making economic profits17 (resource 
rent). The existence of this positive profits (or called in term of super normal profits) will 
attract new entrants into the unregulated open access fishery, and lead to reducing the 
fisheries average revenue until individuals earning zero profits (called in terms of normal 
profits) (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Flaaten, 2009). As a result, the resource rent will be 
dissipated under open access condition (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Griffin et al., 1976; 
Anderson and Lee, 1986; Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Flaaten, 2009). This is a consequence of 
the “Tragedy of the Commons” problem discussed in Hardin (1968).  
The above discussions only aim the understanding of economic effects of fishing in the 
traditional bioeconomic model of Gordon (1954) under open-access condition, given some 
assumptions, which they are fundamental principles for the later theoretical parts.  
As assumed, the fishing fleet of the fishery is homogeneous from a cost and efficiency point 
of view. This implies that average cost of unit effort is the same for all vessels. However, this 
assumption is not reasonable with heterogeneous vessels (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Bertrand 
and Le Floc’h, 2000; Flaaten, 2009) in the fishery case of this study as well as the fishing 
industry of many countries. A fishing fleet with heterogeneous vessels is characterized as 
differences in size, age, engine power, and cost, and other technical and economic 
characteristics (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Flaaten, 2009), or the difference in the skill of the 
skipper and crew (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999). Therefore, the fishing vessels are 
heterogeneous in cost structure and different in efficiency of effort, and resulting in the 
existence of heterogeneous effort in the fishery (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Flaaten, 2009).  
Figure 3.2 illustrates relationship between the standardized effort and the cost efficiency of 
the effort of 10 heterogeneous vessels. For each of the 10 vessels, the standardized effort is 
along the horizontal axis and the average cost per unit standardized effort is with the vertical 
axis. Each standardized fishing effort is measured by the width of the bar whereas the height 
of the bar measures cost per unit effort. The vessels are arranged from the left to the right 
according to their cost efficiency, with vessel number 1 as the most cost efficient one and 
vessel number 10 as the least cost efficient. Since the cost bars in Figure 3.2 are substituted 
by a curve enveloping the bars, this curve is called the marginal cost of effort curve, MC(E), 
for a fishery (Flaaten, 2009).  
17 Coglan and Pascoe (1999) defined the economic profits consisting of resource rent and intra-marginal rent. 
“Resource rent is referred to as the return to the owner of the fisheries resource and represents the value of 
the input generated by the fish stock in the production process”. 













Figure 3.2: Relationship between the standardized fishing effort and the cost efficiency 













Figure 3.3: The traditional bioeconomic model with heterogeneous effort under open 
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With heterogeneous vessels, the marginal cost of effort curve is increasing with respect to the 
increase of fishing effort of the fishery (Figure 3.3b). Based on the above fundamental 
principle of the traditional bioeconomic model, at low effort levels, the average revenue of 
effort, AR(E), is higher than the marginal cost of effort, MC(E), the new entrants will be 
attracted to the fishery under open access condition. And some vessels will exit the fishery 
since AR(E) < MC(E). So, an open access equilibrium is at effort level EOA (Figure 3.3) 
where AR(E) = MC(E). In Figure 3.3, there is an existence of economic surplus which is 
called intra-marginal rent (see Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Flaaten, 2009) at effort level of the 
fishery EOA, showed in the area ABC (Figure 3.3.b) or the line segment R (Figure 3.3.a). The 
intra-marginal rent is generated from the existence of heterogeneous vessels, of which the 
most cost efficient vessels make above normal profits (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Flaaten, 
2009). It is easily seen that there is a positive rent of the fishery at the open access 
equilibrium with the heterogeneous vessels. This is in contrast to the case of homogeneous 
vessels in which rent equals zero. Therefore, a survey indicating above-normal profits of an 
average vessel would indicate the existence of intra-marginal rent in the open access fishery 
with heterogeneous fleet.  
In the case of maximum economic yield management, the level of rent maximizing effort, 
EMEY, is determined at a point where MC(E) = MR(E). The total rent of the fishery generated 
consist of resource rent (area of KLMN) and intra-marginal rent (area of CMN) (Figure 3.3b). 
The intra-marginal rent is lower for the effort level EMEY than that for EOA, but the total rent 
of the fishery managed is greater than the intra-marginal rent of the open access fishery 
because some profits in total rent are obtained due to the effective use of fisheries resource 
(Flaaten, 2009). These profits are called resource rent. The existence of the resource rent is as 
a result of the fisheries management regimes (Anderson and Lee 1986; Bjørndal and Conard , 
1987; Hartwick and Olewiler, 1998; Bertrand and Le Floc’h, 2000; Perman et al. 2003; 
Arnason, 2007; Flaaten, 2009).  
The above analysis presents the bioeconomic model for heterogeneous vessels under open 
access regime, of which total rent produced is only intra-marginal rent18. However, this 
situation is determined at the fishery level of economics in long run rather than short run. In 
the next part, theory of fishing vessel economics will contribute a comprehensive picture to 
the understanding of free and open access situations in marine fishing sector.  
18 This rent is defined as generating by the factors of production owned by the fishers (Coglan and Pascoe, 
1999). 
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3.4. ECONOMICS OF HETEROGENEOUS FISHING VESSELS IN AN 
UNREGULATED OPEN ACCESS FISHERY19 
When an individual vessel’s landing is considered as a small portion of the total landings of 
fish in a competitive market, it is firstly assumed that each vessel is not able to impact on 
market price of fish in the competitive market. This is reasonable to consider fishers as price-
takers and assume that price of fish is the same in all vessels. It is secondly assumed that the 
activity of the vessel hardly impact on stock biomass, and fish stock is considered as constant 
from an individual vessel’s point of view. Therefore, the vessel harvest function is a function 
of its effort, given period of time and the stock level, and assumes that this function is the 
Schaefer harvest function: 
h (e,X) = qeX                        (3.1) 
where e is effort of one individual fishing vessel, given the stock level of fish, X, and the 
catchability coefficiency, q. 
The profit of the vessel is:  
п (e;X) = p h(e,X) – tc(e)  
or                 п (e;X) = p qeX – tc(e)             (3.2) 
where p is the market price of fish and tc(e) is total cost of effort. In short run, tc(e) is only 
total variable cost of effort, tvc(e), so this profit is the operating profit of the vessel. In long 
run, tc(e) consists of total variable cost of effort, tvc(e), and fixed cost, F. Total revenue of 
vessel is pqeX as a function of vessel effort, given p, q and X.   
Assuming that the objective of the vessel is to maximize its profit given in equation (3.2), the 







Xed             (3.3) 
Solving (3.3) gives a criterion of choosing the optimal level of effort for maximizing profit of 
the vessel: 
                                       mc(e) = pqX                                (3.4) 
This equation (3.4) shows that one vessel’s profits are maximized at the level of effort where 
its marginal cost of effort equals its marginal revenue of effort. When the marginal revenue of 
19 This section is based primarily on “Lecture notes on Fisheries Economics and Management” by Flaaten 
(2009). 
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effort of each vessel is referred to as a function of vessel effort, and equals to product of price 
of fish, catchability coefficiency and level of stock, pqX, all vessels will have the same 
marginal revenue of effort, and equal to the fishery average revenue, given at point of time . 
















Xed                      (3.5) 
Rearranging (3.5) gives 0)( >
de
edmc . This implies that the profit maximizing supply level of 
effort can lie only on the upwards sloping part of the vessel’s marginal cost of effort curve. 
From equation (3.2), in the short run the vessel will operate at positive level of effort only if             
)()( eavc
e
etvcpqX =≥                     (3.6) 
where avc(e) is average variable cost of vessel effort. This means that the marginal revenue 
of effort has to be more than minimum average variable cost of vessel effort.  





etcpqX =+=≥                  (3.7) 
where atc(e) is average total cost of vessel effort. This implies that the marginal revenue of 
effort has to be more than minimum average total cost of effort in order to cover the fixed 
capital cost in the long run.  
Figure 3.4 shows graphically the differences between two heterogeneous vessels that will 
lead to the different cost structure of each vessel and different rents generated in the short run 
under unregulated open access condition. In the open access fishery, the marginal revenue of 
vessel effort is pqXOA, with XOA is at the stock level at open access equilibrium. Vessel i 
make zero profit at its optimal effort eiOA in the short run since the marginal revenue of effort 
equal its minimum average variable cost of effort, avci(ei) (Figure 3.4 a). If condition of 
equation (3.6) is not satisfied or pqXOA < avci(ei), the vessel will stop fishing. The vessel i is 
called as a marginal vessel. Figure 3.4 panel (b) shows that at level of effort ejOA vessel j will 
maximize its profits that are showed by the area shaded. When the vessel j has a lower cost 
structure, it will increase individual effort itself to reach the level of effort ejOA. This profit is 
called intra-marginal rent and vessel j is called intra-marginal vessel since vessel j is more 
cost efficient than vessel i.  









Figure 3.4: Differences in cost structure, rent generated and short-run effort 
adaptation of two heterogeneous fishing vessels. Panel (a) for vessel namely i, panel 









Figure 3.5: The vessel’s behavior in short run and long run since two curves of its 
average total cost of effort and average variable cost of effort are drawn graphically 
in the same figure. Source: Flaaten (2009, p.84) 
Figure 3.5 shows behavior of the individual fishing vessel for its adaptation in short run and 
long run in unregulated fishery. A noticeable point here is that the product of fish price, 
catchability and stock level may not be equal between short run and long run. In the long run, 
a vessel will operate at which its marginal revenue of effort is at or above its minimum 
average total cost of effort, atc(e), in order to be able to cover its fixed capital cost. Under 
open access regime if a vessel operates at which its marginal revenue of effort, pqXOA, equals 
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it is a marginal vessel with normal profit. If the vessel earns above normal profit since pqXOA 
> min atc(e), it is a intra-marginal vessel with intra-marginal rent. In the short run, the vessel 
may operate at where its marginal revenue of effort at least is above minimum of its average 
variable cost, which is equal to pqXmin. For given constant values of p and q, this implies that 

















Figure 3.6: Heterogeneous vessels in an unregulated open access fishery and effects of 
fisheries management. Notes: Panel (a), (b) and (c) illustrate for vessel 1, m and n 
respectively; panel (d) for the fishery. Source: adapted from Coglan and Pascoe (1999). 
Figure 3.6 illustrates a heterogeneous fleet in an unregulated open access fishery in long run 
and the effects of management on economic profits. Each vessel has different cost structure 
with different curves of marginal revenue of effort and average total cost of effort for 
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given, will be made up by the supply curves of the individual vessels. The establishment of a 
supply curve was presented by Scott (1955, p.120) for a fishery in theory of fisheries 
economics and by Varian (2006) for other industry in theory of microeconomics of firm.  
Under open access management regime, the effort equilibrium of the fishery is at EOA, 
corresponding to the fishery average revenue of pqXOA (Figure 3.6 panel d). Vessel 1 and 
vessel m make intra-marginal rents (showed by the darker shaded areas) at levels of effort 
e1OA and emOA respectively (Figure 3.6 panel a and b), in which the vessel 1 is earning a higher 
economic profit because vessel 1 has higher cost efficiency than the vessel m, whereas vessel 
n is earning a zero profit (normal profit) at its effort level enOA (panel c). Hence, in the open 
access fishery with heterogeneous vessels, the intra-marginal rent is generated by those 
vessels that have the most cost efficiency making above-normal profit that is more than zero 
profit of the marginal vessel. However, Whitmarsh (1998) analyzed how new entrants with 
most modern and efficient vessels into the fleet over time will pressure on stock and resulting 
in reducing catch rate and increasing cost for all remaining vessels in the fleet, given price of 
fish remaining constant. As a result, the previously marginal vessels (for example vessel n) or 
even intra-marginal vessels will be pushed to become loss (called in terms of extra-marginal 
rent) and force exiting the fishery, so this is called fisheries treadmill in the case of 
unregulated open access fisheries (Whitmarsh, 1998). 
If the existence of management is introduced into the fishery, total effort level of the fishery 
is assumed at E1 as in Figure 3.6 panel (d), corresponding to a result of average revenue 
increasing from pqXOA to pqX1 (fisheries management is assumed that the removal of some 
vessels goes out the fishery. In Figure 3.6, it is also assumed that fisheries management has 
prevented new vessels entry to the fishery, and vessel n is assumed to exist in the fishery 
managed). In this situation, each vessel will increase its individual effort level until its 
marginal revenue pqX1 equals its marginal cost of effort, corresponding e11, em1, en1 for vessel 
1, m and n respectively. The three vessels are earning positive economic profit. The vessel 1 
and m make above normal profits that consist of resource rent and intra-marginal rent, 
whereas vessel n is earning only resource rent.  
As discussed above, this section aims to presenting the theory of the economic adaptation of 
fishing vessels with the profit maximizing objective of fishing activities20. The activity level 
20 Anderson (2005) showed that fishermen could have a different behavior that was called the goal achievement 
behavior (GAB) which contrasts with the profit maximizing behavior (PMB). However, the goal achievement 
behavior do not mentioned in this study.   
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of a vessel is measured by its fishing effort which it can vary by varying its inputs needed for 
generating effort. Thus, a standardized efficiency measure of fishing effort (further discussion 
in the next section) is used to compare of economic performance of fishing vessels given the 
heterogeneity of vessels.  
From equation (3.2), it is clearly seen that total revenue of vessel is the product of fish price, 
catchability, fishing effort and stock level, pqeX, as a function of vessel effort, given fixed 
price of fish, catchability, and constant stock. Hence, average revenue per unit of a vessel’s 
standardized fishing effort as a function of its standardized effort will be pqX and a 
graphically horizontal line. Another explanation comes from the equation (3.1) that h = qeX 
is the Schaefer harvest function which gives catch per unit of effort (CPUE) = h/e = qX. A 
reasonable deduction is that CPUE of each vessel has the same amount of qX since the 
fishing effort of heterogeneous vessels is standardized, and fish stock level is assumed as 
constant in the short run. Since fish price is considered the same for all vessels, the average 
revenue of the vessel’s standardized effort curve thus remains horizontal (hypothesis 2).  
Hypothesis 2 
The average revenue per unit of the vessel standardized effort as a function of 
standardized fishing effort is a horizontal line with slopping coefficient of zero. 
Hence, it is concluded that all vessels will have the same average revenue of standardized 
effort, which equals the vessel’s marginal revenue of standardized effort (from equation 3.4) 
and equals the average revenue of standardized effort of the fishery (hypothesis 3). If the 
average revenue per unit of the vessel standardized effort, ar(e), is known, this implies that 
the marginal revenue of vessel standardized effort, mr(e), and the average revenue of the 
fishery, AR(E), will be determined. Inversely, ar(e) and mc(e) will be specified since the 
average revenue of the fishery, AR(E), is known, at a given period of time.  
Hypothesis 3 
The average revenue per unit of the vessel standardized effort equals the average 
revenue of the fishery. 
 If the hypotheses 2 and 3 are not rejected, it proves a good choice of measuring standardized 
fishing effort, and the average revenue per unit of vessel standardized effort or the average 
revenue of standardized effort of the fishery will be applied in this empirical study. If these 
hypotheses are rejected, measurement of standardized effort may not be practical or marginal 
productivity of each increasing effort is diminishing in the vessels of this study.  
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3.5. FISHING EFFORT STANDARDIZATION  
The fishing effort is a core concept in model of bioeconomic, public regulation, relative 
resource assessment, and productivity of marine capture fishery (Squires, 1987). FAO (2003, 
p.39) determined that fishing effort is an abstract concept that is defined as the combined 
effect of the inputs used in fishing, including fixed components of vessel and variable 
components. The use of the variable inputs and the fixed capital components makes up the 
overall input base as an aggregate input that is underlying the measure of total fishing effort 
in order to generate catch (FAO, 2003, p.28). Early contributions, such as Pollak and Wales 
(1987) and Sathiendrakumar and Tisdell (1987), viewed fishing effort as an intermediate 
output which transfers from the factors of production to harvesting quantity. FAO (2003) also 
determined the fixed input stocks which make up the capacity base (capital base) while the 
variable inputs such as days fished or days at sea, which represents the combination of inputs 
applied to the capacity base to generate catch.   
An earlier collection of papers in this topic, Cunningham and Whitmarsh (1980) showed that 
there are two terms of fishing effort: the first is nominal fishing effort (i.e. total time spent 
fishing) as the volume of resource devoted to fishing, quantified in monetary or physical 
units, whereas effective fishing effort (in terms of fishing power of the vessel) defines as the 
biomass of fish extracted by fishing expressed as a proportion of the mean population size or 
in other words, effective fishing effort can be considered as fishing mortality. Similarly, 
Pascoe and Robinson (1996) showed that the true level of effort comprises a multitude of 
factors which is divided into two groups: the nominal (or observable) effort and the effective 
effort. 
In short term, the vessel’s major characteristics such as weight, length, engine power, hold 
size are fixed, while effort measured in days and hour of fishing (nominal fishing effort) is 
flexible. However, this nominal effort may depend on the vessel’s technical characteristics 
that are built before, which all they generate total fishing effort (Flaaten, 2009). The 
performance analysis of different vessels arise the problem if some forms of standardization 
are not performed (Padilla and Trinidad, 1995).  
According to Taylor and Prochaska (1985, p.89), “standardization of fishing effort is based 
on an index formed utilizing an aggregate fishing power function that reflects changes in the 
average input composition of vessels operating in the fishery”. Hence, fishing effort 
standardization is related to fishing power. The concept of the relative fishing power was 
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mentioned in the studies of Beverton and Holt (1957) who discussed about actual 
measurement of effective effort. Fishing power is regarded as measurement the potential 
ability of a vessel to catch fish (potential ability in terms of average vessel characteristics) 
(Beverton and Holt, 1957). Due to the within-year variations in catch rates of vessels with 
different characteristics will lead to the variations in fishing power between the vessels, 
which are usually attributed to variations in the characteristics of the vessels (Pascoe and 
Robinson, 1996). This may be significant with heterogeneity in vessels of this study with data 
of one year because the result of the analysis or estimation of fishing power is used as a way 
of standardizing fishing effort between different vessels within a given fishery (Pascoe and 
Robinson, 1996; FAO 2003, p.40).       
Measurable items such as vessel size, engine power and fishing gear are considered as factors 
affecting fishing power in previous studies. Betervon and Holt (1957) found that fishing 
power was closely correlated with gross tonnage. Byrne (1982) estimated fishing power as a 
function of vessel length and engine power, and then this estimation result was used to 
predict increases in total effort in the face of limited entry to the South Australian prawn 
fishery. Taylor and Prochaska (1985) found fishing powers of vessel in the Gulf of Mexico 
reef fish fishery were best explained by the number of crew and the size of the boat. Padilla 
and Trinidad (1995) showed that the factors affecting effective effort production was tonnage 
which varied considerably by boat type in the case of the small-pelagic fishery in central 
Philippines. Smit (1996) found that an aggregate effort measurement for Dutch cutter fleet 
was derived from the fishing capacity based on engine power of vessel and the number of 
days at sea, in which the engine power of vessels of different sizes was weighted according to 
their economic productivity.  
Additionally, Griffin et al. (1997) found that shrimp fishing power depended on vessel length 
and footrope length in the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery. The study of Alemany and Álvares 
(2003) explained that fishing effort on hake catch was considered as number of days 
multiplied by GRT (Gross Register Tonnage) of correspondent vessel in Mallorca island 
(western Mediterranean) during the period 1983-1991. In the case of Long et al. (2008), 
although the fishing effort was not directly estimated via the fishing power for longlining 
vessels in Vietnam, the authors found that productivity was best explained via hull length 
which indicates fishing power. Cunningham and Whitmarsh (1980) assumed that among the 
vessels of a given type, length, engine horsepower, tonnage and crew number, each can be 
shown to be associated with fishing power. However, measures of fishing power based on 
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more inclusive features are more accurate than standardized effort unit base on a single 
feature when comparing vessels within a fishery (FAO 2003, p.40). 
In reality, there were some methods for measures of standardized effort. A review of the 
literature of FAO (2003, p.39) shows that standardized effort measures are often constructed 
by normalizing effort by multiplying the ratio of the catch per unit effort of an existing vessel 
to the catch per unit effort of a reference vessel. An alternative version of a standardized unit 
of effort can be derived by multiplying a particular feature parameter of the vessel such as 
engine power by days fished to produce a hybrid measure (i.e. kW days fished) (FAO, 2003, 
p39-40).  
In another way, Taylor and Prochaska (1985) and Griffin et al. (1997) had applied the same 
methodology of estimation of standardized effort in the heterogeneous Gulf of Mexico vessel 
fleets, of which the standardization of nominal effort was accomplished by utilizing the 
estimated fishing power function. An index of the estimated relative fishing power of each 
vessel was firstly derived, which is based on the estimated fishing power function. Then, a 
standardized measure of fishing effort was calculated by multiplying the nominal days fished 
of each vessel by this index.  
Andersen (1999) may have presented a comprehensive review that describes the concept and 
measure of fishing effort using biological and economic approaches. The report interpreted 
fishing effort from both biological and economic perspective, of which each section included 
a theoretical part and an empirical analysis of measuring fishing effort. 
In this study, the standardized fishing effort indicators for vessels will be estimated by fishing 
effort function through the production function approach. Hannesson (1983) and Campbell 
(1991) applied the production function to estimating fishing effort in the Lofoten winter cod 
fishery and in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, respectively. Padilla and Trinidad (1995) 
also applied the production theory to fishing effort standardization in the small-pelagic 
fishery in central Philippines, of which the catch was referred to as a measure of fishing 
effort.  
The economic production function of each vessel adopted by Schaefer in equation (3.1) is a 
special form of the Cobb-Douglas function that can rewrite: 
h = qeβ1Xβ2,   β1 = β2 = 1                  (3.8) 
where h is the produced catch, e is fishing effort of each vessel, X is the stock level of fish, 
and q is a constant.  
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The general form of the economic production function is 
h = f (e, X)                                       (3.9) 
where e = g(x) and x is a vector of inputs consisting of capital (K), labour (L) and other 
variable inputs (V). With cross-sectional data of one year is considered for the short run, an 
assumption of constant the variable of resource stock is reasonable. This assumption implies 
that the production function is separable. Hence, the production function can be of form: 
h = f (g(x), X)                                    (3.10) 
The separability generating the form of equation (3.10) is presented in the studies of Squires 
(1987), Campbell (1991), and Padilla and Trinidad (1995). This separability allows 
aggregation of individual inputs into the aggregate variable fishing effort. And the effort 
function of each vessel, g(x), can be presented by the form of Cobb-Douglas function  
k
kk xxAxxxxgEFFORT
ααα ...),...,,( 21 2121 ==        (3.11) 
where kxxx ,...,, 21  are a set of inputs of the vessel, and A is a constant.  
The Cobb-Douglas - effort function was used validly in many studies of the fisheries fishing 
sector, such as the studies of Comitini and Huang (1967), Hannesson (1983), Taylor and 
Prochaska (1985), Campbell (1991), Padilla and Trinidad (1995). A literature review of 
application of Cobb-Douglas function for estimating of fishing effort, which it was quite 
fully, could be found in Campbell (1991).   
The Cobb-Douglas production function has some economic quantities of interest (Coelli et 
al., 2005). Firstly it has property of non-negative marginal product (MP) of an input, keeping 
other inputs constant. And there is the existence of diminishing marginal productivity, in 
other words, all marginal products are non-increasing with respect to an increase of the 
inputs. Secondly, the marginal rate of substitution (MRTS) between factors of production 
determines how much amount of an input is required to produce a fixed output when we use 
specific amounts of other inputs. Thirdly, the Cobb-Douglas function can exhibit decreasing 
returns to scale or constant returns to scale or increasing returns to scale. The analysis of 
scale economies is essentially a long run phenomenon since the assumption that all factors 
are variable (see appendix D in details). However, for the objectives of this study, the 
estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function demonstrates sufficient in terms of the 
standardized fishing effort between fishing vessels.  
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According to Padilla and Trinidad (1995) the fishing effort that is estimated from equation 
(3.11) is considered as standardized fishing effort. Since output of fish, which is measured 
either in weight or value of fish caught per unit of time, is chosen as a proxy of fishing 
power, this fishing power is called in terms of the effective fishing effort (Cunningham and 
Whitmarsh, 1980). 
Proxy for vessel fishing effort 
In order to estimate the standardized fishing effort by the effort function via the production 
function method, amount of fish caught per unit of time is often used as a measure of fishing 
effort. However, since it is assumed that fixed prices of fish are the same for all vessels and 
months within one year, the annual gross revenue is considered as a proxy for annual quantity 
of fish. In this study, the 2008 gross revenue, therefore, is chosen as a proxy of vessel fishing 
effort due to lack of catch volume data for each vessel.  
In addition, Cunningham and Whitmarsh (1980) assumed that a proxy of effective fishing 
effort can be measured either in weight or value of fish caught per unit of time. These two 
authors demonstrated that it depends on what the production function is to be used for. It 
might be better to consider weight if a fisher is concerned about the biological effect of 
fishing. If one is seeking economic optimum, then value of fish caught may be more relevant, 
and the authors also had stated that “catch is measured in monetary terms it often gives a 
better fit to the data” even though for biological objectives (Cunningham and Whitmarsh, 
1980). The authors explained that skippers, in fact, are more concerned about revenue than 
biomass and therefore, value of catch correlates better with inputs than weight of caught. 
Moreover, if fish caught with heterogeneous species will be better when dependent variable is 
measured in value terms (Cunningham and Whitmarsh, 1980). As a result, it is asserted that 
annual gross revenue of each vessel as a proxy for vessel fishing effort is reasonably 
considered in this study. 
Relative fishing power (RFP) and relative standardized fishing effort (e) 
Beverton and Holt (1957, pp. 172-173) defined relative fishing power (RFP) as “the ratio of 
the catch per unit fishing time of a vessel to that of another taken as standard and fishing on 
the same density of fish on the same type ground." Adapting this definition, the relative 




EFFORTe ==                    (3.12) 
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where ei is the relative standardized fishing effort of vessel i; EFFORTi is the standardized 
fishing effort of vessel i, which is estimated from equation 3.11; EFFORT  is called in terms 
of unit of standardized effort which it is an average standardized fishing effort of the vessels 
in the sample. 
 RFPi is the relative fishing power of vessel i, which is also determined by the formula (3.12) 
above. The fishing power of vessel i is compared in relation to average fishing power of the 
vessels in the sample. This method is slightly different with the definition above of the 
Beverton and Holt (1957), which the catch per unit of fishing time of a standard vessel is 
chosen for denominator in calculating RFP index. 
In this study, the relative standardized effort of vessel i, ei, is used for analyzing economic 
efficiency of fishing vessels. By nature, using the results of “standardized effort” estimated 
from equation (3.11) or “relative standardized effort” calculated from formula (3.12) will 
give the same conclusions. For the purpose of this study, the notion of the “relative 
standardized effort” is applied. The reason is that costs and earnings of each vessel can be 
compared not only among vessels, but also from their real costs and earnings. Additionally, 
calculating “relative standardized effort” of the vessel gives new indices of relative fishing 
power (RFP). These indices can express as relative fishing power efficiency of the vessels.  
 
3.6. SOME ECONOMIC CONCEPTS FOR EMPIRICAL STUDY 




subsidywithivesselofrevenueTotalear __,____=       (3.13)   
The annual revenue per unit of relative standardized effort of vessel i, without the 2008 fuel 
cost subsidy, is 
i
i e
subsidywithoutivesselofrevenueTotalear __,_____ =       (3.14) 
The average revenue per unit of relative standardized effort of the fishery assumed with all 
surveyed vessels for the case of the 2008 fuel subsidy is 

















EAR    (3.15) 
The average revenue per unit of relative standardized effort the fishery assumed including all 
















EAR     (3.16)   
The average total variable, fixed and labor costs per unit of relative standardized fishing 
effort of vessel i in 2008 is  
i
i e
ivesseloftslabourfixediableTotalavc ___cos__,_,var_=      (3.17)    
The average total costs (excluding the calculated interest on owner’s capital) per unit of 
relative standardized fishing effort of vessel i in 2008 is 
i
i e
erestcalculatedtheexcludingivesseloftsTotalatc int____,___cos_=  (3.18) 
In (3.18), total costs of vessel i consist of variable cost, fixed, labor costs, depreciation and 
interest payment on loans, except the calculated interest on vessel owner’s capital. 
The average total costs (including the calculated interest on owner’s capital) of relative 
standardized effort of vessel i in 2008 is  
i
i e
erestcalculatedtheincludingivesseloftsTotalac int____,___cos_=   (3.19)            
In the formula (3.19), total costs consist of all costs (both cash expenses and non-cash 
expenses), including variable, fixed, labor costs, depreciation, interest payment on loans and 
the calculated interest on owner’s capital. 
When values of aci are sorted from the lowest to the highest value along the horizontal axis 
from the left to the right, the marginal cost of relative standardized effort of the fishery curve, 
MC(E), is established.  
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The average total costs (including the calculated interest on owner’s capital) of relative 

















In this study, economic efficiency of the vessel is considered as cost efficiency of the vessel 
since the average revenue per unit of the vessel relative standardized effort is regarded 
identical. The ratio of costs to relative standardized effort reflects the cost efficiency of the 
vessel. Relationship between the cost efficiency and the relative standardized effort of each 
vessel will be graphed in the same manner as Figure 3.2 by Salter-diagram software. It will 
be presented in three perspectives. The short run perspective includes variable, fixed and 
labor costs. There will be two perspectives in the long run. The first long run perspective 
comprises of all costs excluding the opportunity cost of owner’s capital. The second long run 
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Chapter 4 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
4.1. DATA COLLECTION 
Data for this study was obtained by a survey of costs and earnings of gillnet fishing vessels in 
Nha Trang city of Khanh Hoa province, Vietnam with technical and operational 
characteristics as well as some other information. The information collected was based on a 
questionnaire used in previous studies on economic performance of the Nha Trang, Khanh 
Hoa fisheries (see Kim Anh et al., 2006; Long et al., 2008; Thanh Thuy, et al., 2008; and 
Khanh Ngoc, 2009). However, the questionnaire was adjusted for gillnet fishery and the 
objectives of this study (see appendix A). 
The data was collected through direct interviews with fishing households, which was 
represented by vessel owner and/or his wife in a face-to-face manner. All 2008 data was 
collected in July and August 2009 by the author. Annual fishing operation of the gillnet 
vessels often stretches from September (or October) to July (or August) of the following year. 
So, the costs and earnings survey from September of 2008 to August of 2009 is stipulated for 
2008. The previous studies had done this in Nha Trang’s fisheries, such as Kim Anh et al. 
(2006), Long et al. (2008), Thanh Thuy et al. (2008), and Khanh Ngoc et al. (2009).  
The data consists of detailed information on various aspects of gillnet fishery such as vessel 
technical characteristics, number of trips and number of total operating months in year, 
number of fishing days per trip, crew size, fixed costs and variable costs per trip, and revenue 
per fishing trip, and other information. The 2008 vessel revenue and variable costs had to be 
calculated because of the data on revenue and variable costs as the average per trip.  
 
4.2. REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE 
From a population of 225 registered offshore gillnet vessels in Nha Trang at the time of 
survey (on July 7th 2009), a sample of 58 gillnet vessels was selected for investigation (for a 
discussion of representativeness – see below). The Vinh Phuoc and Xuong Huan wards were 
chosen since the number of gillnet vessels of both two wards accounted for 95.6% of the 
population (see Table 4.1). Table 4.1 shows that the number of gillnet vessels investigated 
occupied about 25.8% of the population.  During surveying process, the apportionment of 
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range of horsepower in samples was also employed in order to obtain the sample 
representativeness.  
Table 4.1: The distribution of the gillnet vessels in sample by location 
Ward  
Population b 
Number of vessels in 
sample c 
Rate of sample 


















Total 225 100% 58 25.8% 
Notes: a other wards include Vinh Tho (3 vessels), Vinh Truong (3), Vinh Hai (1), Van 
Thang (1), Phuoc Dong (1) and Ngoc Hiep (1); b source from DECAFIREP of Khanh 
Hoa (2009); c source from own data and calculations.  
The sample representativeness was tested. Engine horsepower and hull length were selected 
to test because they were available in the database of DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa and the 
data of 58 gillnet vessels. In order to test whether this sample is a representative sample of the 
population or not, t-Test statistics are applied for hypothesis tests about the population mean, 
as well as a confidence interval of the population mean is estimated. A null hypothesis is here 
that the population mean, µ, is µ = c, against the alternative hypothesis is µ # c.  
The steps of this hypothesis test are as follows21: 
1. The null hypothesis is Ho: µ = c. The alternative hypothesis is µ # c. 





=  ~ t(N-1) if the null hypothesis is true. 
where X  is the sample mean, c is value of the population mean that is chosen for test, 
σ̂  is the standard deviation of the sample, N is the number of observations in the 
sample.  
3. Let us select the level of significance α = 0.05. The critical values for this two-tail test 
21 Theoretical contents in this section are based primarily on “Principles of Econometrics” by Hill et al., 3th 
Edition. John Wiley & Sons, 2008, p. 501-525. 
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are the 2.5-percentile t(0.025, 57) = - 2.0025 and the 97.5-percentile t(0.975, 57) = 2.0025 for 
t-distribution with N – 1 = 57 degree of freedom.  
4. We will reject the null hypothesis if the calculated value of t ≤ - 2.0025 or t ≥ 2.0025. 
If – 2.0025 ≤ t ≤ 2.0025 we will not reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that the 
sample information we have is compatible with the hypothesis that the population 
mean µ = c.  
When the null hypothesis Ho is true, the value c will fall within a 95% confidence interval 
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*0025.2 +− . 
The hypothesis testing procedures and the confidence interval above are based on the 
assumption that the population is normally distributed in order for t-statistic having a t-
distribution with N – 1 degrees of freedom. However, invoking the central limit theory says 
that the sample mean is approximately normally distributed since the sample is sufficiently 
large (N ≥ 30) (see Hill et al., 2008, p.508). This is compatible with this study since the 
sample size is 58.  
With the population means known, from Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, test results show that we do 
not reject the null hypothesis at the level of significance 5% for both cases of testing with 
engine power and hull length. The results also indicate that the population means known of 
engine power and hull length belong the 95% confidence intervals of their population mean. 
Thus, there is no evidence against the null hypotheses. The sample information of 58 gillnet 
vessels is compatible with the population of 225 gillnet vessels in NhaTrang. It would be 
surprised if this sample of 58 gillnet vessels is not considered as a representative sample of 
Nha Trang offshore gillnet population.  
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Table 4.2: A brief descriptive statistics for the sample and the population 
Variable Sample a Mean of the 
population b 








   1.55 
211.50 
 16.14 
Sources: a own data and calculations, b DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2009) 
Table 4.3: Test about the population mean for horsepower 
 
Sources: own data and calculations 
 
Table 4.4: Test about the population mean for hull length 
 
 
Sources: own data and calculations 
However, there would be some uncertainty about the reliability of the results with any survey 
(Pascoe, Robinson and Coglan, 1996, p.38). In this study, the investigating process was 
performed to try and capture a representative sample. Horsepower and hull length were two 
physical characteristics used to test the sample representativeness due to the available 
information of data. It was found that the population data of horsepower might not confident 
because there were some differences among horsepower registered at the Khanh Hoa’s 
DECAFIREP (Department of Capture Fisheries and Resources Protection) and actual 
horsepower surveyed. The Khanh Hoa’s DECAFIREP only allowed registering maximum 
450 HP of engine power in the past time, whereas the real engine power of some vessels was 
more than 450 HP, which were collected confidently through interviewing fishers trusted 





Difference Lower Upper 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Test Value = 211.5 





Difference Lower Upper 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Test Value = 16.14 
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well. Thus, the confidence of the population data for HP is questionable. As a result, the 
investigated sample has low representative for this population in terms of horsepower. 
Regardless of horsepower, a comparison of the hull length of the sample and those of the 
offshore gillnet fleet in Nha Trang as a whole suggest that the sample was fairly 
representative of the fleet. It can only be assumed that this extended to economic 
performance. Nevertheless, economic analyses of this study are considered for the sample 
data rather than for population.   
 
4.3. TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 4.5 presents a summary of technical and operational data for 58 surveyed offshore 
gillnet vessels. All parameters are per vessel. “Engine” and “Length” are engine power and 
hull length (measured in metric system), respectively. “Age” shows age of vessel. “Gear” 
indicates the average number of pieces of gill net used in the fishing operation year 2008. 
“Months”, “Trips” and “Days fished” are total operating months, number of fishing trips and 
number of days fished in the year 2008, respectively. “Fuel” is the level of fuel consumption 
in the year (in 1000 liters). “Crew” is crew size including captain (in persons). 
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of some technical and operational characteristics of 
the 58 gillnet vessels. 
58 50.00 630.00 249.57 149.30
58 13.50 20.05 16.43 1.55
58 2.00 21.00 8.69 5.24
58 150.00 350.00 267.74 63.56
58 7.00 12.00 10.31 1.05
58 7.00 33.00 13.52 5.36
58 140.00 288.00 231.24 28.64
58 11.00 55.00 31.92 11.84











N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Deviation
 
Source: own data and calculations. 
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The results in Table 4.5 show that the sample vessels are heterogeneous in terms of technical 
and operational characteristics. Engine powers for the sample gillnet vessels ranged from 50 
to 630 HP, with a mean of about 249.57 HP. Hull length varied from 13.5 to 20.05 m, with an 
average length of 16.43 m. The average age of the vessels was about 8.7 years, of which the 
youngest age is 2 years, whereas the oldest one is 21 years of age. The vessel age is estimated 
from year of construction to year 2008. It is not the case of estimating from year of 
purchasing of a second hand vessel. The average number of pieces of gillnet used for fishing 
of the vessels were nearly 268 pieces, with a range from 150 to 350 pieces. The average total 
operating months and the average number of fishing trips of the vessels were 10.31 months 
and 13.52 trips, with a range from 7 to 12 months and a range from 7 to 33 trips in the year 
2008, respectively. Total fishing days of the vessels in the year also varied from 140 to 288 
days, with an average of about 231 days. The average crew size was 10.47 persons, with a 
range from 8 to 12 persons. A final characteristic is the level of fuel consumption for the 
fishing operations in 2008. The average total number of fuel used of the vessels was 31.92 
thousand liters, with a range of fuel consumed from 11 to 55 thousand liters. 
Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics of some technical and operational characteristics 
among vessel groups of the 58 gillnet vessels. 
64.58 11.96 148.44 54.73 333.95 33.27 452.73 63.73
14.72 .66 15.53 .94 17.22 1.00 18.23 .67
14.17 3.38 10.00 4.58 6.95 4.17 3.82 3.25
184.25 29.02 240.31 46.56 307.47 31.38 330.09 15.30
9.83 1.19 10.00 1.15 10.63 .96 10.73 .47
21.00 5.72 12.63 4.47 11.16 2.34 10.73 .47
212.67 32.43 219.63 20.47 240.53 27.46 252.36 15.74
17.29 4.48 26.93 7.93 37.75 7.10 45.05 6.46












50 <= HP < 90
(N=12)
Mean S.D.
90 <= HP < 250
(N=16)
Mean S.D.
250 <= HP < 400
(N=19)
Mean S.D.




Source: own data and calculations 
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Table 4.6 presents a comparison of technical and operational characteristics between four 
groups of the offshore gillnet vessels, which are categorized according to engine sizes. 
Almost figures in Table 4.6 show the large mean values in the groups with great engine size, 
except the age characteristic and the number of fishing trips in the year.  Characteristics such 
as hull length, number of pieces of gill net, total number of fishing days and fuel consumption 
had remarkable differences among the first two groups with smaller engines and the last two 
groups with higher engines. For example, the average number of pieces of gill net was 307.47 
and 330.09 for the 250-400 HP vessel group and group with engine of 400HP and larger, 
respectively; whereas the 50-90HP and 90-250HP vessel groups, on average, only had 184.24 
and 240.21 pieces, respectively. For vessel age, the average age of the vessels with engine of 
400 HP and larger is 3.82 years while those of 50-90 HP engine vessels is 14.17 years. The 
average number of fishing trips was 21 trips for the 50-90HP group, but vessel groups with 
engine of more than 250 HP were only round 11 trips per year. 
In summary, Tables 4.5 and 4.6 shows the 58 offshore gillnet vessels were quite 
heterogeneous because there were quite great differences in some technical and operational 
characteristics. 
 
4.4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF STRUCTURE OF FIXED CAPITAL 
Fixed capital stock or investment capital 
Table 4.7 presents the investment capital re-valued at prices of year 2008 for the vessels. The 
average amount of investment capital re-valued (or capital invested or fixed capital stock or 
the value of the vessel) of a vessel is computed at 1,481.3 million VND with a wide range 
from 559.1 to 2,513.0 million VND (see appendix E in detail). These figures just reflect the 
total investment capital or total value of the vessel already in operation. The vessel fixed 
assets are valued basing on original investments and annual consumer price indices in order 
to convert the value of year 2008. Of the total investment, fishing gear consumed an average 
amount of 771.8 million VND, accounted for about 52.1% in total. It took the greatest share 
in the components of the total fixed capital stocks. Hull and engine on average are valued at 
422.2 and 199.2 million VND, ranking in the second and third position with 28.5% for hull 
and 13.4% for engine in total capital invested, respectively.  
Contrary to fishing gear, hull and engine, other items such as mechanical equipments, 
electronic equipments and storage facilities accounted for a modest proportion of the total 
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fixed capital stocks (Table 4.7). Mechanical equipments included winch, dynamo, lighting 
system, battery. Most vessels are equipped electronic equipments such as compass, sonar and 
short-distance communication equipment. Long-distance communication equipment is more 
widely used on large engine vessels. There were a few vessels using radar. 
Table 4.7: Investment components of the 58 gillnet vessels 
131.8 875.0 422.2 196.8
29.3 480.0 199.2 98.9
22.5 57.0 38.5 8.7
8.8 80.6 27.7 11.1
288.0 1155.0 771.8 249.3
1.8 30.0 11.1 7.1
4.7 17.0 10.7 2.7
559.1 2513.0 1481.3 521.1
   Hull
   Engine
   Mechanical equipments
   Electronic equipments
   Fishing gear
   Storage equipments
   Others
Total fixed capital stocks
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
 
Unit: million VND per vessel. Source: own data and calculations 
Table 4.8: Investment components among vessel groups of the 58 gillnet vessels 
195.8 50.8 323.0 83.7 515.6 144.7 652.2 133.3
93.4 41.2 180.0 66.0 215.3 70.3 314.9 96.3
29.6 3.1 33.8 1.0 40.4 5.6 52.1 5.1
20.9 8.3 27.5 8.1 26.5 6.6 37.4 17.0
452.2 132.2 656.6 175.0 919.1 108.9 1033.7 85.8
3.9 1.2 6.6 2.9 14.6 4.3 19.7 6.5
7.9 1.3 9.9 2.1 11.3 2.1 13.7 2.0
803.7 181.5 1237.4 282.0 1742.9 245.2 2123.6 232.1
   Hull
   Engine
   Mechanical equip.
   Electronic equip.
   Fishing gear
   Storage equip.
   Others
Total fixed capital stocks
Mean S.D.
        50<=HP<90      
(N=12)
Mean S.D.
         90<=HP<250   
(N=16)
Mean S.D.
        250<=HP<400   
(N=19)
Mean S.D.
         HP >= 400       
(N=11)
Range of engine power
 
Unit: million VND per vessel. Source: own data and calculations 
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Table 4.8 describes capital invested among four vessel groups by engine size category. The 
average fixed capital stock increased with vessel engine sizes. Two vessel groups with higher 
engine power had investment capitals far greater than those of smaller engine groups. Fishing 
gear also occupied a high ratio with around 50% of investment capital in vessel groups. 
Net capital value 
Net capital value is the remaining fixed capital stock at the year 2008 after subtracting the 
accumulated depreciation from fixed capital stock or investment capital. The average net 
capital value at 2008 is estimated about 862.8 million VND (Table 4.9). Fishing gear and 
hull, on average, also held the biggest amounts of net capital value: 42% for fishing gear and 
35.6% for hull. 
Table 4.9: Components of the net capital value of the 58 gillnet vessels at 2008 
 
Unit: million VND per vessel. Source: own data and calculations 
It can be calculated that net capital value of an average vessel at 2008 occupied about 58.2% 
of its fixed capital stocks (calculated from Tables 4.7 and 4.9). This means that, until year 
2008, the loss in the value of an average vessel (or accumulated depreciation) was about 
41.8% of capital invested. Similarly, 47% and 73% were percentages of net capital value to 
capital invested of fishing gear and hull, respectively. This implies that the accumulated 
depreciation accounted for 53% for fishing gear and 27% for hull, respectively. It can be 
explained that depreciation rate of fishing gear is more than that of hull (the average lifespan 
8.7 805.0 307.1 209.5 
.0 432.0 145.3 93.0 
9.7 41.1 22.9 7.7 
2.0 58.3 14.4 9.3 
89.1 701.3 363.4 165.2 
.5 20.0 5.7 4.5 
1.2 11.3 4.1 2.8 
171.5 1954.0 862.8 454.7 
   Hull 
   Engine 
   Mechanical equipments 
   Electronic equipments 
   Fishing gear 
   Storage equipments 
   Others 
Total net capital value 
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
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is estimated about 8.5 years for fishing gear and 24 years for hull) while capital invested for 
fishing gear was higher than that of hull.  
Table 4.10: Components of the net capital value among vessel groups at 2008 
92.8 45.1 199.1 87.7 388.6 178.8 557.3 153.3
46.6 36.7 119.7 41.8 160.8 62.6 263.4 97.7
17.2 3.8 18.7 3.8 23.9 6.1 33.6 5.8
6.4 3.1 11.4 6.0 15.7 4.9 25.5 12.4
178.6 55.7 278.9 95.3 423.8 94.3 583.5 99.4
1.2 .7 2.8 1.5 7.1 1.7 12.2 4.1
1.7 .7 2.5 1.4 4.7 2.0 7.6 3.0
344.5 108.1 633.0 185.7 1024.6 274.1 1483.1 314.2
   Hull
   Engine
   Mechanical equip.
   Electronic equip.
   Fishing gear
   Storage equip.
   Others
Total net capital value
Mean S.D.
       50<=HP<90      
(N=12)
Mean S.D.
       90<=HP<250     
(N=16)
Mean S.D.
        250<=HP<400   
(N=19)
Mean S.D.
       HP >= 400       
(N=11)
Range of engine power
 
Unit: million VND per vessel. Source: own data and calculations 
Table 4.10 shows components of the net capital value among vessel groups at year 2008. The 
average net capital value also increased with engine sizes. Two vessel groups with higher 
engines had the net capital value far higher than those of two groups with smaller engines. 
The average net capital value of vessels with engine of 400HP and larger was estimated about 
1483.1 million VND, accounting for nearly 70% of their capital invested, while those of 50-
90 HP vessels was 344.5 million VND, accounting for 43% of their capital invested, 
respectively. The reason is that an average age was about 3.82 and 14.17 years for the former 
and the latter vessels, respectively (see Table 4.6). Of vessels with engine of 400HP and 
larger, there were 10 vessels with their age from 2 to 5 years.  
Structure of net capital value 
Structure of net capital value comprises of the remaining debt (called in terms of loan as in 
Table 4.11 and 4.12) and owner’s capital of the vessels at the time of 2008. An average vessel 
owner’s capital is estimated about 766.1 million VND, accounting for 88.8% in net capital 
value, whereas average remaining debt of the vessel was 96.7 million VND – corresponding 
ratio of 11.2%, (Table 4.11). This implies that fishers tend to be highly self-financed. As 
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shown in Table 4.12, at year 2008, the remaining debt and owner’s capital of the vessels 
increased with engine sizes. Two higher engine groups had the greatest amount of owner’s 
capital.  
Table 4.11: Structure of the net capital value of the 58 gillnet vessels at 2008 
 
Unit: million VND per vessel. Source: own data and calculations 
Table 4.12: Structure of the net capital value among vessel groups at year 2008 
 
Unit: million VND per vessel. Source: own data and calculations 
By investigation, 12 out of the 58 vessel owners responded that they had not borrowed and 
paid any loan. 21 vessel owners had paid all their debts and loan interest before 2008, of 
which there were loans from the offshore fishery program initiated by the Vietnamese 
government. Meanwhile, there were 27 vessel owners to provide information about their 
remaining debts at year 2008 and their interest payment on loans in 2008 (see appendix E in 
detail). The fishers borrowed from various sources such as relatives, neighbors, banks, 
middle-buyers, with diversified interests of loans. Three vessels had debts from some loan 
sources. Three vessels still had to pay debts from the national offshore fishery program with 
an interest rate from 0.5 to 0.6% per month. There were 15 vessels to borrow from their 
relatives, of which 5 vessels paid loan interest of 0%. 23 vessel owners admitted they had 
.0 500.0 96.7 142.1 
171.5 1771.5 766.1 435.3 
171.5 1954.0 862.8 454.7 
   Loan 
   Owner’s capital 
Total net capital value 
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
36.1 40.7 95.4 159.6 86.8 126.8 181.8 183.4 
308.5 81.6 537.5 209.1 937.7 326.5 1301.3 330.4 
344.5 108.1 633.0 185.7 1024.6 274.1 1483.1 314.2 
   Loan 
   Owner’s capital 
Total net capital value 
Mean S.D. 
  50<=HP<90         
(N=12) 
Mean S.D. 






   HP >= 400        
(N=11) 
Range of engine power 
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obtained loans from banks. Most loans from banks are performed from year 2005 to 2008 
with a range of interest rate from 0.7 to 1.75% per month. 
The majority of fishers noted that it was difficult to access loans from banks because the 
banks always insist on secured loans to minimize risks while fishing operations are greatly 
exposed to risks. For example, the banks only lend at a limited level since a new vessel is 
constructed completely or an old vessel is re-valued sensibly. In addition, fishing gear often 
consumed a large amount of investment capital, but it may not be put up as security for a 
loan. Thus, a joint investment was often established on the basic of kinship for vessels.  
 
4.5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF STRUCTURE OF COSTS 
Variable costs 
The annual average vessel variable costs was of about 604.4 million VND with a wide range 
from 280 to 880 million VND, of which expenses for fuel and lubricant were highest with 
371.4 million VND (corresponding to accounting for 61.4% of annual variable costs), also 
with a large range from 150 to 600 million VND (Table 4.13). Provisions for crew and ice for 
preserving fish held the second and third important components in annual variable costs, 
respectively.   
As presented in Table 4.5, the technical and operational characteristics such as engine power, 
the number of fishing months, trips and days fished, the number of fuel consumed, as well as 
crew size of the vessels varied greatly in 2008. Thus, the annual vessel variable costs and its 
components also fluctuated with wide ranges showed in Table 4.13.  
Table 4.13: Structure of the variable costs of the 58 gillnet vessels, 2008. 
150.0 600.0 371.4 128.1
20.0 130.0 70.8 27.4
45.0 155.0 100.4 26.4
15.0 90.0 54.3 20.9
2.0 20.0 7.5 3.3
280.0 880.0 604.4 174.5
   Fuel & Lubricant
   Ice
   Provisions
   Minor repairs
   Others
Total variable costs
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
 
Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations 
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Table 4.14: Structure of the variable costs among vessel groups, 2008 
199.3 40.1 317.8 84.3 448.7 61.5 503.5 59.9
41.9 10.3 54.6 13.6 84.0 20.1 102.9 16.6
74.3 19.0 90.3 17.4 113.9 22.9 120.0 20.6
45.8 21.0 61.6 23.6 59.6 16.8 44.1 18.1
5.1 2.0 6.9 2.1 8.4 3.1 9.5 4.7
366.3 50.5 531.3 101.8 714.7 97.7 780.0 67.0
   Fuel & Lubricant
   Ice
   Provisions
   Minor repairs
   Others
Total variable costs
Mean S.D.
       50<=HP<90      
(N=12)
Mean S.D.
    90<=HP<250      
(N=16)
Mean S.D.
     250<=HP<400      
(N=19)
Mean S.D.
      HP >= 400      
(N=11)
Range of engine power
 
Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations 
 The annual average variable costs and its components almost increased with engine sizes 
(Table 4.14). The 400 HP or larger vessels consumed higher amounts of fuel, provisions and 
ice. However, expenses for minor repairs (mainly fishing gear), of this vessel group was 
lowest. One of the reasons is that these vessels almost operated in fishing grounds of high sea 
waters and the extreme South of Vietnam, and resulting in a few damages and losses with 
their fishing gear. Additionally, most these vessels were from 2 to 5 years of old. This may 
result in lowest minor repair costs of equipments. 
Fixed cost 
Fixed costs included annual major repair costs and fees and insurance for crews and the 
vessel in year 2008. The major repair costs were for hull, engine, mechanical and storage 
equipments, and fishing gear. In this study, the major repairs just covered those preparing for 
the next year or season. The repair costs for fishing gear comprised of costs of fixing gear as 
well as money paid for labors to mend nets, including family-member labors. Yearly, the 
vessel is required to have a paper of register certificate so the vessel owners have to pay at 
least fee for this.  
Table 4.15 shows that the average vessel fixed cost substantially varied from 30 to 150.9 
million VND, with a mean of 89.4 million VND in 2008. The annual average repair costs of 
hull, engine and equipments accounted for a greatest amount of 44.4 million VND. However, 
respondents noted that repair costs of fishing gear were larger than that of each of hull, 
engine and equipments. Through direct interviews, none of the vessel owners paid the annual 
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fee of register and insurance for crew and vessel. Thus, this item of fixed cost greatly varied 
from 0.3 to 12.6 million VND. 
Table 4.15: Structure of the fixed cost of the 58 gillnet vessels, 2008 
13.0 85.0 44.4 14.3
10.0 80.0 39.9 18.9
.3 12.6 5.1 3.0
30.0 150.9 89.4 30.1
   Hull,  engine, equipments
   Fishing gear
   Fees and insurance
Total fixed costs
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
 
Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations 
Table 4.16: Structure of the fixed cost among vessel groups, 2008 
32.8 8.5 41.3 10.5 53.9 12.0 45.4 17.4
22.2 6.8 26.1 13.5 50.6 12.0 60.6 8.6
3.2 2.4 4.6 3.1 6.0 2.6 6.4 3.4
58.1 10.3 71.9 23.6 110.6 20.9 112.4 17.9
   Hull,  engine, equipments
   Fishing gear
   Fees & insurance
Total fixed costs
Mean S.D.
       50<=HP<90    
(N=12)
Mean S.D.
        90<=HP<250    
(N=16)
Mean S.D.
       250<=HP<400    
(N=19)
Mean S.D.
          HP >= 400      
(N=11)
Range of engine power
 
Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations 
Table 4.16 presents the structure of the fixed cost among vessel groups by engine sizes. It can 
be seen that the fixed cost increased with engine sizes. Among vessel groups, the 400 HP and 
greater vessel group had the highest repair cost of 60.6 million VND for fishing gear, 
whereas this group had lower repair costs for hull, engine and equipments than the 250-400 
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Depreciation 
Table 4.17 shows that the average vessel depreciation was 136.4 million VND with a wide 
range from 60.5 to 215.4 million VND. The composition of component items in depreciation 
is considered to be compatible with that in capital invested. Depreciation of fishing gear was 
at the highest level of 91.8 million VND. Because the lifespan of gill net is fairly short, often 
replacing within the range 7 – 10 years, this kind of gear is often required rapid depreciation 
compared with other gear, even when the usage period of time can be extended. Since gill 
nets are used for fishing in many years, the sea blue of gill nets would be faded by many 
times of fishing, resulting in keeping off from fishing gear by target species. Moreover, fish 
could easily escape from mesh since gill nets are so old. Hence, productivity of fishing would 
decrease over time.  
As can be obtained from investigation, the majority of owners who had vessels with engine of 
more than 250 HP often replaced their fishing gear after 7 or 8 years. This is one of the 
reasons why these vessels had great depreciation for fishing gear showed in Table 4.18.  
Contrary to fishing gear, hull and engine can be operated for a long time, with 15 – 25 years 
and 7 – 20 years, respectively, in this study. Thus, the annual hull and engine depreciation are 
generally lower than depreciation of fishing gear. 
Table 4.17: Structure of depreciation of the 58 gillnet vessels, 2008. 
7.0 35.0 17.6 7.3
4.2 24.0 11.6 4.2
5.4 10.9 8.1 1.5
1.5 5.7 3.1 .7
36.0 144.4 91.8 32.9
.5 5.0 2.4 1.3
.8 2.8 1.8 .4
60.5 215.4 136.4 45.8
   Hull
   Engine
   Mechanical equipment
   Electronic equipment
   Fishing gear
   Storage equipmet
   Others
Total depreciation
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
 
Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations 
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Table 4.18: Structure of depreciation among vessel groups, 2008. 
9.4 1.7 13.4 2.9 21.3 4.9 26.1 5.3
6.3 1.7 10.4 2.4 12.9 2.1 16.9 3.4
6.1 .6 7.5 .6 8.6 .9 10.1 .5
2.5 .7 3.0 .4 3.1 .6 3.8 .9
49.2 10.7 74.3 18.2 111.8 15.8 129.2 10.7
1.0 .3 1.6 .6 3.2 .7 3.9 .9
1.3 .2 1.7 .3 1.9 .3 2.3 .3
75.7 12.0 111.8 22.0 162.9 19.6 192.3 14.8
   Hull
   Engine
   Mechanical equip.
   Electronic equip.
   Fishing gear
   Storage equip.
   Others
Total depreciation
Mean S.D.
       50<=HP<90       
(N=12)
Mean S.D.
       90<=HP<250     
(N=16)
Mean S.D.
       250<=HP<400    
(N=19)
Mean S.D.
       HP >= 400         
(N=11)
Range of engine power
 
Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations 
Interest payment on loans and the calculated interest on owner’s capital 
The average interest payment on loans of the vessels was 8.9 million VND, with a range from 
0 to 42 million VND (Table 4.19). There were 31 vessel owners not to pay any loan in 2008; 
in contrast, 27 vessel owners had to pay interest on their loans (see appendix E in detail) with 
different rate of interest, which is mentioned in section 4.4.  
Interest payment on loans increased with engine sizes (see Table 4.20). As presented, the 
large engine vessels had a great value of net capital of hull and engine. Thus, these vessels 
would have a larger security for loans; lenders would loan a greater level for these vessels 
compared with other small engine vessels. This may be compatible with results in Table 4.20 
that the vessel group with engine of 400 HP and larger had the highest interest payment on 
loans in average (19.8 million VND), 2.3 times higher than that of the 250-400HP group, 3.7 
times greater than that of the 90-250 HP group, and 4.5 times larger than that of the 50-90 HP 
group. 
Also shown in Table 4.19 and 4.20 are the calculated interest on owner’s capital of the vessel. 
The average of this item substantially varied from 15.4 to 159.4 million VND, with a mean of 
68.9 million VND (Table 4.19). This interest also increased with vessel engine sizes (Table 
4.20 and appendix E in detail).  
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Table 4.19: Interest payment on loans and the calculated interest on owner’ capital of 
the 58 gillnet vessels, 2008. 
 
Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations 
Table 4.20: Interest payment on loans and the calculated interest on owner’ capital among 
vessel groups, 2008 
 
Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations 
As discussed partially in chapter 3 (section 3.2), the calculated interest on owner’s capital is 
considered as the opportunity cost of owner’s capital. The 2008 base interest rate in 
Vietnamese dong to be about 9% per annum is chosen as a benchmark for determining the 
opportunity cost of capital in this study. There may be some reasonable explanations for this. 
First, the fixed assets on the vessel may not be easily altered to participate in other sectors of 
the economy, other than into another fishery (Agar and Sutinen, 2004). Moreover, it is 
difficult to assess the degree of financial risk involved in the activity of other industries since 
information is imperfect in some developing countries as Vietnam. Second, it is difficult to 
identify an appropriate rate of return in Nha Trang fishery with the diversity of vessel kinds 
of different fishing activities. Third, the habit of fishers is often to either deposit their savings 
in bank or lend others as a loan since they have a saving amount of money.   
 
 
.0 42.0 8.9 13.9 
15.4 159.4 68.9 39.2 
Interest payment on loans 
Calculated interest on 
owner’s capital                      
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
4.4 5.4 5.3 10.2 8.6 13.7 19.8 19.8 
27.8 7.3 48.4 18.8 84.4 29.4 117.1 29.7 
Interest payment on 
loans 
Calculated interest on 
owner’s capital                    
Mean S.D. 
   50<=HP<90      
(N=12) 
Mean S.D. 






   HP >= 400       
(N=11) 
Range of engine power 
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4.6. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS  
Data analysis procedures were conducted by using Microsoft Excel 2003; the Salter-diagram 
software; the statistical package SPSS version 15.0; and by the econometric and statistical 
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Chapter 5 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
5.1. ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
This study uses engine capacity (measured in horsepower) and fishing gear (measured by the 
average number of pieces of gill net) as proxies for capital inputs, and the number of fishing 
days in a year as the proxy for variable inputs. All are identified as factors affecting fishing 
effort of the vessel. Initially, other inputs such as hull length and crew size were also 
considered part of the input bundle generating fishing effort. However, they were excluded in 
the final model because neither individual nor joint tests produced any evidence to support 
their significant effects on the fishing effort of the vessel. Consequently, the equation used in 
the application of the model of this study is 
321* ααα iiii DAYGEARHPAEFFORT =           (5.1) 
 
where EFFORTi is the standardized fishing effort of vessel i, HPi is horsepower of vessel i, 
GEARi is the average number of pieces of gill nets of vessel i, DAYi is the number of fishing 
days in a year of vessel i, A is a constant.  
Model in specification: 
From equation 5.1, the log-linear effort model for vessel i can be written as follows: 
riiii uDAYGEARHPEFFORT ++++= lnlnlnln 3210 αααα       (5.2) 
where α0, α1, α2, α3 are coefficients estimated, in which A = exp(α0), and ur is a random error 
term.  
HP is engine capacity of the vessel, which is measured in horsepower. It is expected that 
engine power has positive effects on the fishing power of the vessel. 
GEAR is the average number of pieces of gill net used to fish in the fishing season of the year 
2008. When one fisher uses more pieces of gill net for fishing than others do, he might expect 
that his catch will be higher. Thus, it may be predicted that this independent variable have the 
strongest positive impact on the fishing power.  
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DAY shows the total number of fishing days in the year 2008. The data available from the 
survey only have the total average number of fishing days per trip and the total number of 
fishing trips in the year (whereby the total number of fishing days in the year is the product of 
these two quantities). If a fisher fishes one day more, his total catch in year will increase 
accordingly. Therefore, it is expected that this independent variable has positive relationship 
with fishing effort. 
                                                                                    
5.2. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
In this section, the regression analysis results of standardized fishing effort for Nha Trang’s 
58 gillnet vessels in 2008 are presented. The parameters estimated, test of goodness of fit 
(R2), and test of overall significance of the regression model (F-test) for model 5.2 are 
reported in Table 5.1 by using ordinary least square (OLS) estimation. The results show the 
effect of the independent variables in explaining variations in fishing effort is significant for 
the sample vessels with R2 of 98.7%. The F – test specifically shows the null hypothesis that 
all coefficients of the explanatory variables are zero is rejected, and provides that the 
estimated relationship is significant. 
Table 5.1: Parameter estimate and test statistics of standardized effort function 
VARIABLE  ESTIMATED                           WHITE      WHITE    
NAME      COEFFICIENT    t-value  P-VALUE     t-value    P-VALUE              
lnHP       0.251        16.229    0.000*      20.120      0.000*      
lnGEAR     0.542        12.451    0.000*      12.200      0.000*      
lnDAY      0.478         9.704    0.000*      11.060      0.000*      
CONSTANT  -0.045        -0.153    0.879       -0.161      0.873     
Dependent Variable: lnEFFORT;  
R-square = 0.987; F - statistic = 1394.375; DW-statistic = 2.027   
* Statistically significant at the level of 1% 
Source: own data and calculations 
However, a good regression model should not violate the least square assumptions. The 
hypotheses testing outcome procedures have shown that autocorrelation are not the problem 
in this model. The calculated value for Durbin-Watson statistic is d = 2.027, whereas upper 
and lower critical value bounds for the Durbin-Watson test are dUc = 1.51 and dLc = 1.30, 
respectively, with 58 observations and 3 explanatory variables at 1% of significant level.  
Since value of d nears 2 or satisfies dUc < d < 4 - dUc we can conclude that there is no 
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evidence to suggest that autocorrelation exists (Hill et al., 2008, p. 261-264). This conclusion 
is reasonable with cross-section observations (Hill et al., 2008, p. 227).  
When using cross-sectional data, heteroskedasticity is often encountered (Hill et al., 2008, p. 
200). The OLS procedure outcome has shown the random error values are normally 
distributed about their mean of zero (3.15E-14 is considered to close with 0) with standard 
deviation of 0.973, approximately 1. Standardized residuals are plotted along standardized 
predicted values have shown that there may be no patterns of any sorts in the residuals (see 
appendix F). However, the potential problem of heteroskedasticity can be warned for a 
formal treatment (Flaaten et al., 1995). Thus, White’s procedure for correcting for 
heteroskedasticity is applied and White’s heteroskedasticity consistent t-values are also 
reported in Table 5.1.  
The second potential problem of this model is multicollinearity since the sample correlation 
coefficients between the explanatory variables are considered high (see appendix F). 
However, this may not be an important problem for four reasons: first, the coefficients 
estimated are statistically significant, and have the expected signs and magnitudes. Second, 
these coefficients are not sensitive since few observations are deleted from samples of 58 
gillnet vessels for test of collinearity. Third, estimating the auxiliary regressions by choosing 
each of one of explanatory variables as an artificial dependent variable while keeping the 
remaining explanatory variables; the results show that all R2 of these artificial models are less 
than R2 of 0.987 in the main model of this study and level of 0.80 discussed in Hill et al. 
(2008, p.156). Finally, a nonexact multicollinearity is not a violation of the least square 
assumptions. Therefore, there is no reason to try mitigating multicollinearity.  
The RESET test (Regression Specification Error Test) is also reported to detect omitted 
variables and incorrect functional form (Hill et al., 2008, p. 151-152). The outcome of this 
test indicates that the model is adequate and well specified (see appendix F). 
Table 5.1 demonstrates that all coefficients estimated of the explanatory variables are 
significantly different from zero at 1% level or better based on the OLS estimation with 
White’s procedure for correcting for heteroskedasticity. These parameters, estimated with 
positive signs, are expected in this model to register values of 0.251, 0.542 and 0.478 
corresponding lnHP, lnGEAR and lnDAY, respectively. Keeping other variables constant, a 
10% increase in horsepower (HP) is estimated to produce about a 2.51% in the fishing effort 
of the vessel. Similarly, the elasticity corresponding to the average number of pieces of gill 
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nets (GEAR) estimates that a 10% increase in this factor will increase average fishing effort 
of the vessel by 5.42%, given other inputs constant. Regarding the effect of the nominal 
fishing effort, the effective fishing effort will increase 4.78% since days fished increases 
10%, given other inputs constant.  
 
5.3. ESTIMATES OF STANDARDIZED FISHING EFFORT  
The estimated fishing effort equation is used to derive standardized measures of fishing effort 
for each vessel as follows: 
478.0542.0251.0*)045.0exp( iiii DAYGEARHPEFFORT −=   (5.3) 
In this study, the estimated equation (5.3), the actual engine power, the average number of 
pieces of gill net and the number of fishing days for each vessel are used to estimate the 
standardized fishing effort. Estimated results for 2008 for each of the sample vessels are 
presented in Figure 5.1 and appendix G in detail.  
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of the standardized effort and the relative 
standardized effort of the 58 gillnet vessels 
 
Source: own data and calculations 
The average standardized fishing effort is 1043.18 (unit of effort). The vessel number 35 has 
the minimum standardized effort of 478.53 (units of effort), whereas the maximum 
standardized effort of 1514.77 is amount of fishing efforts of the vessel number 30 (see 
Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2). 
58 478.53 1514.77 1043.18 336.64 
58 .46 1.45 1.00 .32 
Standardized effort 
Relative standardized effort 
N Min Max Mean S.D. 
72 
















































Figure 5.2: Relative standardized fishing effort of the 58 the gillnet vessels. Note: sorted from the lowest to the highest effort level. Source: 
own data and calculations 
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5.4. RELATIVE STANDARDIZED EFFORT AND RELATIVE FISHING POWER 
INDEX 
Applying the formula 3.12, the relative standardized fishing effort is computed for each of the 
sample vessels. The average value of relative standard effort is equal to one. The minimum 
and maximum of the relative standardized effort are 0.46 and 1.45, corresponding to the 
vessel number 35 and 30, respectively (see Figure 5.2, Table 5.2 and appendix G in detail).  
The relative standardized effort indices are also considered as the relative fishing power 
(RFP) indices in the same manner of measure. Figure 5.2 shows that RFP indices range from 
0.46 to 1.45 for the 58 surveyed vessels (see appendix G in detail). There were 28 vessels 
with a relative fishing power less than one, whereas 30 vessels had the relative fishing power 
greater than one, which is an average RFP index of all vessels in the sample and also as the 
RFP index of an artificial standard vessel. The vessel number 43 with the RFP of 1.0035, 
most closely with 1, is considered to nearly equal the average RFP index.  The majority of 
vessels with RFP indices above the average RFP index had engine power of more than 250 
HP and 300 pieces of gill net and over.   
 
5.5. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE INDICATOR RESULTS 
Economic performance indicators, including the 2008 fuel subsidies 
The key economic performance indicators for an average gillnet vessel are given in Table 5.3 
and summarized partially in Figure 5.3, including the 2008 fuel subsidies of Vietnamese 
government. There were three vessel classes of the subsidies in 2008. Vessels with an engine 
of 90 HP or larger received the total subsidies of 30 million VND per year. Vessels with 
engine of from 40 HP to less than 90HP were subsidized total values of 26 million VND. 
Others received 20 million VND in 2008 (Decision 965/QD-TTg, 2008). All 58 surveyed 
gillnet vessels received enough the subsidies. The relative performance indicators include 
gross profit margin, profit margin, return on capital value, and return on owner’s capital. 
Gross profit margin is estimated by dividing gross cash flow by gross revenue with the 
subsidies. Profit margin, return on capital value and return on owner’s capital estimated by 
dividing profit by gross revenue with the subsidies, net capital value and net owner’s capital, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.3: Economic performance indicators, including the 2008 fuel cost support 
480.0 1550.0 1044.6 341.2
26.0 30.0 29.2 1.6
506.0 1580.0 1073.7 342.3
280.0 880.0 604.4 174.5
140.0 810.0 469.3 193.8
30.0 150.9 89.4 30.1
84.2 702.2 379.9 172.3
57.8 396.0 184.1 78.4
-35.8 440.2 195.8 121.2
60.5 215.4 136.4 45.8
.0 42.0 8.9 13.9
-152.5 249.3 50.5 93.1
15.4 159.4 68.9 39.2
-211.0 157.1 -18.4 84.4
171.5 1954.0 862.8 454.7
171.5 1771.5 766.1 435.3
-.045 .315 .173 .083
-.166 .186 .038 .085
-.285 .329 .053 .127
-.298 .329 .061 .139
7.2 33.0 17.1 5.8
Criteria
Gross revenue from fishing
   Subs idy
Gross revenue,                                                 
including subsidies
   Variable costs
Income
   Fixed costs
Gross value added
   Labour costs
Gross cash flow
   Depreciation
   Interest payment on loans
Profit




Net owner's  capital
Gross profit margin
Profit margin
Return on capital value
Return on owner's capital
Average income per fisherman
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
Notes: all economic values are in million VND; the averages of gross profit margin, 
profit margin, return on capital value and return on owner’s capital are estimated with 
relative to standard error, and measured in decimal number. All they are per vessel and 
year. Source: own data and calculations. 






































Figure 5.3: Economic performance indicators of an average gillnet vessel, including the 
2008 fuel cost support. Notes: items of costs are assigned the negative sign; unit: million 
VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations. 
The results show indicators which include income, gross value added, gross cash flow and 
profit are positive for an average vessel, whereas net profit is negative in 2008.  
However, the first performance measure computed was the annual gross revenue from fishing 
operation. This indicator varied from 480 to 1550 million VND, with an average of 1044.6 
million VND. Because all 58 surveyed gillnet vessels were received the 2008 fuel cost 
support from Vietnamese government, the average gross revenue including this subsidy of 
the gillnet vessels increased at level of 1073.7 million VND.   
The second performance measure estimated was the difference between annual gross revenue 
with the subsidies and variable costs. The average annual income of the vessels was 
estimated at 469.3 million VND, with a wide range from 140 to 810 million VND. 
The next is an indicator of gross value added, which is considered as the remaining value 
after less costs paid to other industries from gross revenue with the subsidies. The annual 
gross value added of the vessels, on average, was largely varied from 84.2 to 702.2 million 
VND, with a mean of 379.9 million VND. 
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Test hypothesis 1 
The average gross cash flow of the gillnet vessels was 195.8 million VND with a large range 
from –35.8 to 440.2 million VND. As obtained from investigating, there were two vessels 
(vessel number 25 and 40) where gross revenue including the subsidies did not offset their 
variable, fixed and labor costs. Thus, the null hypothesis that the vessel owner has a positive 
gross cash flow from his fishing in 2008, including the fuel cost lump-sum subsidy, is 
rejected in the case of these two vessels (see hypothesis 1 in chapter 3, p.31). However, this 
hypothesis is not clearly rejected since the average gross cash flow of the 58 vessels was 
positive with large difference from zero. Thus, the null hypothesis rejection would not be 
statistically significant for whole 58 vessels. 
In addition to the results, the average annual vessel profit was estimated at 50.5 million VND, 
including the 2008 fuel subsidies. Profit also fluctuated greatly from – 152.5 to 249.3 million 
VND.  
An indicator that measures the vessel owner efficiency from society’s point of view is net 
profit or net economic profit. Table 5.3 shows that the average annual net profit of the vessels 
was negative sign of 18.4 million VND in 2008. This indicator varied greatly from – 211 to 
157.1 million VND. Thus, there was a negative economic return of the vessel, on annual 
average, to society of employing owner’s capital in the current fishing activity.  
Also shown in Table 5.3, each of the five indicators, including income, gross value added, 
gross cash flow, profit and net profit, accounted for each of their items of costs. For example, 
net profit accounted for all expenses, including the calculated interest on owner’s capital. 
Variable costs, fixed costs, labor costs, depreciation and interest payment on loans, as well as 
calculated interest on owner’s capital as the annual average per a vessel were 604.4, 89.4, 
184.1, 136.4, 8.9 and 68.9 in unit of million VND, respectively. These cost items also varied 
greatly (see Table 5.3). The labor costs are here what were included in the survey of crew 
members, skipper, owner-operator’s labor and also crew members of the boat owner’s family 
in the income share system, resulting the labor costs as a resource cost incurred if the vessel 
operates in the fishery.   
Also shown in Table 5.3 are the average relative performance indicators in the case of 
including the 2008 fuel cost support. Rates are estimated for each gillnet vessel. Results are 
represented including the standard deviation to determine differences in the 58 gillnet vessels. 
The average vessel gross profit margin and profit margin were 17.3% and 3.8%, respectively, 
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with wide ranges from – 4.5% to 31.5% for gross profit margin and from – 16.6% to 18.6% 
for profit margin. The average vessel return on capital value and return on owner’s capital 
were 5.3% and 6.1% respectively, also with large ranges for both two indicators. The large 
variance of the return on capital value and return on owner’s capital was caused by not only 
greatly differences in profit, but also wide ranges from 171.5 to 1954 million VND in net 
capital value and from 171.5 to 1771.5 in net owner’s capital of the vessels. 
For income of fishermen, 17.1 million VND was the income level of the average annual crew 
share. The average income per fisherman also varied greatly from 7.2 to 33 million VND. As 
a result, the average monthly crew share during the fishing season is 1.65 million VND, being 
that the average annual total operating months of a gillnet vessel are 10.31 months. As 
mentioned above, crew remuneration also was to include for crews, skipper and owner-
operator’s labor in the income share system. 
 
Economic performance indicators among the vessel groups 
A breakdown of the sample by engine size of the vessels is given in Table 5.4 and 
summarized partially in Figure 5.4. The results show most annual performance indicators 
increased on average with engine size classes of the vessels. These indicators comprised of 
gross revenue with/without the subsidy, income, gross value added, gross cash flow and 
profit. Crew remuneration on average also increased with vessel engine sizes. Costs followed 
the same trend as gross revenue and vessel engine sizes. An average gillnet vessel of each 
group covered the cash cost as well as depreciation (non-cash costs) (Table 5.4).  
However, while 400 HP vessels and larger barely covered all expenses including the 
opportunity cost of owner’s capital and got only a very small surplus with a net profit of 0.3 
million VND on average for 2008, other vessels got negative net profits. The reason is that 
the smaller than 400 HP groups of vessels, on average, earned the return on owner’s capital 
less than the opportunity cost of owner’s capital, the nominal interest rate of 9% in this study 
(see Figure 5.5). 
In general, as shown in Table 5.4, Figure 5.4 and 5.5, two vessels groups with higher engine 
power had economic performance indicators far better than those of two vessels groups with 
smaller engines in 2008. The 400 HP and greater vessel group had the best average economic 
performance indicators with gross cash flow of 329.5, profit of 117.4 million VND and 
positive net profit, including subsidies. 
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Table 5.4: Economic performance indicators among vessel groups, including the 2008 
fuel cost support. 
594.2 75.6 848.1 168.3 1249.7 125.1 1467.3 70.9
26.0 .0 30.0 .0 30.0 .0 30.0 .0
620.2 75.6 878.1 168.3 1279.7 125.1 1497.3 70.9
366.3 50.5 531.3 101.8 714.7 97.7 780.0 67.0
253.8 50.8 346.8 137.0 565.1 81.6 717.3 79.9
58.1 10.3 71.9 23.6 110.6 20.9 112.4 17.9
195.7 49.7 274.9 125.6 454.5 78.8 604.9 83.7
105.7 41.9 141.4 40.2 216.7 57.2 275.4 57.6
90.0 59.7 133.5 110.1 237.7 88.0 329.5 71.2
75.7 12.0 111.8 22.0 162.9 19.6 192.3 14.8
4.4 5.4 5.3 10.2 8.6 13.7 19.8 19.8
9.9 62.6 16.4 100.9 66.2 92.8 117.4 71.2
27.8 7.3 48.4 18.8 84.4 29.4 117.1 29.7
-17.9 65.1 -32.0 97.6 -18.2 94.8 .3 69.3
344.5 108.1 633.0 185.7 1024.6 274.1 1483.1 314.2
308.5 81.6 537.5 209.1 937.7 326.5 1301.3 330.4
.145 .088 .145 .101 .187 .069 .219 .043
.015 .095 .011 .103 .053 .072 .078 .046
.046 .178 .021 .152 .068 .096 .081 .052
.046 .185 .031 .169 .077 .113 .093 .063
12.2 4.2 14.2 3.7 19.2 4.8 23.1 4.6
Criteria
Gross revenue from fishing
   Subs idy
Gross revenue                                          
with subsidies
   Variable costs
Income
   Fixed costs
Gross value added
   Labour costs
Gross cash flow
   Depreciation
   Interest payment on loans
Profit




Net owner's  capital
Gross profit margin
Profit margin
Return on capital value
Return on owner's capital
Average income                                         
per fisherman
Mean S.D.
       50<=HP<90         
(N=12)
Mean S.D.
       90<=HP<250       
(N=16)
Mean S.D.
       250<=HP<400    
(N=19)
Mean S.D.
     HP >= 400          
(N=11)
Range of engine power
 
Notes: all economic values are in million VND per vessel per year; the averages of 
gross profit margin, profit margin, return on capital value and return on owner’s capital 
are estimated with relative to standard error, and measured in decimal number.  
Source: own data and calculations. 
 

































Figure 5.4: Costs and profit in gross revenue by engine sizes, including the 2008 fuel 

































Figure 5.5: Return on owner’s capital by engine sizes, including the 2008 fuel cost 
support. Source: own data and calculations. 
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Economic performance indicators, excluding the 2008 fuel subsidies 
Table 5.5 and 5.6 represent economic performance indicators assuming no 2008 fuel cost 
support of Vietnamese government to determine the effect level of said subsidies on 
economic performance of the gillnet vessels.     
As seen in Table 5.5, since vessel economic performance is estimated from vessel actual 
fishing operation, annual economic performance indicators (income, gross value added, gross 
cash flow, profit and net profit) on average were less than those of the case with the subsidy 
by 29.2 million VND: an average quasi-lump-sum subsidy of the surveyed gillnet vessels. 
These indicators also varied from their minima of the subsidy case deducting 26 million VND 
to their maxima of the subsidy case subtracting 30 million VND.  
Noticeably, there would have been 3 vessels with the negative gross cash flow (increased one 
vessel in comparison with the subsidy case), 23 vessels (accounted for 40% in the total) with 
negative profit (increased 7 vessels) and 42 vessels (accounted for more than 72% in the 
total) uncovered their opportunity cost of owner’s capital (increased 9 vessels). 
Consequently, the surveyed gillnet vessels were earning, on average, negative economic 
profits (–47.6 million VND) from their actual fishing. Similarly, the actual relative 
performance indicators without the subsidies in Table 5.5 are lower rates than those of the 
case with the subsidies in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.6 presents economic performance indicators among the gillnet vessel groups in the 
exclusive case of the 2008 fuel cost support. The results show that vessels with less than 90 
HP had 26 million VND less economic performance (including income, gross value added, 
gross cash flow, profit and net profit) than those that had been subsidies. In a similar 
explanation, the economic performances of 90 HP or higher engine vessels were 30 million 
VND less than those subsidized.   
It can be seen that an average vessel in each group was covering its variable, fixed and labor 
costs by its gross revenue of fishing operations during fishing season, excluding the 
subsidies. However, on average, vessels less than 250 HP were not able to cover depreciation 
and interest payment on loans from their gross revenue of fishing operation, whereas the two 
groups of vessels with higher horsepower averaged positive profits annually. Additionally, 
the annual average of each individual vessel group could not have earned positive economic 
profits for society of employing owner’s capital to the fishing activities.  
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Table 5.5: Economic performance indicators, excluding the 2008 fuel cost support  
480.0 1550.0 1044.6 341.2
280.0 880.0 604.4 174.5
110.0 780.0 440.2 192.9
30.0 150.9 89.4 30.1
54.2 672.2 350.7 171.4
57.8 396.0 184.1 78.4
-65.8 410.2 166.6 120.5
60.5 215.4 136.4 45.8
.0 42.0 8.9 13.9
-182.5 219.3 21.4 92.7
15.4 159.4 68.9 39.2
-241.0 127.1 -47.6 84.4
171.5 1954.0 862.8 454.7
171.5 1771.5 766.1 435.3
-.085 .299 .147 .089
-.211 .166 .008 .092
-.359 .250 .007 .128
-.359 .250 .007 .142
7.2 33.0 17.1 5.8
Criteria
Gross revenue from fishing
   Variable costs
Income
   Fixed costs
Gross value added
   Labor costs
Gross cash flow
   Depreciation
   Interest payment on loans
Profit




Net owner's  capital
Gross profit margin
Profit margin
Return on capital value
Return on owner's capital
Average income per fisherman
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
Notes: all economic values are in million VND per vessel per year; the averages of 
gross profit margin (estimated by dividing gross cash flow by gross revenue without 
the subsidies), profit margin, return on capital value and return on owner’s capital are 
estimated with relative to standard error, and measured in decimal number. Source: 
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Table 5.6: Economic performance indicators among vessel groups, excluding the 
2008 fuel cost support. 
594.2 75.6 848.1 168.3 1249.7 125.1 1467.3 70.9
366.3 50.5 531.3 101.8 714.7 97.7 780.0 67.0
227.8 50.8 316.8 137.0 535.1 81.6 687.3 79.9
58.1 10.3 71.9 23.6 110.6 20.9 112.4 17.9
169.7 49.7 244.9 125.6 424.5 78.8 574.9 83.7
105.7 41.9 141.4 40.2 216.7 57.2 275.4 57.6
64.0 59.7 103.5 110.1 207.7 88.0 299.5 71.2
75.7 12.0 111.8 22.0 162.9 19.6 192.3 14.8
4.4 5.4 5.3 10.2 8.6 13.7 19.8 19.8
-16.1 62.6 -13.6 100.9 36.2 92.8 87.4 71.2
27.8 7.3 48.4 18.8 84.4 29.4 117.1 29.7
-43.9 65.1 -62.0 97.6 -48.2 94.8 -29.7 69.3
344.5 108.1 633.0 185.7 1024.6 274.1 1483.1 314.2
308.5 81.6 537.5 209.1 937.7 326.5 1301.3 330.4
.107 .092 .114 .107 .167 .070 .203 .044
-.029 .099 -.025 .109 .030 .073 .059 .047
-.036 .170 -.033 .150 .037 .095 .060 .050
-.044 .179 -.036 .165 .040 .111 .068 .062
12.2 4.2 14.2 3.7 19.2 4.8 23.1 4.6
Criteria
Gross revenue from fishing
   Variable costs
Income
   Fixed costs
Gross value added
   Labor costs
Gross cash flow
   Depreciation
   Interest payment  on loans
Profit







Return on capital value
Return on owner's capital
Average income                                         
per fisherman
Mean S.D.
     50<=HP<90     
(N=12)
Mean S.D.
      90<=HP<250     
(N=16)
Mean S.D.
      250<=HP<400    
(N=19)
Mean S.D.
       HP >= 400        
(N=11)
Range of engine power
 
Notes: all economic values are in million VND per vessel per year; the averages of 
gross profit margin (estimated by dividing gross cash flow by gross revenue without 
the subsidies), profit margin, return on capital value and return on owner’s capital are 
estimated with relative to standard error, and measured in decimal number.  Source: 
own data and calculations. 
In summary, with the 2008 government fuel subsidies, an average gillnet vessel from each 
group was able to compensate its variable, fixed, labor costs as well as economic depreciation 
and interest payment on loans. However, these vessels were not able to cover its opportunity 
cost of owner’s capital, save of vessel group with engines of 400 HP and larger. Regarding 
economic performance, from the vessels calculated from gross revenue of fishing operation 
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(except the 2008 fuel subsidies), the vessels with less than 250 HP, on annual average, were 
not able to cover their depreciation and interest payment on loans. The relative performance 
indicators without the subsidies were lower than those of the case with the subsidies, even 
though negative with the vessels less than 250 HP. The costs also were quite different among 
the gillnet vessels. A vessel’s economic costs, on average, increased with engine size as well 
as the increasing trend of gross revenue. In order to compare the vessel’s actual economic 
performance, an analysis of relative economic efficiency in production of the vessels is 
presented next. 
 
5.6. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF THE VESSEL 
Economic efficiency of the vessel in short run 
This section presents individual efficiency of the 58 gill net vessels in the short run. Figure 
5.6 shows the relative cost efficiency between vessels, of which the relative standardized 
effort of each vessel i is measured by the width of the bar, the height of the bar measures the 
average total variable, fixed and labor costs per unit of relative standardized effort, avci, of 
each vessel i. In this figure, all avci is sorted in order from the most to least efficient vessel 
and from the left to the right.  The figures within the bars are to show the vessel numbers. 
In Figure 5.6, it can be seen that avc22 of vessel number 22 was lowest (avc22 = 733 million 
VND) with its relative standardized effort, e22, of 1.20, whereas avc25 of vessel number 25 
was highest (avc25 = 1147.4 million VND) with its relative standardized effort, e25, of 0.73 
(see Figure 5.2 and appendix G). Thus, vessel number 22 and 25 are considered as the most 
and the least cost efficient vessels in the short run, respectively.  
If we choose vessel number 43 with its avc43 = 837.7 million VND, corresponding to its e43 of 
1.0035, closely to 1, as a standard vessel in order to compare with others, there were 14 
vessels with their relative standardized effort of more than e43 = 1.0035, but their avci were 
less than avc43. These 14 vessels included vessel number 22, 19, 37, 57, 31, 26, 20, 9, 27, 15, 
1, 41, 30, and 42. Additionally, the majority of vessels with their relative standardized effort 
of less than e43 = 1.0035 had their avci more than avc43. There were only 4 vessels with 
relative standardized efforts of less than e43 = 1.0035, including vessel numbers 4, 47, 48 and 
50, to have more cost efficiency than vessel number 43 in the short run perspective. 
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Figure 5.6: The cost efficiency of relative standardized effort in the short run and average revenue per unit of relative standardized effort 
among the 58 gillnet vessels. Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations. 
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The average all avci of the 58 surveyed gillnet vessels was about 889.8 million VND. The 
vessel number 36 had relative standardized effort of 0.58, but avc36 was 889.4 million VND, 
approximately 889.8 million VND (the average level of all avci). 23 vessels out of 30 vessels 
with relative standardized effort of more than one had their avci less than that of vessel 
number 36, whereas 19 vessels of 28 with relative standardized effort of less than one had 
their avci more than that of vessel 36 as well as more than the average of all avci.   
In general, Figure 5.6 illustrates that the majority of the most cost efficient vessels in the 
short run were those with large relative standardized fishing efforts (above one) (indicated by 
the large width of the bars), while there were many vessels with smaller relative standardized 
fishing efforts (below one) belonging with the group of the lower cost efficient vessels.  
However, some vessels such as numbers 4, 47, 48 and 50 with small relative standardized 
effort were operated with high cost efficiency, whereas some vessels like numbers 11, 28, 8, 
32, 7, 21, 12 and 13 with high relative standardized efforts belonged to the group of low cost 
efficient vessels.   
Figure 5.6 also represents the average revenue per unit of relative standardized effort of each 
of the individual 58 vessels including the 2008 fuel subsidies, arwei, versus ar_ei which 
excludes the subsidies. The gross revenue variance analysis of the 58 surveyed gillnet vessels 
is already presented in the previous part 5.5. However, as can be seen in Figure 5.6, average 
revenue per unit of relative standardized effort of each vessel might fluctuate horizontally 
around a horizontal line, of which vessels 34, 18 and 56 had remarkable differences in their 
ar_ei in comparison with others. 
Test hypothesis 2 
In order to test the hypothesis that the average revenue per unit of the vessel relative 
standardized effort as a function of relative standardized fishing effort is a horizontal line 
with slopping coefficient of zero (see hypothesis 2 in chapter 3, p.41), a simple linear 
regression model is estimated of which the dependent variable is the average revenue per unit 
of relative standardized effort of each vessel, ar_ei, and the corresponding independent 
variable is the relative standardized effort of each vessel ei. Revenue is gross revenue from 
fishing operation of each vessel, not including the 2008 fuel subsidies.   
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Table 5.7: Results of testing hypothesis 2 
VARIABLE   ESTIMATED                           WHITE      WHITE    
NAME       COEFFICIENT    t-value  P-VALUE     t-value    P-VALUE              
e             1.040        0.060    0.952        0.060      0.952 
CONSTANT   1043.400       57.538    0.000*      51.060      0.000* 
Dependent Variable: ar_e;  
R-square = 0.0001; F - statistic = 0.0040; DW-statistic = 2.0023   
* Statistically significant at the level of 1% 
Source: own data and calculations. 
In this test method, in order to make the econometric model complete, assumptions of the 
simple linear regression model should firstly be held. Outcomes of OLS estimation show that 
autocorrelation is not a problem (see appendix H). However, heteroskedasticity can still be a 
potential problem in cross-section data. Since the existence of heteroskedasticity, the OLS 
estimator is still a linear and unbiased estimator, but it is not efficient (no longer best). This 
leads to standard errors usually calculated for the least squares estimator are incorrect. Thus, 
confident intervals and hypothesis tests that use these standard errors may be misleading (Hill 
et al., 2008, p. 201). The result of testing this hypothesis can be also concluded incorrectly. 
White’s procedure for correcting for heteroskedasticity is therefore applied and results of 
White’s heteroskedasticity consistent t-values are also reported in Table 5.7.  
Table 5.7’s results show the dependent variable’s proportion of variation is unexplained by 
variation in the explanatory variable due to the coefficient of determination R2 of 0.0001. 
Both F – test and t – test show that we do not reject the null hypothesis that the explanatory 
variable coefficient is zero. Therefore, the estimated relationship is insignificant. In other 
words, the sample data for dependent variable and independent variable are uncorrelated 
showing no linear association, resulting in the least squares fitted line being “horizontal”. 
This is compatible with the constant coefficient having statistically significance of 1%.  
For this simple linear regression model, the RESET-test is also reported to detect omitted 
variables and whether the simple linear functional form is correct. RESET-test results show 
that the simple linear model is adequate and well specified (see appendix H). 
From the test results above, it can be concluded that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between ar_ei, and ei. This is compatible with the hypothesis that the average 
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revenue per unit of vessel relative standardized effort as a function of relative standardized 
fishing effort is a horizontal line with slopping coefficient of zero. 
Test hypothesis 3 
The next is to test the hypothesis that the average revenue per unit of the vessel relative 
standardized effort equals the average revenue of the fishery (see hypothesis 3 in chapter 3, 
p.41). The average revenue per unit of relative standardized effort of all 58 gillnet vessels, 
ARos(E), is considered as the average revenue of the fishery in this study. ARos(E), without 
the 2008 fuel subsidies, is estimated 1044.6 million VND from the formula (3.16 ).  
The test results in Table 5.8 show that we can not reject the null hypothesis that ARos(E) of 
1044.6 million VND equals the mean of the average revenue per unit of relative standardized 
effort of the vessels (see section 4.2 in chapter 4 for the same testing way). In other words, 
the average revenue per unit of relative standardized effort of each vessel (ar_ei) varied 
around and closely with the horizontal line of 1044.6 (unit of million VND). 
Table 5.8: Results of testing hypothesis 3 
 
Source: own data and calculations. 
As expected, both hypothesis 2’s and 3’s test results leave us unable to reject the null. This 
means that parameters of each gillnet vessel (including engine power, the number of pieces of 
gill net and the number of days fished in the year) may be a good choice of measuring 
vessel’s standardized fishing effort. These results also show that analyses of vessels’ 
economic efficiency of the vessels in this section are significant.  
Figure 5.6 shows the lower horizontal line is the average revenue per unit of relative 
standardized effort of all 58 gillnet vessels for the case of excluding the 2008 subsidies 
(ARos(E) = 1044.6 million VND). The horizontal line at 1044.6 can be considered as the 
theoretical average revenue per unit of relative standardized effort of individual vessels, and 
also as the average revenue per unit of relative standardized effort of a fishery assumed with 
-.026 57 .979 -.1445 -11.1361 10.8471 ar_e 





Interval of the Difference 
Test Value = 1044.6 
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the 58 gillnet vessels. It can be easily seen that the most cost efficient vessels earned the 
highest gross cash flows since the costs only comprised of the variable, fixed and labor costs. 
There would have been three vessels (vessel numbers 24, 40 and 25) operating at a loss. 
Since ARos(E) of 1044.6 million VND is more than the mean of all avci of all 58 surveyed 
gillnet vessels (889.8 million VND), the annual gross cash flow of the vessels was positive on 
average. 
The higher horizontal line in Figure 5.6 is the average revenue per unit of relative 
standardized effort of all 58 gillnet vessels, including the 2008 fuel subsidies (ARws(E) = 
1073.7 million VND, including the subsidies with a mean of 29.2 for 58 gillnet vessels). This 
means that the annual gross cash flow of each vessel increased 29.2 million VND. 
Futhermore, there were only two losing vessels: number 40 and 25.  
 
Economic efficiency of the vessel in long run 
Economic efficiency of the vessel in long run for the case of excluding the opportunity cost 
of owner’s capital 
Figure 5.7 presents each vessel’s individual efficiency in the long-run in the case of 
excluding the opportunity cost of the owner’s capital. The height of the bars on Figure 5.7 
measures the average total cost (except the calculated interest on owner’s capital) per unit of 
relative standardized effort of each vessel i, atci. All atci are also sorted in order from the 
most (left) to least (right) efficient vessel.  
There were a few differences in the cost efficiency of the gillnet vessels between the short 
and long run (except the calculated interest on owner’s capital). The vessel numbers 22 and 
25 were still the most and the least cost efficient vessels, respectively (atc22 = 871.6 million 
VND and atc25 = 1280.2 million VND). 
- 89 - 














































0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58





















Average revenue from fishing operation per unit effort of each vessel i Average revenue including the subsidies per unit effort of each vessel i




Figure 5.7: The cost efficiency of relative standardized effort in the long run, excluding opportunity cost of owner’s capital, and average revenue 
per unit of relative standardized effort among the 58 gillnet vessels. Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations  
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Also shown in Figures 5.7, the majority of the vessels with high relative standardized efforts 
(more than one) belonged to the most cost efficient vessel group, whereas a high percentage 
of the vessels with low relative standardized efforts (less than one) comprised the medium or 
least cost efficient vessels. In 33 vessels which their atci were less than ARos(E) of 1044.6 
million VND (see Figure 5.7), there were 22 vessels with a relative standardized effort above 
one. Of those 22, 15 vessels had a relative standardized effort of more than 1.20, and 11 
vessels had a relative standardized effort of less than one (see Figure 5.8). A contrast picture 
is described in Figure 5.9 for the least cost efficient vessels with an atci more than ARos(E) of 
1044.6 million VND. 
When including the 2008 subsidies, there were 18 vessels with an atci of more than ARws(E) 
= 1073.7 million VND. Therefore, the number of vessels with their atci less than ARws(E) = 
1073.7 million VND increased to 40 vessels, 24 of which 40 had a relative standardized 
effort above one. 
The average all atci of 58 vessels was about 1034.8 million VND. This value was more than 
atc34 = 1031.4 million VND of vessel 34, but less than atc51 = 1037.3 million VND of vessel 
51, and smaller than ARos(E) = 1044.6 million VND. Additionally, there were fewer vessels 
turning a negative profit at ARws(E) = 1073.7 million VND when including fuel subsidies 
compared. Therefore, the majority of the vessels with a relative standardized effort of less 
than one might have operated at a negative profit unless they received government subsidies. 
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Figure 5.8: Frequency of the 33 most cost efficient vessels in the long run by range of relative 
standardized effort, excluding opportunity cost of owner’s capital. Source: own data and 
calculations. 



















Figure 5.9: Frequency of the 25 least cost efficient vessels in the long run by range of relative 
standardized effort, excluding opportunity cost of owner’s capital. Source: own data and 
calculations  
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Average revenue from fishing operation per unit effort of 58 vessels Average revenue including the subsidies per unit effort of 58 vessels
 
 Figure 5.10: The cost efficiency of relative standardized effort in the long run, including the opportunity cost of owner’s capital, and average revenue 
per unit of relative standardized effort among the 58 gillnet vessels. Unit: million VND per vessel per year. Source: own data and calculations 
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Economic efficiency of the vessel in long run for the case of including the opportunity cost 
of owner’s capital 
Figure 5.10 shows vessel cost efficiency including opportunity cost of owner’s capital. 
Generally, compared with Figure 5.7, there is some movement in vessels between the high 
and medium cost efficiency groups for the vessels with high relative standardized efforts, and 
the low and the medium cost efficiency groups for the vessels with low relative standardized 
efforts. However, vessels 25, 40, 45, 24, 38, 2 and 55 remained the least cost efficient while 
having low relative standardized efforts (less than one). There were only 16 vessels which 
their aci were less than ARos(E) = 1044.6 million VND (see Figure 5.10), of which 12 vessels 
had relative standardized effort of more than one (accounted for 75% of total 16 vessels) (see 
Figure 5.11). The number of vessels which their aci were lower than ARws(E) increased to 23, 
of those 23 vessels, 15 had a relative standardized effort of above one. Nevertheless, each 
vessel of out the 58 gillnet, on average, did not cover its whole costs either through fishing 
operation gross revenue or through gross revenue including the subsidies.   




















Figure 5.11: Frequency of the 16 most cost efficient vessels in the long run by range of 
relative standardized effort, including opportunity cost of owner’s capital. Source: own data 
and calculations.  















0 5 10 14 19 23 27 31 36 39 42 47 50 54 57















Figure 5.12: Marginal cost (MC) and average cost (AC) of relative standardized effort 
curves for a fishery assumed with the 58 gillnet vessels. Source: own data and 
calculations 
Figure 5.12 presents an illustration of the gillnet fishery assumed with the 58 vessels, which 
is extrapolated from vessel economic efficient analysis in long run including the opportunity 
cost of owner’s capital, given only 2008 data. The marginal cost of relative standardized 
effort curve, MC, for the fishery with the 58 vessels is inferred from substitution by a curve 
enveloping the bars on Figure 5.10. In addition to Figure 5.12 is the average cost of relative 
standardized effort curve of the fishery, AC, which is plotted basing on the formula (3.20) 
defined in chapter 3. Two dotted lines show two levels of ARos(E) = 1044.6 million VND 
(excluding the 2008 fuel subsidies) and ARws(E) = 1073.7 million VND (including the 2008 
fuel subsidies).  
Figure 5.12 shows that MC is equal to ARos(E) at the level of total relative standardized 
efforts of about 19, and equals ARws(E) at the level of total relative standardized efforts of 
about 25. However, the 58 vessels were operating at where ARos(E) and ARws(E) were not 
only lower than MC, but smaller than AC. This is a problem that will be discussed more in 
next chapter.  
 





6.1. KEY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCES 
The study carried out in 2008, based on a survey of costs and earnings data of a sample of 58 
offshore gillnet vessels in Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa province, shows that the 58 vessels, on 
average, had positive income, gross value added, gross cash flow and profit both including 
and excluding the 2008 government fuel subsidies. One average, the vessels earned a gross 
profit margin of 17.3% and a profit margin of 3.8% including the subsidies; excluding the 
subsidies, these percentages dropped to 14.7% and 0.08%, respectively. This implies that the 
owner of an average gillnet vessel was not only capable of covering the variable, fixed and 
labor, depreciation and loan interest payment costs, but also turned a profit for the operating 
year (not withstanding the opportunity cost of owner’s capital) even excluding fuel subsidies. 
This may somewhat attract additional private investments in the near future.   
The results above may highlight the advantages of fisheries under open access conditions 
versus the offshore gillnet fishery, which is exposed to high risks. The offshore fishery’s 
capital investment and operational expenses are great, while capital rationing is actually 
limited in an imperfect capital market. Risks of damaging and losing fishing gear, which 
often represents half of capital invested, are quite large for this fishery due to high density of 
various types of vessel activities in fishing grounds. Moreover, difficult weather and the 
remoteness of the fishing grounds cause obstacles for operations. Additionally, the 2008 
world economic crisis’s effects on economy resulted in high expenses for fishing operations 
in 2008.         
However, there were still two gillnet vessels unable to cover their total of variable, fixed and 
labor costs despite receiving the 2008 fuel subsidies, resulting in negative gross cash flows 
(one with 55 HP engine, the other a 90 HP engine). In 2008, these two vessels had high minor 
fishing gear repair costs compared with other vessels in the group because their number of 
pieces of gill net damaged and lost was higher relative to others. This may potentially be 
explained by bad management, an inexperienced skipper and/or poor crew skills. 
Additionally, these two vessels had built before 1995; the age of the vessel no doubt 
increased probability and frequency and high costs of repairs for hull, engine and mechanical 
equipment relative to newer vessels. Nevertheless, they may continue operations in next the 
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few years without contradicting the economic theory of fishing vessel because the loss may 
be perceived as arising from bad luck or a poor year. If this loss persists in next the few years, 
these vessel owners will eventually be forced out from the fishery. 
Besides, 27.6% of vessels surveyed (16/58 vessels) operated at a loss (profit before the 
opportunity cost of owner’s capital) including the 2008 fuel subsidies. When excluding 
subsidies, this increases to 40% (23/58 vessels). These vessels may again operate as long as 
the loss is not expected to persist over a number of years; the loss may be attributed bad luck 
or a poor year resulting in a low catch. Additionally, for fishermen in Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa, 
the vessel and fishing gear are considered to be great assets that create opportunities for 
employment and income for most family members.  
When all costs are considered, including the opportunity cost of owner’s capital and 
subsidies, 33/58 vessels (57%) were found to be making economic losses. Excluding 
subsidies, 42/58 vessels (72%) make economic losses. Thus, the net profit indicator, on 
average, was negative for both cases. This implies that, from society’s perspective, higher 
returns could have been earned if owner’s capital would been invested in the next best 
alternative activity. 
The analysis demonstrates that in 2008, the average larger engine vessels had better annual 
economic performance indicators (including income, gross value added, gross cash flow and 
profit) than smaller engine vessels. Overall, vessels with engines 400 HP and greater had the 
best economic performance. Some explanations for these include:  
Firstly, vessels with engines of larger than 250 HP, especially those 400 HP and above, often 
earned larger annual gross revenues than those with smaller engines. Large engines can 
afford go to further into deep sea fishing grounds where fish stocks are abundant. These 
fishing grounds were allocated in the South of Vietnam, where it borders Malaysian and 
Indonesian waters, as well as the Gulf of Thailand. Because of the large vessel size, these 
vessels could carry more gill nets. They might also have utilized much time for fishing since 
the number of days fished, including the time for moving, was greatest in 2008. Moreover, 
middle-buyers were often available in the fishing grounds, the fishing vessels can thus spend 
more time fishing instead of transporting their catch to landing for sale. As a result, the larger 
engine vessels catch a greater fish volume, therefore achieving a larger amount of gross 
revenue.  
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By contrast, the vessels with engine smaller than 250 HP were restricted to fishing grounds of 
offshore waters from Khanh Hoa to Ba Ria – Vung Tau provinces, where a large number of 
vessels were operating. Hence, these vessels not only caught a lower fishing quantity 
compared to the larger engine vessels, but also incurred greater repair and replacement costs 
for fixing and mending nets since risks of damaging and losing fishing gear were high.         
Secondly, the large engine vessels spent higher absolute amounts of the operational expenses 
than small engine vessels because large engine vessels operated for more days, with greater 
number of gill nets and crew members, and higher fuel consumption. Additionally, larger 
engine vessels incur high depreciation and interest payment on loans due to relatively larger 
investments. Furthermore, the majority of the large engine vessels are new with more modern 
equipment. 10/11 vessels with engine 400HP and larger were the newest boats surveyed, 
between 2 to 5 years of old. Thus, these vessels may be considered as the higher cost efficient 
than other vessel groups. 
Thirdly, as obtained information from interviewing, the fishing grounds from Khanh Hoa to 
Ba Ria – Vung Tau often face with more difficult conditions of weather than areas of the 
extreme South of Vietnam. In these fishing grounds, the capture is often exposed to bad 
weather conditions from September to January of the following year. Therefore, large engine 
vessels had flexibility insofar as being able to re-route from Khanh Hoa – Ba Ria Vung Tau 
region for the more abundant fish stocks of the extreme South of Vietnam. Smaller engine 
vessels were restricted to the overexploited or offshore fishing grounds from Khanh Hoa to 
Ba Ria – Vung Tau waters.   
By comparison, the average gross cash flow and profit (including the 2008 fuel subsidies) of 
the 58 vessels are lower than those of Nha Trang 50 vessels that carried out in 2005 costs and 
earnings survey in Kim Anh et al. (2006). Although the 2008 annual gross revenue of the 58 
vessels, on average, is about 23% higher than that of the 2005 study of Kim Anh et al. (2006), 
cost growth outpaced the increasing rate of gross revenue. There are two key reasons for this: 
Firstly, striped tuna prices (Sarda orientalis), considered as a major target specie of Nha 
Trang gillnet fleet, increased to between 13 to 15 thousand VND per kg in 2008, from 8.5 to 
9.5 thousand VND per kg in 2005 (Kim Anh et al., 2006). This means striped tuna prices 
increased about 55.5% between 2005 and 2008. However, as can be obtained from survey, all 
respondents admitted that their catch decreased about 20-50% compared with previous years. 
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Most of them were aware of depletion of the fish stocks due to increased fishing activities 
over time.  
Secondly, inputs prices increased to high levels in 2008. From interviewing, fishers bought 
fuel at average levels between 11.5 to 12.5 thousand VND per liter, higher than the fuel price 
of 7.5 thousand VND per liter in 2005 (Decision 58/2005/QD-BTC) – corresponding 
increasing rates from 53.3 - 66.7% between 2008 and 2005. Prices of food and foodstuff 
increased nearly 1.65 times between these periods of time (GSO, 2009, p.165). The labor cost 
for mending nets was 70-80 thousand VND/labor/day in 2008, instead of 40-50 thousand 
VND/labor/day in 2005. These increases may be caused by Vietnam’s recent consumer price 
inflation, stemming perhaps in part some effects of the world economic crisis. Therefore, the 
operational costs of the 58 gillnet vessels remained at high. 
 
6.2. FISHERMAN INCOME 
For remuneration, the average annual crew member’s share was about 17.1 million VND. 
This figure was about 74.5% more than the 2008 average income per capita in Khanh Hoa 
province (9.8 million VND per capita per year of 2008 (GSO of Khanh Hoa, 2008)), and 
43.2% higher than the 2008 national average income per capita (monthly average income per 
capita at current prices of 2008 was 995 thousand VND for whole country – corresponding to 
11.94 million VND per capita per year of 2008 (GSO, 2009, p.214)). For the average vessel 
operating 10.31 months per year, the average crew share per month during the fishing season 
was more than 2 times and 1.65 times of the monthly average income per capita of Khanh 
Hoa province and national scale, respectively. This demonstrates that crew members may be 
earned an opportunity cost of labor or above in the fishing season of 2008.  
For the vessels surveyed, the average annual income per fisherman increased with engine 
sizes. The two groups of larger than 400 HP and 250-400HP paid highest annual incomes for 
crew members. This may not be unexpected since these large engine vessels spent a greater 
amount of time for fishing than small engine vessels. From a societal perspective, fishing 
activities that provide lower income levels might not be preferable to those that provide larger 
incomes, given other things constant. For Nha Trang’s 58 offshore gillnet vessels, the owner-
operators and the owner’s family-crew members received their explicit crew- share. Thus, the 
owner-operator derived income from both the crew-share as a crew member, and the profit 
(residual profit) as the vessel owner. Since the average annual profit indicator and crew 
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income increased with engine sizes, there may be incentives for owner-operators to adopt 
technologies in order to provide them with the highest income.  
Annual crew remuneration of the 58 gillnet vessels in 2008 was larger than that of the 50 
gillnet vessels in Kim Anh et al. (2006). If the 2005 average income per fisherman is revalued 
at 2008 prices via either average consumer price indices or the annual increasing rate of 
income per capita (this rate is estimated by the author on the basic of information from GSO, 
2009), the 2008 average income per fisherman was lower than that the 2005 average crew 
income valued at 2008 prices. This may imply that the purchase power of the 2008 crew 
income was less than that of the 2005 crew income, and perhaps the average income per 
fisherman in 2008 may be undervalued in comparison with that in 2005.  
Traditionally, there are three main ways of sharing income for crew members at Nha Trang 
gillnet fishery. The first method gives whole crew 35% of revenue less variable costs. Of the 
surveyed vessels, 40 use this method, the majority of which are small engine vessels (less 
than 250 HP). The second method calculates wages basis of 50% of revenue less both 
variable costs and withholding 10% of revenue. This 10% is expensed for annual vessel 
repair and maintenance. 13 vessels surveyed use this method, of which most have large 
engine capacity. The final method distributes 60% of income to the owners and 40% to whole 
crew. However, as obtained by investigating, a majority of the 58 vessel owners distribute to 
crew members at a rate higher than their traditional sharing rate.  
Most vessel owners noted it was difficult to encourage crew members jointing in the fishing 
activity with them during the fishing season since there was the large number of vessels with 
different fishing activities. Fishing crews often bargained the income sharing rate obtained 
and compared the other vessel’s crew income. Therefore, vessel owners often had to either 
accept the high sharing rate of income or grant a reward adding to crew members. Two small 
engine vessel groups almost met with this difficult situation. Consequently, labor costs 
accounted for a high amount in gross revenue in 2008 compared with previous years.  
 
6.3. THE STANDARDIZED FISHING EFFORT OF THE VESSEL 
In order to measure vessels’ relative economic efficiency, the study estimates vessels’ 
standardized fishing effort through the production function approach. Engine power, fishing 
gear and fishing days are factors best reflecting vessel effort standardization. As an expected 
result, the rate of contributions in the capital input of fishing gear is more than that in the 
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capital input of engine power. This result is somewhat reasonable with results from 
interviewing. All respondents admitted, for gillnet fishery, that investment for fishing gear is 
the most important for an increase of fishing quantities. Griffin et al. (1973) also found this in 
relationship between the horsepower and the sum of the length of the footrope measured in 
yards in the case of the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery.  
The effect of the nominal fishing effort (fishing time) on the effective fishing effort is to 
some extent valid for this study since Padilla and Trinidad (1995) found coefficients 
estimated of a composite input between number of crew and the length of the fishing time 
fluctuating from 0.417 to 0.549 for the encircling gill net and Danish seine vessels in 
Philippine in the same manner of the function form. Another explanation may be that the 
number of fishing days may be restricted by other technical parameters of the fishing vessel. 
Regardless of the fishing time variable, the two physical factors exhibited the diminishing 
return to scale in a vessel’s fishing effort. This implies that any increase in total these two 
inputs would have resulted in a smaller increase in the vessel fishing effort. 
The vessels’ relative standardized effort indicators have a quite wide range from 0.46 to 1.45. 
Results show that the 58 vessels were different in relative fishing power, implying they were 
heterogeneous in the effort and cost structure. Therefore, they differed in efficiency of 
relative standardized effort.  
 
6.4. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND INTRA-MARGINAL RENT OF THE VESSEL 
The 58 gillnet vessels’ cost efficiency of relative standardized effort had few differences 
between the short and long-term. A large number of vessels with high relative standardized 
effort (more than one) were the most cost efficiency in both perspectives.  
For short run perspective  
In 2008, most vessels with relative standardized effort of more than one earned large gross 
cash flows compared low relative standardized effort vessels (less than one). In other words, 
the large numbers of intra-marginal rents in the short run were generated by mostly vessels 
with high relative standardized effort (above one). There were only two vessels earning extra-
marginal rents from this perspective, including the subsidies.  
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For long run perspective excluding the opportunity cost of owner’s capital 
22 out of the 30 vessels with relative standardized effort above one were in the 33 most cost 
efficient vessels (their atci less than ARos(E)). This implies that most intra-marginal rents 
(excluding subsidies) are generated by vessels with high relative standardized effort (above 
one). Here, the most cost efficient vessels are viewed from a viewpoint that a vessel’s 
average cost of relative standardized effort is less than the average revenue per unit of 
relative standardized effort of the fishery assumed with the 58 gillnet vessels.  
When including subsidies, 24 of 30 vessels with relative standardized effort above one were 
among the 40 most cost efficient vessels (their atci less than ARws(E)). However, rents were 
generated by the additional 7 vessels were the results of subsidies rather than technological 
efficiency in fishing operation. 
For long run perspective including the opportunity cost of owner’s capital 
In total, 15 out of 23 most cost efficient vessels (their aci lower than ARws(E)), had a relative 
standardized effort above one. 12 out of 16 most cost efficient vessels (their aci lower than 
ARos(E)), also had relative standardized efforts above one. This also implies that the majority 
of intra-marginal rents, which is more than zero net profit of the marginal vessel, are 
generated by vessels with high relative standardized effort (more than one). 
The results above indicate that there might still be attractive for additional private effort 
investments in this fishery in the near future. Either improvement/investment in engine 
capacity and fishing gear or an additional increase in fishing time may be able to continue 
expanding. This will result in diminishing catch of individuals as fish stocks are decreasing 
over time, resulting in potentially forcing currently profitable vessels to become unprofitable. 
This seems to somewhat reflect the situation of Khanh Hoa’s fishery since total engine power 
of the fishing fleet increased in 2009 (see chapter 2).  
Nevertheless, a great number of the most cost inefficient vessels (their aci more than 
ARws(E)) had a low relative standardized effort (under one). Thus, the number of extra-
marginal vessels was higher than intra-marginal vessels in the long run, including opportunity 
cost of owner’s capital, resulting in economic losses on average for the 58 vessels.     
Additionally, since the average vessel return on owner’s capital of 6.1% was less than the 
opportunity cost of owner’s capital, the average gillnet vessel was making economic losses in 
2008 including subsidies. This implies that there was also the larger number of vessels 
earning extra-marginal rents in 2008, whereas the smaller number of vessels was earning 
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intra-marginal rents. However, profits increased with engine sizes, and average returns on 
owner’s capital were highest for the two groups with largest engines. This means that most 
intra-marginal rents generated come from the vessels with large engine capacity: the majority 
of the rents generated by the group with 400 HP engines and larger because they earned the 
highest average return on owner’s capital of 9.3% and positive net profit on average, 
including the subsidies.  
The results above may not contradict each other because engine power is one of factors 
affecting vessel’s standardized fishing effort. Vessel cost efficiency analyses provide 
information on which vessels earned an intra-marginal rent or extra-marginal rent. The 
majority of vessels with high relative standardized effort belonged to the two groups with 
greatest horsepower (see appendix G). Thus, a large amount of vessels with low relative 
standardized effort (under one) and/or small engine power were extra-marginal vessels in the 
long run, including opportunity cost of owner’s capital.  
Further, investigation revealed that a large number of large engine vessels or high relative 
standardized effort vessels were recent entrants (from 2 to 5 years earlier) with new fishing 
gears and modern equipments. This might have led to pressure on fish stock over time, 
resulting in reduced catch rates and increasing costs for all remaining vessels in 2008. This 
problem seems to be a “fisheries treadmill” phenomenon discussed in Whitmarsh (1998), and 
a consequence of the “tragedy of the common” problem presented in Hardin (1968).  
An average gillnet vessel’s economic loss may not contradict with the open access fisheries 
theory with heterogeneous vessels when the results are analyzed with only a single year’s 
data, but may in a multi-year analysis. Moreover, the effects of the world economic crisis on 
the national economy combined with 2008’s peak demand returned in substantial input price 
index increases. Nevertheless, if vessels’ looses in this study persist over many years, they 
will eventually be forced out from the fishery.  
The survey results can also be extrapolated to provide an indication of the fishery (Figure 
5.12), given only one year’s data. An assumption behind this extrapolation is that the vessels 
in the sample are representative. However, this study’s economic analyses are conducted 
using sample formula rather than population. Moreover, relationship between marginal cost 
(MC) and average cost (AC) of the fishery are in long term, which stock levels have varied 
over time, requiring time serious data. Thus, this model should be viewed with caution, and 
as indicative only. Nevertheless, this model (Figure 5.12) is probative that this fishery was 
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overcapitalized from an economic perspective, and that the 2008 fuel subsidies may have led 
to an increase in fishing efforts. This may reflect to some extent the status of Khanh Hoa’s 
fishery, since the number of fishing vessels and total engine power of the fishing fleets in 
Khanh Hoa province increased a large amount in 2008 and 2009 (see Figure 2.2). 
Using Anderson’s definition (1989) that resource rent only exist since all vessel are making 
positive economic profits, there was no resource rents generated; only negative resource rents 
for a fishery including the 58 gillnet vessels. Therefore, the offshore fishery is still considered 
as “pure” open access in this country. Moreover, there was also not an intra-marginal rent for 
the fishery in the long run. This may imply that fisheries management controls have been 
inefficient. However, this statement is only based on analysis results with 2008 data.     
Long run economic performance indicators for the fishing vessels are affected by capital 
valuation (Le Floc’h et al., 2008). This is subject misinterpretation of what capital costs 
(depreciation and opportunity cost of owner’s capital), profit, and net profit actually mean. In 
this study, capital costs are calculated assuming that capital invested (fixed capital stock) is 
re-valued at 2008 prices using the annual consumer price indices on a historical price basis 
(price of assets acquired in earlier period). Annual asset price indices should be taken into 
calculations of capital invested for it. However, this information is unavailable; hence the 
annual consumer price indices are used for all vessel fixed assets. This method of capital 
valuation was used by Vietnam’s IFEP-Institute of Fisheries Economics and Planning (1998) 
in a summary report namely “Assessment of the Living Marine Resources in Viet Nam”. 
Thanh Thuy et al. (2008) also applied this method for the purse seine fishery of Khanh Hoa.  
Depreciation22 is calculated on a straight-line basis over the owner’s estimated lifespan of 
assets, starting from the first year of assets acquired (either new or second-hand assets). Since 
major repair and maintenance costs are excluded in depreciation but included in the annual 
fixed cost, lower depreciation offsets the higher annual fixed cost. Depreciation is described 
in details for hull, engine, fishing gear and other equipments (see section 4.5 in chapter 4).  
There are alternative methods for capital valuation and depreciation. Book value (or historical 
value) can be used as the starting point of evaluating fishing capital. However, net worth 
(results from the difference between book value and accumulated depreciation) that can be 
seen on a balance sheet did not correspond with economic value (when selling on the second 
hand market) because Vietnamese accounting standards, for example, allow lifespan of 7 – 
22 With the vessels surveyed, the rates are from 4 to 6.7% for hull, 5 – 14.3% for engine, 10 – 14.3% for fishing 
gear, the average of 21% for mechanical equipment, 11% for electronic devices, and 20% for storage facilities 
(source: own data) 
- 104 - 
 
15 years for hull, 8 – 10 years for engine (Decision 206/2003/QD-BTC). Therefore, some 
fishing assets were fully depreciated from an accounting stand point of view while still in use. 
In practice, the survey of the fishermen indicated an average lifespan of 24 years for hull, 17 
years for engine. As a result, vessel economic depreciation should not be based on pure 
financial consideration with the low lifespan for the vessel assets.  
The market value or replacement value, which equals to the current building costs of a similar 
new one, may give a high depreciation costs and a high calculated interest on owner’s capital 
for the vessel surveyed. This would lead to a lower profit and net profit compared to the 
method applied in this study. Also, current building costs of a new vessel are much greater 
than the vessel fixed capital re-valued at 2008 prices because construction material and 
equipment prices increased dramatically as a consequence of both the world economic crisis 
and the government’s policies involved in forest conservation. 
The survey could not have the calculated capital value based on acquisition value (called the 
estimated current value by the owner at the year of survey, 2008). The vessel’s acquisition 
value could be a reasonable method of reflecting a vessel’s capital value since it includes 
improvements and new equipment purchases post vessel construction. This may also be the 
reason why most vessel owners answered that their vessel’s lifespan is more than 30 years, 
inversely a shorter lifetime. However, in order to get this information, more much money and 
time would be spent while these conditions were limited. Moreover, the majority of 
respondents lacks abilities estimating accurately their acquisition value of the vessel with 
many fixed asset items at the time of 2008.  
The capital valuation method used in this study is not markedly different from the acquisition 
value method in Kim Anh et al. (2006)’s research on gillnet vessels in Nha Trang in 2005. 
The average consumer price index between 2005 and 2008 is adduced for comparison 
purspose. The average investment capital and depreciation of a vessel in 2008 are 48% and 
20% more than those in 2005, respectively, while the average consumer price index is 43.4% 
between these two periods (estimated by the author basing on IMF’s data, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the long run economic performance indicators in this study are still viewed on 
the basis of the assumption that the investment capital re-valued at prices of 2008 through 
annual average consumer price indices, and that straight-linear depreciation plan is applied. 
In the future, research on capital valuation methods should be performed in accordance with 
characteristics of Nha Trang fishery and Vietnam fishery as well.  
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6.5. THE EFFECT OF THE SUBSIDIES ON PROFITABILITY OF THE VESSEL 
When all 58 vessels received the 2008 subsidies, annual economic performance indicators 
(including income, gross value added, gross cash flow, profit and net profit) of individual 
vessels increased adding an amount equaling the subsidy that they received in 2008. Gross 
cash flow and profit of an average gillnet vessel increased about 17.5% and 36%, 
respectively. 
Thanks to the 2008 subsidies, there were only 2 vessels failed to cover their total variable, 
fixed and labor costs. Without the subsidies, there are three cases in total. The number of the 
vessels failed to cover all costs (excluding the opportunity cost of owner’s capital) reduced 
from 23 to 16 vessels – corresponding to a decrease of 30%.  With the 2008 fuel cost support, 
two vessel groups of 50-90HP and 90-250HP were able to cover their depreciation and loan 
interest payment to earn a positive profit, inversely a negative profit. When all costs are 
considered, 33 vessels suffered economic losses, instead of 42 vessels in the non-subsidies 
case – cutting down 21.4%. In four engine groups, only the vessels with engine capacity 
above 400 HP, on average, could cover the opportunity costs of owner’s capital when 
receiving the 2008 subsidies.   
From cost efficiency analysis in the long run exclusive of the opportunity cost, among 58 
vessels, those with their atci below average revenue of the fishery assuming with 58 vessels 
increased to 21.2% (from 33 vessels in the non-subsidies to 40 vessels in the subsidies). More 
than 70% of the additional 7 vessels had relative standardized efforts below one.  
Therefore, small-scale vessels may have received the most significant benefits from the 2008 
fuel cost support program. These small-scale vessels are defined in this study based on either 
low engine capacity or low relative standardized effort (below one).  
Obviously, the direct fuel cost subsidy had a good impact on profitability of the vessels in the 
2008 fishing season. However, this subsidy is considered as a bad subsidy as it triggers 
potential impacts on growth of fishing effort, leading to fishing overcapacity and therefore 
putting fish stocks at threat of rapid depletion (Sumaila et al., 2007). This problem will not 
ensure for a sustainable income of fishermen in the long run. Thus, a question for Vietnamese 
policy-makers is whether it is necessary to maintain direct subsidies.   
In order to ensure the sustainable and efficient offshore fishery and to enhance fisher’s 
income, some recommendations should be addressed. Firstly, instead of implementing bad 
subsidies, good subsidies such as fisheries management, monitoring and enforcement 
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programs should be implemented in order to enhance the growth of fish stocks. Supports such 
as forecasting weather, training fishermen, providing information of fish stock and rescue and 
life-saving activities in sea may also be good subsidies that do not expand fishing effort and 
capacity. Secondly, potential entrants who would like to enter the gillnet fishery should be 
limited for a registration. This is expected that fishing overcapacity will not be more serious. 
Thirdly, gillnet vessels that were the least cost efficient making economic losses or even 
negative profits in persistence of many years should be removed out fishing activities. These 
vessels may belong with vessels with engine power below 250HP or low relative 
standardized effort (below one). In practice, no little vessels have still operated over time 
since their gross cash flow uncovered depreciation costs. Additionally, the government 
should plan to make vocational guidance or training for them as well as their family members 
to ensure a stable income and life. Fourthly, engine capacity, fishing gear and fishing time 
may be major factors creating fishing efforts of the gillnet fishery. Regulations for fisheries 
management should be also considered basing on these inputs. Finally, fisheries managers 
should concern about average performance of all vessels and engine size class. The average 
values may reflect the likely incentives for potentially new entrants to the fishery as well as 
efficiency of management controls. Besides, analysis of economic efficiency between the 
vessels may give good information for managers in planning the development of an 
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Chapter 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The marine fishing fisheries in Vietnam in general and in Nha Trang-Khanh Hoa in particular 
are small scale, multi-species, multi-gear and open access. However, the sector is under the 
overcapacity pressure. Marine fisheries production and fishing fleet have continuously 
increased over time, resulting in overexploitation in the coastal areas. In response, the 
offshore fishing fleets have expanded rapidly, but gone far beyond the control. The questions 
emerged are whether the offshore fisheries development program is efficient and whether the 
offshore fleet performs profitably or not. 
The purpose in this study is to present the results of a cost and earnings survey carried out in 
Nha Trang city of Khanh Hoa province. These results were used to assess the vessels’ 
economic performance, to determine economic efficiency of individual vessel, and to find out 
which vessel group gets intra-marginal rents. The impact of the 2008 subsidies on vessels’ 
profitability was also assessed. In addition to these objectives, the methods of measuring 
vessels’ standardized fishing effort were discussed.  
The study reviewed literature on fisheries economic performance in the world as well as in 
Vietnam, and defined concepts of costs and earnings used for this study. Theories of open 
access fishery and fishing vessel economics were presented briefly, and the production 
function application for fishing effort standardization was also mentioned.  
A sample of the 58 offshore gillnet vessels was chosen for survey. Descriptive statistics 
showed that the vessels were quite heterogeneous because they were quite different in some 
technical and operational characteristics, capital structure and cost structure.  
The econometric result showed that horsepower, fishing gear and fishing days affected 
significantly on the vessel fishing effort. The testing results indicated that the combination of 
these parameters was reasonable for measuring vessels’ standardized fishing effort. The 
relative fishing power indices were different between the vessels. Vessels equipped with high 
engine power, number of pieces of gill nets, and large number of fishing days would have 
large relative standardized effort. Even though this does not come as a surprise, it is useful for 
the economic analysis to calculate the fishing power of each vessel and to compare them. The 
results proved that vessels were heterogeneous in the fishing effort.  
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From results of economic analyses noted that a gillnet vessel covered its variable, fixed and 
labor costs as well as depreciation and loan interest, and earned a gross profit margin of 
17.3% and a profit margin of 3.8%, including the 2008 subsidies, but made an economic loss 
of 18.4 million VND. The average crew income was 17.1 million VND per year –
corresponding to 74.5% higher than the 2008 average income per capita in Khanh Hoa 
province. However, the level of economic performance varied significantly between across 
engine groups. The vessel group with engine power 400HP and above had best economic 
performances. 
Including subsidies, most operators covered their variable, fixed and labor costs. Only two 
vessels were not able to cover their costs. About 27.6% vessels could not cover their 
depreciation and loan interest payment. When all costs are considered, 57% of the vessels 
suffered negative economic profits. Low catch, high operational expenses and large capital 
investment were important reasons for this.  
The majority of vessels with high relative standardized effort (above one) were the most cost 
efficient vessels. In the short run, these vessels were able to earn more intra-marginal rents 
than others. In the long run, two-thirds of the 33 most cost efficient vessels had relative 
standardized effort of more than one. When all costs are included, the vessels with relative 
standardized effort above one accounted for three-quarters of the 16 most cost efficient 
vessels. The vessels with high relative standardized effort (above one) occupied a large 
amount of intra-marginal vessels in the long run.  
The number of intra-marginal vessels was smaller than extra-marginal vessels, and an 
average return on owner’s capital of 6.1% was less than the expected return of 9%, resulting 
in an economic loss in average. However, the average profit was positive, and the large 
amount of intra-marginal rents was generated by the vessels with high relative standardized 
effort. Under open access condition, this may still attract additional private investments in 
fishing power/capacity in the fishery.  
The government 2008 fuel cost support had a good impact on vessels’ economic performance 
and efficiency. The average gross cash flow and profit increased about 17.5% and 36%, 
respectively. The number of vessels with negative profit reduced 30%. The number of the 
vessels uncovered all costs decreased 21.4%. This subsidy program was to bring more 
benefits for the vessels with small engine power or low relative standardized effort. However, 
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this direct subsidy may cause the growth of fishing effort and fishing overcapacity, resulting 
in rapid fish stock depletion in the future. 
From the management perspective, the assessment of vessels’ economic performance and 
efficiency may be a key element in understanding economic status of the fishery. Further, it 
may help to understand economic incentives existing in the fishery.  
Limitation and future research suggestions 
It is difficult to conclude whether a sample surveyed is representative or not. This is because 
population data is not often available and in update in developing countries, as in the case of 
Vietnam. Improving the national database and capacity of statistics organizations in the 
future should become a priority. A manageable solution may increase the sample size in 
future research. Another alternative is to stratify by class of characteristics which their 
available information from population data is reliable. Then, each stratified sample of vessels 
is selected for interview with condition that it is representative for population subset of each 
stratum. Pascoe, Robinson and Coglan (1996) applied this method for the English Channel 
fleet.  
As mentioned, heteroskedasticity often encounter when using cross-sectional data in a 
regression model. The outcome of White’s procedure for correcting for heterokedasticity 
showed that values of t-test of all coefficients estimated are not significantly different. Thus, 
tests for heterodekasticity were not performed in this study. However, future researches 
should have tests for heterodekasticity, and have formal treatments such as application of the 
generalized least squares (GLS) estimator.  
In addition, since the objectives of this study are to focus on vessels’ economic performance 
and efficiency, it did not cover in detail different effects of explanatory variables on vessels’ 
standardized fishing effort. Future researches should specify these effects, and measure 
marginal productivity as well as marginal rate of substitution of physical inputs in the 
production of fishing effort in this fishery. Moreover, quality and age of the physical inputs 
were not mentioned in the fishing effort model. In fact, these characteristics may affect on 
vessel’s effort. Thus, they were considered as constant for all vessels. The future works 
address this concern using various scenarios. 
There are alternative methods for constructing vessel’s economic efficiency. They can be 
DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) and SPF (Stochastic Production Frontier) methods. The 
future study should examine these for a comparison.  
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Capital valuation is vital for measuring long run economic performance. The performance 
indicators should be viewed with caution when taking the assumptions into consideration. 
Additionally, opportunity cost equaling zero is determined for fixed assets depreciated fully 
in this study while still in use. However, in fact these assets could have a positive opportunity 
cost. These assets were owned by a few vessels. This may only cause a slight variation in the 
opportunity cost of owner’s capital. Future research should be performed to choose the most 
reasonable method of capital valuation that best reflects characteristics of the local gillnet 
fishery.   
With only one year’s data, the overall economic performance of the gillnet fleet is difficult to 
determine. Moreover, an ambition of establishing the open access bioeconomic model for the 
fishery is hard to become a reality with this single year sample data. Future work therefore 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Questionnaire 
ANNUAL SURVEY ON OFFSHORE GILLNET VESSELS 
 IN NHA TRANG CITY, VIETNAM 
 
I. General information: 
1. Data of the year: ……................Period of data from month….………to month ........................  
2. Time of survey:        Date.............month............year.......... ........................................................  
3. Name of interviewer:………. ......................................................................................................  
4. Address ........................................................................................................................................  
 .........................................................................................................................................................  
5. Phone number of interviewer……………………………………………………. ......................  
6. Main fishery ………………… ………… Other…………………………… .............................  
7. Level of subsidy received from the government in year: ............................................................  
II. Information of vessel and owner 
1. Name of Vessel Owner.....................................................Age:.................................................... 
      Vessel owner is skipper or not?              Yes          No  
2. Address …………………………………………………………. ……………………………... 
    Phone number: …………………………………………………………………………………. 
3. Registered Number of vessel......................................................................................................... 
4. Hull length (m):………………………………………………………………………………… 
5. Engine (HP):…………………………………………………………………………………… 
6.a. Year of construction (with new building vessel)……………………………………………… 
6.b. or Year of purchase (with second hand vessel)………………………………………………. 
            Do you know about your vessel-building year?…............................................................... 
 
III. Information about labour 
Skipper Crew (including skipper) 
1. Skipper information  
   a. Does skipper have license?  Yes      No  
   b. Skipper educational level................................. 
   c. Skipper age:...................................................... 
   d. Skipper experience........................................... 
   e. Skipper vocational training time...................... 
f. Does skipper come from traditional fishing 
household?              Yes          No  
2.Average annual crew size (persons):…….. 
……………………………………………… 
 
3. Income/person  (1000 VND) 
a. Average income/trip in main season:.............. 
 
b. Average income/trip in other season:............ 
 
IV. Information about season, operating time, fishing ground and weather 
Items  Main season Other season 
1. Season time (from month to month)   
2. Number of trips in year   
3. Average duration per trip (days)   
4. Number of operating months in year   
5. Fishing ground (and show in Figure A)   
6. Special weather? (serious storms)   
V. Information about harvested quantity, average revenue and income share method 
for crew 
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Items  Main season Other season 
1. Average quantity of harvested species per trip   
   a. Main species 1 (kg)   
   b. Main species 2 (kg)   
   c. Main species 3 (kg)   
   d. Main species 4 (kg)   
2. Total revenue for all (1000 VND)   
3. Average revenue per trip (1000 VND)   
4. Average annual price (1000 VND/kg) of  - 
   a. Main species 1   
   b. Main species 2   
   c. Main species 3   
   d. Main species 4   




VI. Average variable costs/trip  
Items  Main season Other season 
Quantity Value (1000 VND) Quantity Value (1000 VND) 
1. Fuel      
2. Lubricant      
3. Ice     
4. Provisions     
5.Minor repairs     
6. Others     
Total (from 1-6)     
VII. Capital items  














of a similar 
new one 
1. Hull        
2. Engine        
3. Mechanical 
equipment 
       
a. Winch        
b. Normal lighting 
system: 
  + Battery 
  + Lamps  
  + Dynamo 
       
c. Lighting system 
for fishing 
       
d. Others         
4. Electronic 
equipment 
       
a. GPS        
b. Compass        
c. Short range radio        
d. Long range radio        
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e. Radar        
f. Others        
5. Fishing gear        
a. Gill net         
 + Piece of net        
+ Float        
+ Main line        
+ Branch line        
b. Others        
        
6. Storage 
equipment 
       
        
7. Other 
equipments 
       
a. Anchor         
b. Sub-small boat        
c. Others        
VIII. Annual Repair and Maintenance 
Items  Costs (1000VND) 
1. Hull  
2. Engine  
3. Equipments  
4. Fishing gear  
5. Others  
Total  
IX. Improvement/ Big maintenance (more than 1 year) 
 Last year of 
improvement 
Costs (1000 VND) Duration (years) 
1. Hull    
2. Engine    
3. Equipments    
4. Fishing gear    
5. Others    
X. Insurance and charge 
Items  Costs (1000 VND) 
1. Insurance  
   a. Vessel  
   b. Crews  
2. Annual registration charge  
3. Other charge  
Total  
XI. Loan 





Debt at end of 
year  
(1000 VND) 
Interest payment  in year 




1. Project/ program      
2. Bank      
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3. Private loan      
Total      
XII. Income and characteristics of household  
1. Total income of household in year (million VND): ...........................................................................  
      a. From fishing operation: ................................................................................................................  
      b. From other operation: ..................................................................................................................  
2. Which income source is the most important? ....................................................................................  
3. Household size (person): ....................................................................................................................  
4. Characteristics of family-members: 




      
No. people participate in 
fishing operation 
      
XIII. Assessments of interviewer 
1. The harvested quantity in this year compared with previous years: ..................................................  
     a. More than:……..%                      b. Less than: ………%                     c. No change:…………. 
     Give reasons (If can): ........................................................................................................................  
2. Operational expenses in this year compared with previous years:.....................................................  
     a. More than:……..%                      b. Less than: ………%                     c. No change:…………. 
     Give reasons (If can): ........................................................................................................................  
3. The vessel-owner’s income from fishing in this year compared with previous years: 
    a. More than:……..%                      b. Less than: ………%                     c. No change:…………. 
    Give reasons (If can): .........................................................................................................................  
4. The following reasons affecting on your fishing performance in the year: 
    a. Input price (Fuel……..):  decrease    increase       b. Fish price:     decrease    increase        
    c. Quantity caught:              decrease    increase       d. Engine power:    small         large   
    e. Length size:                          small         large        f. Fishing gear:………………………….  
    g. Experience of crews and skipper:………………..       k. Weather:……………………………… 
5. For gillnet fishery, in order to increase fishing harvest, which are the most important following 
things (tick number in order of priority: 1 – the most important. No tick if it is not important) 
 Investment capital for large vessel 
 Investment for fishing gear  
 Investment for modern fishing equipments 
 Experience of crews and skipper 
 Fishing techniques  
 Ability of forecasting fishing grounds 
 Cooperation among different vessel owners, middle-buyers 
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Figure A: The distribution of fishing grounds and fishing productivity of gillnet vessels in South-West 
monsoon, 2008. Notes: VIỆT NAM (in Vietnamese) = VIETNAM (in English); TRUNG QU.ỐC, 
LÀO, CAM-PU-CHIA = CHINA, LAO, COMBODIA, respectively; Low letters (blue) are provinces 
of Vietnam (except Đ. H.ả.i. Nam); CHÚ GI.ẢI = ANNOTATION; Năng suất (kg/km lưới) = 
Productivity (kg/km of gill net). This Figure is used in survey process. Source: website of RIMF-
Research Institute for Marine Fisheries. Available from 
http://rimf.org.vn/DuBao/2008/SW/Nghe/B200/2008_SW_B200_All.jpg . Cited July, 2009.  
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APPENDIX B: Fisheries production of Vietnam 




1995 1584.4 1195.3 389.1 
1996 1701.0 1278.0 423.0 
1997 1730.4 1315.8 414.6 
1998 1782.0 1357.0 425.0 
1999 2006.8 1526.0 480.8 
2000 2250.5 1660.9 589.6 
2001 2434.7 1724.8 709.9 
2002 2647.4 1802.6 844.8 
2003 2859.2 1856.1 1003.1 
2004 3142.5 1940.0 1202.5 
2005 3465.9 1987.9 1478.0 
2006 3720.5 2026.6 1693.9 
2007 4197.8 2074.5 2123.3 
Prel.2008 4602.0 2136.4 2465.6 
Source: General Statistic Office (GSO), 2008. Note: units of thousand tones; 
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Of which: fish 
1995 1195.3 990.3 722.1 205.0 
1996 1278.0 1058.7 808.2 219.3 
1997 1315.8 1098.7 835.3 217.1 
1998 1357.0 1155.2 856.7 201.8 
1999 1526.0 1314.6 974.7 211.4 
2000 1660.9 1419.6 1075.3 241.3 
2001 1724.8 1481.2 1120.5 243.6 
2002 1802.6 1575.6 1189.6 227.0 
2003 1856.1 1647.1 1227.5 209.0 
2004 1940.0 1733.4 1333.8 206.6 
2005 1987.9 1791.1 1367.5 196.8 
2006 2026.6 1823.7 1396.5 202.9 
2007 2074.5 1876.3 1433.0 198.2 
Prel.2008 2136.4 1946.7 1475.8 189.7 
Source: General Statistic Office (GSO), 2008. Note: units of thousand tones; fisheries 
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APPENDIX C: Fisheries production and fishing fleet in Khanh Hoa 
Table C1: Fisheries production, number of vessels and horsepower during 2001-2009 in 
Khanh Hoa province 
Criteria 
Year 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total fisheries 
production: 






























Number of fishing 
vessel: 
-Number of vessel 
powered 




























Sources: Khanh Hoa’s DARD (2009a). Notes: a information from Khanh Hoa’s DARD 
(2009b); b information from DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2009); c information from Khanh 
Hoa’s DARD (2009c); unit of thousand tones for quantity, horsepower for engine capacity.  
 
Table C2: Marine catch per unit of vessel (in tones/vessel) and per unit of engine 
power (in tones/HP) during 2001-2009 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Catch/hp 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.31 0.196 0.195 
Catch/vessel 13.74 13.79 13.37 11.95 13.04 12.61 10.56 6.44 5.65 
 Sources: Khanh Hoa’s DARD (2009a, 2009b, 2009c); DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2009); 
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Table C3: The distribution of vessels by districts and engine power in Khanh Hoa, 2009 
District 
Range of engine power 
Total Rate  
0-<20 20-<50 50-<90 90-<250 250-<400 400-<4000 
Nha Trang 2046 1205 471 423 128 22 4295 33.5% 
Van Ninh 2053 1145 128 51 1 0 3378 26.4% 
Ninh Hoa 1152 342 47 12 1 1 1555 12.1% 
Cam Lam 568 64 6 0 0 0 638 5.0% 
Cam Ranh 2206 543 114 64 6 2 2935 22.9% 
Dien Khanh 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.0% 
Total 8025 3299 767 550 136 25 12802 100% 
Rate  62.7% 25.8% 6.0% 4.3% 1.1% 0.2% 100%  
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APPENDIX D: Some economic quantities of interest of the Cobb-Douglas function 
The Cobb-Douglas function has some economic quantities of interest in the following 
(reference from Coelli T. et al., 2005): 
The marginal product (MP) of input xi (i = 1, 2,…,k) is the change in output since the input xi 







=                             (D1) 
The second property is concave in xi, this implies the existence of diminishing marginal 
productivity or the marginal product is non-increasing with respect to an increase of input xi. 














i                       (D2) 
The marginal rate of substitution (MRTS) is the ratio of the substitutability between two 
factors of production, given keeping the output level constant. The MRTS  measures the slope 


















         (D3) 
where MRTSij is marginal rate of substitution of input xi and input xj (i, j = 1, 2,…,k).. 
The direct elasticity of substitution (DES) measures the percentage change in the input ratio 














=                  (D4) 
The DES is sometime regarded as a short-run elasticity because it measure substitutability 
between input xi and input xj while holding all other inputs fixed. In Cobb-Douglas 
production function, DES = 1. 
The output elasticity of production or the elasticity of scale (E) depends on the value of the 


















α                                (D5) 
The Cobb-Douglas function can exhibit decreasing returns to scale or constant returns to 
scale or increasing returns to scale. The analysis of scale economies is essentially a long run 
phenomenon since the assumption that all factors are variable.   
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capital or fixed 
capital stock  
Annual 
depreciation  










1 1679.4 146.2 150 685.1 835.1 9.0 61.7 
2 1162.7 103.7 100 503.6 603.6 5.9 45.3 
3 745.7 68.8  280.7 280.7  25.3 
4 1162.3 107.3  791.5 791.5  71.2 
5 559.1 60.5 53 226.9 279.9 7.2 20.4 
6 2450.5 215.0  1421.6 1421.6  127.9 
7 1528.3 158.9 300 503.1 803.1 31.2 45.3 
8 1888.8 186.4  1217.3 1217.3  109.6 
9 1920.3 195.3  790.2 790.2  71.1 
10 1544.4 158.3 150 369.2 519.2 12.5 33.2 
11 2057.0 185.8 250 962.9 1212.9 29.2 86.7 
12 1593.0 168.3  538.3 538.3  48.4 
13 1632.2 162.0  868.1 868.1  78.1 
14 1444.2 121.9 460 238.4 698.4 0.0 21.5 
15 2079.9 190.0 400 1179.7 1579.7 36.0 106.2 
16 1966.3 183.9 400 818.1 1218.1 42.0 73.6 
17 2107.8 194.8 400 1194.0 1594.0 40.0 107.5 
18 1353.1 125.9  706.2 706.2  63.6 
19 1858.8 173.9 400 978.8 1378.8 40.0 88.1 
20 1792.3 168.3  1173.1 1173.1  105.6 
21 2113.5 169.9  1394.9 1394.9  125.5 
22 1828.0 165.8  892.1 892.1  80.3 
23 1753.9 164.3  985.7 985.7  88.7 
24 1527.8 127.8 150 511.3 661.3 36.8 46.0 
25 1155.7 96.7  534.1 534.1  48.1 
26 2032.5 173.4  1417.6 1417.6  127.6 
27 1943.2 167.9  1354.7 1354.7  121.9 
28 2231.0 200.4 300 1405.6 1705.6 20.0 126.5 
29 1904.6 171.7  1335.5 1335.5  120.2 
30 2269.7 193.9  1771.5 1771.5  159.4 
31 2186.7 188.9  1588.2 1588.2  142.9 
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32 1837.4 175.7 300 894.7 1194.7 39.6 80.5 
33 1121.0 107.6 250 507.0 757.0 29.5 45.6 
34 1005.7 101.9  582.3 582.3  52.4 
35 1021.1 86.4 70 295.5 365.5 10.1 26.6 
36 887.2 98.6  261.6 261.6  23.5 
37 1614.4 157.4 100 767.9 867.9 10.0 69.1 
38 1139.4 104.0  562.9 562.9  50.7 
39 1536.2 151.8 50 774.3 824.3 0.0 69.7 
40 897.1 81.0  349.4 349.4  31.4 
41 2513.0 215.4 200 1754.0 1954.0 42.0 157.9 
42 1959.4 187.6  1263.5 1263.5  113.7 
43 1570.9 130.9  1038.3 1038.3  93.4 
44 711.0 75.2  279.3 279.3  25.1 
45 1379.1 110.8  762.1 762.1  68.6 
46 564.1 61.9  171.5 171.5  15.4 
47 760.8 68.8  329.5 329.5  29.7 
48 931.1 82.0 50 371.5 421.5 14.4 33.4 
49 805.9 78.4 60 293.9 353.9 12.2 26.4 
50 1301.9 118.3 100 584.2 684.2 11.0 52.6 
51 1522.3 133.3 500 418.4 918.4 0.0 37.7 
52 1148.2 118.6 110 423.1 533.1 15.8 38.1 
53 938.3 82.8 107 372.4 479.4 5.6 33.5 
54 692.7 69.7 100 202.0 302.0 16.0 18.2 
55 849.6 76.1 100 327.7 427.7 2.8 29.5 
56 635.8 65.8  272.0 272.0  24.5 
57 1788.6 166.4  1177.5 1177.5  106.0 
58 1312.8 105.8  758.2 758.2  68.2 
Average 1481.3 136.4 96.7 766.1 862.8 8.9 68.9 
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APPENDIX F: Regression results of standardized fishing effort model 










Mean Std. Deviation N
 
Correlations
1.000 .962 .937 .634
.962 1.000 .873 .518
.937 .873 1.000 .472
.634 .518 .472 1.000
. .000 .000 .000
.000 . .000 .000
.000 .000 . .000
.000 .000 .000 .
58 58 58 58
58 58 58 58
58 58 58 58





























All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: lnEFFORTb. 
 
Model  Summaryb













Predic tors:  (Constant), lnDAY, lnGEAR, lnHPa. 
Dependent  Variable: lnEFFORTb. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predic tors:  (Constant), lnDAY, lnGEAR, lnHPa. 
Dependent  Variable: lnEFFORTb. 
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Coefficientsa
-.045 .295 -.153 .879 -.637 .547
.251 .015 .528 16.229 .000 .220 .282 .962 .911 .249 .223 4.488
.542 .044 .393 12.451 .000 .455 .629 .937 .861 .191 .237 4.228













t Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound

























Dependent Variable: lnEFFORTa. 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics a
3.987 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00
.012 17.953 .01 .25 .00 .00
.000 94.763 .00 .34 .75 .29










Index (Constant) lnHP lnGEAR lnDAY
Variance Proportions




6.1716 7.3261 6.8924 .35758 58
-.14339 .10308 .00000 .04063 58
-2.016 1.213 .000 1.000 58





Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N



























































F2) Get the heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors (by the econometric and statistical 
package SHAZAM version 10.) 
OLS ESTIMATION 
        58 OBSERVATIONS     DEPENDENT VARIABLE= LNEFFORT 
 ...NOTE..SAMPLE RANGE SET TO:      1,     58 
 
USING HETEROSKEDASTICITY-CONSISTENT COVARIANCE MATRIX 
 
  R-SQUARE =   0.9873     R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =   0.9865 
 VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 =  0.17423E-02 
 STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA =  0.41741E-01 
 SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE=  0.94086E-01 
 MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE =   6.8924 
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                      ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - FROM MEAN 
                     SS         DF           MS                 F 
 REGRESSION       7.2884         3.       2.4295            1394.375 
 ERROR            0.94086E-01   54.       0.17423E-02         P-VALUE 
 TOTAL            7.3825        57.       0.12952              0.000 
 
VARIABLE ESTIMATED    STANDARD  T-RATIO    PARTIAL    STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY 
 NAME    COEFFICIENT   ERROR     54 DF  P-VALUE CORR. COEFFICIENT   AT MEANS 
LNHP      0.25064     0.1246E-01 20.12   0.000  0.939   0.5282      0.1921 
LNGEAR    0.54205     0.4443E-01 12.20   0.000  0.857   0.3933      0.4371 
LNDAY     0.47849     0.4328E-01 11.06   0.000  0.833   0.1744      0.3773 
CONSTANT -0.45047E-01 0.2805    -0.1606  0.873 -0.022   0.0000     -0.0065 
 
 DURBIN-WATSON = 2.0266    VON NEUMANN RATIO = 2.0621    RHO = -0.01500 
 
F3) The RESET Test (by the econometric and statistical package SHAZAM version 10.) 
REQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR=      10 CURRENT PAR=   11000 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNEFFORT             58 OBSERVATIONS 
 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
   0.250644472130   0.542048838258  0.478490707480   -0.450471586587E-01 
 
 
 RAMSEY RESET SPECIFICATION TESTS USING POWERS OF YHAT 
   RESET(2)=  1.6515     - F WITH DF1=   1 AND DF2=  53 P-VALUE= 0.204 
   RESET(3)=  0.82417    - F WITH DF1=   2 AND DF2=  52 P-VALUE= 0.444 
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APPENDIX G: The relative standardized effort of the 58 gillnet vessels 
Vessel number HP GEAR DAY Standardized effort 
Relative standardized 
effort/ RFP index 
35 50 200 140 478.53 0.46 
44 50 160 200 502.83 0.48 
5 70 160 175 513.31 0.49 
56 60 160 216 546.10 0.52 
46 70 150 231 566.01 0.54 
54 90 155 200 572.83 0.55 
49 80 155 220 582.06 0.56 
55 60 196 200 587.58 0.56 
47 50 200 216 588.74 0.56 
40 55 200 220 608.31 0.58 
36 90 160 220 609.93 0.58 
3 80 180 264 688.68 0.66 
48 80 200 250 710.40 0.68 
2 70 250 220 729.35 0.70 
25 90 240 220 759.84 0.73 
45 100 250 200 762.14 0.73 
53 120 200 252 789.51 0.76 
38 90 240 242 795.26 0.76 
34 165 220 200 806.36 0.77 
58 105 230 242 807.78 0.77 
50 140 240 208 826.50 0.79 
52 180 220 220 862.58 0.83 
18 165 250 220 904.50 0.87 
33 260 222 200 908.30 0.87 
4 220 270 175 908.61 0.87 
51 140 300 220 958.10 0.92 
24 240 250 220 993.69 0.95 
14 200 280 225 1020.28 0.98 
43 320 251 210 1046.87 1.00 
37 250 300 220 1108.20 1.06 
1 340 300 200 1143.80 1.10 
12 350 320 200 1193.17 1.14 
39 340 280 253 1232.85 1.18 
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22 240 340 250 1247.86 1.20 
23 340 300 242 1252.91 1.20 
20 380 310 220 1253.08 1.20 
21 320 320 240 1272.86 1.22 
42 345 340 230 1313.46 1.26 
13 350 300 264 1315.66 1.26 
29 420 300 242 1321.16 1.27 
8 340 340 240 1335.55 1.28 
11 340 340 242 1340.86 1.29 
7 320 300 288 1341.03 1.29 
26 320 350 242 1341.52 1.29 
10 350 300 276 1343.92 1.29 
57 340 315 275 1367.55 1.31 
9 400 350 230 1384.73 1.33 
32 410 320 253 1389.15 1.33 
27 390 330 253 1394.89 1.34 
16 350 324 275 1398.73 1.34 
41 450 340 242 1438.59 1.38 
6 410 350 250 1449.99 1.39 
28 470 340 242 1454.38 1.39 
19 420 320 275 1454.40 1.39 
17 450 340 250 1461.13 1.40 
15 450 326 275 1494.78 1.43 
31 470 325 275 1508.67 1.45 
30 630 320 242 1514.77 1.45 
Notes: “HP” is horsepower; “GEAR” is the number of pieces of gill net; “DAY” is the 
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APPENDIX H: Results of testing hypothesis 2 









All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: ar_eb. 
 
Model  Summaryb













Predic tors:  (Constant), ea. 
Dependent  Variable: ar_eb. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predic tors:  (Constant), ea. 
Dependent  Variable: ar_eb. 
 
Coefficientsa
1043.416 18.134 57.538 .00000












Dependent  Variable: ar_ea. 
 
Residuals Statistics a
1043.8945 1044.9237 1044.4555 .33619 58
-138.637 109.00928 .00000 41.80188 58
-1.669 1.393 .000 1.000 58





Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Dependent Variable: ar_ea. 
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H2) Get the heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors (by the econometric and statistical 
package SHAZAM version 10.) for the simple linear regression model. 
OLS ESTIMATION 
        58 OBSERVATIONS     DEPENDENT VARIABLE= AR_E 
 ...NOTE..SAMPLE RANGE SET TO:      1,     58 
 
USING HETEROSKEDASTICITY-CONSISTENT COVARIANCE MATRIX 
 
  R-SQUARE =   0.0001     R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =  -0.0178 
 VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 =   1778.6 
 STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA =   42.173 
 SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE=   99602. 
 MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE =   1044.5 
 LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -298.305 
 
                       ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - FROM MEAN 
                     SS           DF            MS                   F 
 REGRESSION        6.4424          1.        6.4424                0.004 
 ERROR             99602.         56.        1778.6              P-VALUE 
 TOTAL             99608.         57.        1747.5                0.952 
 
                       
VARIABLE ESTIMATED   STANDARD T-RATIO       PARTIAL    STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY  
  NAME   COEFFICIENT ERROR    56 DF      P-VALUE CORR.  COEFFICIENT AT MEANS 
 E         1.0396     17.20   0.6043E-01  0.952  0.008   0.0080     0.0010 
 CONSTANT  1043.4     20.43   51.06       0.000  0.989   0.0000     0.9990 
 
 DURBIN-WATSON = 2.0023    VON NEUMANN RATIO = 2.0374    RHO = -0.00198 
 
 
Notes: AR_E is dependent variable “ar_e”; E is independent variable “e” 
 
 
H3) The RESET Test (by the econometric and statistical package SHAZAM version 10.) for 
the simple linear regression model. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = AR_E              58 OBSERVATIONS 
 REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
    1.03962982161       1043.41624591 
 
RAMSEY RESET SPECIFICATION TESTS USING POWERS OF YHAT 
  RESET (2) = 2.0498 - F WITH DF1=   1 AND DF2= 55 P-VALUE= 0.158 
 
 
 
